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Abstract 
This dissertation contributes to the local development discourse by presenting a third sector perspective from 
the Sub Saharan Africa. The study examines the third sector in Kenya using a seven point criteria 
constructed from various schools of thought. The criteria is made of aspects such as organization, autonomy, 
profit distribution, governance, degree of voluntarism, contribution to social inclusion and extent of 
entrepreneurial dynamism. It studies selected third sector organizations that include cooperatives, faith based 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, micro-finance institutions and self-help groups. The study 
uses these organizations to understand the contribution of the sector in solving social problems.  
The study uses different sets of designs, methodologies and data for each of the sections on the third sector 
actors. In some cases, data are drawn from Kenya Bureau of Statistics, government ministries, UN bodies, 
the Central Bank of Kenya, and both Kenyan and international public data domains. The section on self-help 
groups that has been used for empirical analysis uses two sets of data: one from the administrative offices of 
Riruta Location made of 523 observations and another collected by the researcher from a sample of 122 self-
help groups. The former tests success self-rating determinants while the latter tests economic empowerment 
effects. The study also applies case studies in order to corroborate empirical and statistical findings.   
A number of findings emanate from the study. First, the traditional cultural way of life and the cooperative 
activities amongst different ethnic communities provided important initial conditions for the build-up of the 
third sector in Kenya. Second, the colonial administration played a role in the formation of the modern third 
sector through their policy on community development and other policies that encouraged cooperation 
between government and third sector actors in service delivery. Third, in post-independence Kenya, the 
Harambee concept gave the sector an indigenous image anchored in community dimension, mutual and self-
help emphasis. Fourth, the growth of some aspects of this sector suffered as a result of excessive government 
control between independence to the 2000s. Fifth,  World Bank induced changes that swept across Africa in 
the 1980’s to 2000’s had both positive and negative influence on the sector. Last but not least, the coming to 
power of a new government in 2002 brought about an increase in the number of civil society actors. 
The third sector in Kenya helps to fill welfare gaps as a result of minimal, absent or shrinking public service 
spending. Although the term “third sector” is not commonly used in Kenya, its multiple actors contribute in 
the promotion of social inclusion of marginalized persons and regions. It helps to empower individuals 
economically, enhancing civic participation, infrastructure building and social welfare provision. Before 
1980s the government controlled the sector closely, in the 1990s however it became more autonomous. The 
sector is also characterized by an explicit pursuance of a social mission, limited profit distribution and a 
resource mix approach. Though the policies of most of the sectors actors are quite enabling, the policies 
governing some of the actors are not conducive.  
This study is unique in two distinct ways. First, unlike earlier studies which were particularly actor-specific, 
the study offers a systematic approach to the discourse on the third sector in Kenya with respect to local 
development. Previous studies looked at the civil societies, non-profit organizations and other individual 
third sector actors separately. The holistic and systematic approach of this study demonstrates the collective 
contribution of the third sector in enhancing social welfare and development of the local communities. 
Secondly, it has explored the challenges faced by the sector which must be redressed in order to sustain its 
vibrancy.  
The study did suffer from lack of quality data. However, triangulation was used to ensure that much is learnt 
from the available data and to overcome any ensuing analytical limitations.  
 
Key Words: Local development, third sector, social enterprise, social economy, solidarity economy and 
social innovation 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is strong evidence that living standards in Kenya have deteriorated over the past two decades. 
In 1994, Welfare Monitoring Survey estimated the poverty index or the extent of deprivation in 
terms of longevity, knowledge and decent living standards at 47 percent while in 2004 it was at 56 
percent (Mualuko 2007; UNDP 1990).  
In recent times, comparable figures of the Welfare Monitoring Surveys are not readily available. 
However, the World Bank study on Kenya in 2009 found that living standards had deteriorated and 
poverty levels had risen due to quadruple shocks. These shocks included rapid population growth, 
the impact of 2007 post-election violence, spike in food and energy prices and the global economic 
crisis of the late 2000s.  Deterioration in living standards transcended lack of material well-being 
and physical deprivation to include exposure to vulnerability and exploitation, lack of infrastructure, 
marginalization from civic participation and dearth of employment opportunities (Kristjanson, et al. 
2010; Narayan, et al. 1999).    
In 2006, the proportion of the Kenyan population suffering from food poverty i.e. those whose total 
income was insufficient to meet their food needs was estimated at 20 percent (Republic of Kenya, 
2006a). Moreover, statistics reveal that more than 50 percent of the Kenyan districts had  above 50 
percent poverty levels, with the worst performing rural districts recording as high as 90 to 97 
percent (Republic of Kenya, 2011b). It is therefore evident that a sizeable proportion of  Kenyan 
population lives in extreme poverty and is experiencing social exclusion. 
Since independence, efforts to eradicate poverty in Kenya have been articulated through various 
government policies (Mualuko, 2007). In the 1960s and 1970s, the policies focused on community 
development through self-help that was branded as Harambees (Republic of Kenya, 1965). Through 
these policies, communities were encouraged to develop projects through local resources while the 
government provided recurrent operational costs (Mbithi and Rasmusson, 1977). In 1980s, the 
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District Focus for Rural Development Policy commonly known as ‘District Focus Approach’ 
(DFA) was promulgated. Though it failed after sometime, the DFA made a first attempt to 
decentralize resources through a provincial system to address community challenges (Mulinge 
2012). In 1980s and 1990s, the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were 
introduced in Kenya amidst a myriad challenges to help the economy become more market oriented 
through macro-economic stabilization, privatization and deregulation (Karingi and Mahinda, 2001). 
From 2003 to 2007, the government initiated the Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) that allowed 
several resources to be devolved to the local authorities, constituencies and districts as part of its  
policy to address poverty (Republic of Kenya, 2003).  
The aforementioned plans suffered a number of challenges and could thus not deal a dent on 
poverty and ultimately help empower people (Obudho, Akatch and Aduwo 1988; World Bank, 
2002; 2009). Notable impediments included weak involvement of grassroots structures, poor 
institutional framework, weaknesses in planning, implementation processes and political 
manipulation. The previously protected institutions of the poor were put in direct competition with 
market forces. This had the effect of alienating poor people from basic services thus promoting 
inequality. Other challenges associated with social service provision included corruption and 
inadequate technical and administrative capabilities (World Bank, 2002; Rono, 2002; Chitere and 
Ireri, 2004; Gikonyo, 2009; Kenya National Anti-Corruption Committee, 2008; and Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 2010). The central government also did not transfer fully decision making 
powers to local levels which hampered local participation (Mulinge, 2012).  
There was a felt inability to correctly identify local communities’ priorities in the above plans. This 
stemmed from poor involvement of all stakeholders at both planning and implementation levels. 
The end result was the marginalization of vulnerable people, communities and investment in 
projects of little significance to the communities (Owinga, 2003). According to Hillman (1991)  and 
Ruto, Ongwenyi and Mugo (2009) some of the communities that faced marginalization included 
15 
 
minorities, rural communities, slum communities, pastoralists, Arid and Semi-Arid Lands  
communities, communities supporting opposition political parties among others. These 
communities were severely constrained by lack of quality schools, quality health facilities, poor 
sanitation, security,  lack of clean water and abuse of human rights (Makoloo, 2005). They also 
suffered from gender disparities where women had little access to opportunities (Suda, 2002).   
The challenges brought about by the marginalizing development process in Kenya contributed to 
the rise in community-initiatives aimed at addressing socio-economic disparities. Apart from 
contributing to local development, these initiatives have led to the growth of the Kenyan third sector 
with unique dimensions of self-help, mutual help, voluntarism, cooperation and community action  
(Kanyinga and Mitullah, 2007).  The community-initiatives sought to address social and other types 
of exclusions, promote equitable wealth distribution and assist in employment creation. They also 
did provide practical solutions in the mitigation of disasters, promotion of peace, and in finding 
solutions to a myriad challenges (Chelogoy, Anyango and Odembo, 2004; UNDP, 1990).   
The said initiatives are carried out by community/third sector actors made up of formal and 
informal institutions such as faith based organizations, civil societies, kinship groupings and 
community based organizations (Chelogoy, Anyango and Odembo, 2004). While the third 
sector/community-actors may seem to have a little impact at the national level, they have made 
tremendous strides in the improvement of welfare within their local communities. They therefore 
complement the public sector by offering services, developing infrastructure and improving levels 
of policy and civic engagement in Kenya (Kanyinga and Mitullah, 2007). 
The Research Problem 
Research indicates that the third sector provides solutions to local development challenges 
manifested in the form of exclusionary dynamics of contemporary economy and politics. It 
constitutes important innovations which transform the way societies deal with social problems 
16 
 
(Vicari, 2008). It not only takes into cognizance people’s needs but also builds on their capabilities. 
The sector embraces a diversity of voluntary actors and institutional forms that are autonomous 
from the state (Hache, 2011). Some of the third sector organizations include voluntary and 
community organizations, charities, social enterprises, and cooperatives  (McGuire, 2010).  
In Europe and USA, there is a documented evidence that the third sector plays a role in reducing 
social exclusion (Borzaga and Gui, 2001: Spear, et al., 2001). There is however dearth of 
information on the impact of the sector in African countries as research in this area is limited 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1997).  In Kenya, for example, the concept of a locally embedded third 
sector has only been used in limited ways. Wanyama (2002) used the concept but focused narrowly 
on the role played by community-based groups in transforming the governance structure. Available 
studies have tended to focus on civil society; non-profits, non-governmental organizations and on 
the informal sector (Chelogoy, Anyango and Odembo, 2004; Kanyinga and Mitullah, 2007).   
The above studies are limited since they do not take into account the social enterprise dimension 
and other aspects embraced by the sector in its efforts to contribute to socio-economic welfare of 
communities. The social enterprise dimension is considered to be an innovative feature of the third 
sector as it enables it to pursue multiple resources which are then used to address social needs 
(Borzaga & Tortia, 2007). It therefore becomes of necessity to study the organizational form 
adopted by these institutions with respect to Kenyan legal structures, the political economy of 
welfare provision, culture, traditions and history. Further, in order to understand their practical 
contribution, it will be important to examine their engagement in the delivery of social services, 
promotion of integration for disadvantaged groups and ultimately their contribution to local 
development.  
Contextually, research on social enterprising aspects of the third sector in Kenya is minimal. Closest 
efforts in this area were isolated studies of institutional actors such as micro finance, cooperatives, 
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faith based organizations and non-governmental organizations. For example Ndemo (2006) found 
that some religious communities supported what he referred to as ‘faith based enterprises’ which 
used market resources and strategies to finance their work. In another research, Kanyinga and 
Mittulah (2007) ascertained that the bulk of resources generated by most community service 
organizations were internally generated through members’ contributions or enterprise activities.  
Prevailing studies have hence been carried out on specific actors of the third sector. They have 
however not attempted to demonstrate the universal third sector contribution on a collective, 
systematic and holistic way. The purpose of this study is to provide contributions towards 
addressing the identified gap.  
Objectives of the Study 
The study examines the third sector in Kenya with respect to local development by focusing on faith 
based organizations, cooperatives, non-governmental organizations, micro-finance institutions and 
self-help groups. It uses third sector and social enterprise discourses to examine social-welfare 
organizations. The strength of using the third sector approach stems from its ability to provide an 
umbrella to all organizations of the civil society and those stemming from the community (Borzaga, 
Nogales and Galera, 2008). The third sector encapsulates all organizations with an explicit social 
mission and accords them a particular positioning with respect to state, market and communities 
(Defourny and Pestoff, 2008). On its part, the social enterprise discourse, examines how third sector 
organizations use market and other resources to address social challenges in their communities.   
The study’s analysis has been developed alongside the following themes; 
 The evolution, size, characteristics, role and influence of the sector 
 The social entrepreneurial trend amongst the third sector organizations  
 The contribution of  the third sector in delivering social services  
 The impact of the sector on local development  
18 
 
The study examines the relief provided by third sector actors in bridging the gap left by government 
and market forces in Kenya. Of interest is the degree of sector-innovation in enhancing social 
inclusion, addressing disempowering dimensions of poverty, helping poor people access welfare 
through mutual assistance and paving way for eventual grassroots driven economic development. It 
further demonstrates how third sector actors contribute to the development process by addressing a 
myriad of social problems faced in Kenya. Some of these problems include distributive problems, 
conflicts, unemployment, lack of access to health facilities, gender inequalities, hunger and 
illiteracy amongst others. In providing solutions to these and other challenges, the third sector helps 
move a sizeable proportion of the poor into the inclusion bracket, assisting them to cross the 
poverty line  (Bourguignon, 2004).   
The Structure of the Dissertation 
The study has five main chapters.  Chapter one presents conceptual framework, relevant empirical 
and theoretical literature on the third sector and its dimensions. The chapter looks at the 
background, theories and concepts mainly emanating from developed countries. It then examines 
the contribution of the third sector in developing countries and explores its innovative 
characteristics and dimensions with respect to local development.  
Chapter two examines evolution of the third sector in Kenya. It starts with a historical background 
dating back to the pre-colonial era. It presents a descriptive overview of selected actors; faith based 
organizations, cooperatives, non-governmental organizations and micro finance organizations. This 
chapter in particular discusses the role and influence of government policies, Harambee movement 
and elements of local culture in the growth of third sector in Kenya.   
Chapter three samples out community based organizations also known as self-help groups and 
accords them a deeper analysis. An in-depth study of the self-help groups is done to deepen insights 
of the work of grassroots associations in social welfare activism. The chapter uses two sets of data; 
19 
 
administrative data collected from local government offices and data collected by the researcher. 
From the two sets of data, three econometric models are estimated to test for success self-rating, 
resource mobilization and economic empowerment effects. 
As an extension of chapter three, the fourth chapter examines ten self-help organizations in order to 
corroborate the former. The chapter provides background information of the selected organizations, 
success and challenges, their role in the delivery of social services and tests each of them against the 
seven points criteria; organization, autonomy, profit distribution, governance, degree of 
voluntarism, contribution to social inclusion and extent of entrepreneurial dynamism. 
Chapter five discusses the findings of the study and how it relates to the wider literature reviewed. 
The discussion is made in accordance with the four objectives and will be enriched by the results of 
data and theoretical analyses in the preceding chapters.  This chapter also highlights specific 
conclusions and recommendations for policy makers and areas of future study. 
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CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE THIRD SECTOR 
1.1: Chapter Introduction 
This chapter examines local development in the light of the third sector discourse. Its highlights 
include concepts such as social economy, solidarity economy and social enterprise. The chapter 
ends by looking at the evolution of third sector in developing countries and provides an import for  
theoretical and empirical framework. 
1.2 Local Development 
Several studies demonstrate that local development is about expanding the capacities of 
development agents in all dimensions (social, political, cultural and economic) of their communities 
(Chambers, 1999; Mulwa, 2010; Manyasa, Etyang, & Wawire, 2014) .  By doing so it helps in 
strengthening social structures to act in favor of local issues incorporating aspects such as culture, 
ethical and ideological values (Bennett & Krebs, 1991). Effective local development also offers the 
possibility of creating solid and lasting foundations for sustainable and graduated anti-poverty 
interventions (GRIPS, 2003; Isakson, 2007; Amis, 1999). Competencies developed at a regional 
level become not only the source of competitive advantage but also acts to open way for economic 
progress. 
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Figure 1.1: Third Sector and local development 
According to Swinburn (2006) the purpose of local development is to ensure that human conditions, 
economic capacity and future prospects of an area are improved. The UNDP (1999) human 
development report provides dimensions for consideration when working to improve human 
conditions. They include life quality, education and sustainable livelihoods. Communities are 
therefore expected to work towards improving their investment climate, increasing productivity of 
their localities and ultimately promote innovative approaches to poverty eradication.  For this 
improvement to be achieved, a collaboration between the  market, state and private sector is needed 
(Bennett & Krebs, 1991).  
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An effective local development strategy utilizes  strategic resources both market based and non-
market to strengthen local initiatives. The market based resources mainly emanate from the private 
sector while non-market resources emanate from the public and the third sector (Coffey & Polese, 
1995). Apart from utilizing the above strategic resources, an effective local development strategy 
brings together locals and experts in a collaborative endeavor to  address existing challenges. By so 
doing, it addresses  barriers of involvement by encouraging participation of communities according 
to their own ways of organizing (Chambers, 1999). 
The primary focus becomes to address the needs and aspirations of local communities through 
strengthening local social groups, organizations, institutions and impacting the environment 
positively (Panico, Fleitas, & Barquero, 2002). This strategy emphasizes local initiatives and local 
participation deviating from the current practice where the “expert led” development mainly 
associated with the neo-classical economics elevates economic growth at the expense of the needs 
of people (Mulwa, 2010). It is therefore important that local development should transcend the neo-
classical economic growth perspective to account for other dimensions such as local conditions, 
human capital, social capital and civic abilities (Swinburn, 2006; Manyasa, Etyang, & Wawire, 
2014).  
There are  unique sets of  conditions that act to  enhance or constrain the potential for local 
economic development. These conditions include human capital, social capital, employment 
opportunities, investment opportunities and local innovativeness  (Sarker, 2004; Abel & Deitz, 
2011; Andriopoulou & Tsakloglou, 2011).  Some communities with better conditions and are 
presumed to be in a better off position while some have a bare minimum of these conditions and 
hence suffer from poor local development. Weaker communities should work to improve the 
qualities of these conditions in order to achieve better development prospects. They need to make  
investments in order to improve the quality of life, create new economic opportunities and fight 
poverty.   
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We choose to focus on the third sector as an agent of local development in this dissertation. The 
third sector promotes development by investing in the local communities and hence helps to 
improve the local conditions thereby promoting endogenous capacities for development (Borzaga, 
Nogales, & Galera, 2008). This makes the sector a unique actor of local development as it spurs 
innovations to address the challenges of local development through pursuing a typology of 
entrepreneurship that focuses on addressing local problems (Defourny & Pestoff, 2008). Its 
contributions entail enhancing organic participatory development, facilitating access and use of 
locally available resources,  enhancing bottom up approaches to development and considering local 
conditions in the pursuance of local development (Birkholzer, 2009).  
1.3: Historical Background of the Third Sector 
The third sector discourse has been constructed differently in Europe, the United States of America 
(USA) and other parts of the world (Defourny and Pestoff, 2008). The European third sector is an 
extension of the welfare state. That of the United States has little to do with the state but stems 
mainly from individual efforts (Pestoff, 2005b). In other regions of the world the sector has 
idiosyncrasies that are location specific. These idiosyncrasies may include affluence of a country, 
the prevailing political system, presence or absence of welfare, local culture and traditions and 
enabling ambient in terms of legislation and support in terms of resources (Evers & Laville, 2004).  
The prominence of the third sector is attributed to inadequacies of modern welfare state among 
other reasons. The welfare state had made social investments to respond to basic needs of its 
citizens and accelerate creation of full employment. It failed partly because of the erosion of social 
capital and individual responsibility (Cameron, 2011). The welfare state was accused of coddling 
the poor, making them unproductive, dependent and thus delaying social progress. Consequently, 
instead of creating employment, it gave incentives to opt for voluntary unemployment (Crouse & 
Waters, 2010). Heavy taxes were also required to sustain welfare, jeopardizing competitiveness and 
productivity of states. The nature of contemporary globalization, characterised by the quest for 
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economic growth and search for competitiveness, dictated that an efficient alternative to welfare 
provision had to be found. Heavy taxation contributed to capital flight as investors looked for 
countries that had favourable tax regimes (Camdesus, 1998).  
The third sector compensated for the weaknesses of the welfare state through offering alternative 
sources of public services. This explains why different scholars are in agreement on the fact that the 
sector rose to modernize (Kendall and Knapp, 2000), democratize (Pestoff, 2005b) and to cover for 
the inadequacies of the welfare state (Defourny and Pestoff, 2008). Its rise contributed to the growth 
of voluntary activities making citizens actively involved in the production of social services 
(Osborne, 2008). This participation in the co-production of services enhanced civic participation 
enabling citizens assume greater responsibility for solving their own problems instead of solely 
relying on the state.  
With the proliferation of the third sector, the welfare state could not continue its business as usual. 
The sector contributed to the reorganization of the welfare state through encouraging efficiency and 
effectiveness in the provision of public services (Hopkins, 2010).  States also did support it by 
developing enabling legal ambients in accordance with their different traditions (Defourny and 
Pestoff, 2008). These traditions were broadly classified as ‘philanthropy’ in United Kingdom (UK) 
and Ireland; ‘civic commitment’ in the Scandinavian countries; ‘subsidiarity’ in Belgium, 
Netherlands and Germany and ‘cooperation’ in Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Belgium and France.  
There were also other traditions where the family played a prominent role in the provision of 
welfare and they included Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. From the different traditions, three 
main types of organizations emerged; cooperatives, mutuals and associations (Evers & Laville, 
2004). 
The third sector continued expanding and becoming dynamic after the Second World War (Kendall, 
2009). As the sector expanded, so did innovative institutions and associations emerge within it 
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focused on promoting social inclusion and were viewed as important actors in the socio-political 
evolution of states. They were in the form of charitable organizations, civic organizations, social 
enterprises and cooperative endeavours that were based on moralistic, altruistic and voluntary 
commitments (Defourny and Pestoff, 2008). These associations were also influenced by 
philosophies such as egalitarianism and solidarity that emphasized an inter-generational debt of 
responsibilities.  The rise of such associations with an over-riding social dimension provided the 
impetus for the growth of the third sector  (Evers and Laville, 2004).  
According to a study by Defourny and Pestoff (2008), third sector actors are specifically structured 
to address needs according to their inherent designs and in response to the prevailing ambient 
surrounding them. For example, mutual aid societies got entrenched into the welfare government. 
They were launched in the early 19th century to handle problems of disability, sickness and old age 
on the basis of solidarity. They later became part of a broader architecture of social security.  When 
compulsory insurance schemes were introduced by states, the mutual societies became the 
alternative insurance sources (Kendall, 2009).  
Cooperatives on the other hand, found themselves in competitive environment prompting them to 
specialise in activities connected to the work of their members (Hopkins, 2010). Social enterprises 
rose to address social problems by pursuing a resource-mix approach making them idiosyncratic 
from other actors of the third sector (Defourny and Nyssens, 2012; Defourny and Pestoff, 2008). At 
around the same time, various associations arose looking at different aspects of human needs such 
as health, gender and democracy. They championed for the rights of the vulnerable and liberation of 
those trapped in the informal economy (Borzaga, Nogales, & Galera, 2008; Lyons, 2001). In several 
countries such as Germany, Austria and Belgium, these associations became private pioneers of 
social services and were later supported and regulated by the state (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001).  
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1.1.1: The European Model of the Third Sector 
In a study that sought to conceptualize the third sector at a European level in 2008, images of the 
third sector from 13 countries of Europe were presented by various scholars under the EMES 
framework. These countries were Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. From the study it became evident 
that the third sector is an integral driver of economic and social progress (Defourny and Pestoff, 
2008). Its organizations promoted social inclusion, economic empowerment and environmental 
justice. They were also innovative in delivering services to vulnerable people. According to the 
study, the sector was characterized by both distinct legal formations and ethos that put social and 
environmental interests above economic imperatives. The sector has historically addressed double 
‘market’ failures, where both state and private sector fail to produce or deliver much needed and 
valued goods and services, or do so in a way that is unjust or unfair (Evers and Laville, 2004). 
The third sector comprises of a range of institutions falling in the space between the state, 
community and the private sector (Nyssens, Adam and Johnson, 2006). Its organizations are value 
drivers whose objective is to maximize the solutions to social problems. It creates value by 
embedding itself in a tripolar iteration in between the market, state and community (Nyssens, 
Adam, & Johnson, 2006).  This is exemplified in the manner in which the sector mixes both social 
and entrepreneurial dimension in response to community challenges. The value created becomes 
unique from that of conventional economics focused solely on rational calculations, selfishness and 
profit motivations (Becchetti, Conzo, & Pisani, 2009).  
Different countries have contributed in different ways towards its growth. Those in Europe place a 
limit on surplus distribution while in the USA they place a constraint on distribution of surpluses 
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(Evers and Laville, 2004). The residual of third sector organizations is principally invested in the 
organization to further social environmental and cultural objectives (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001).   
The third sector gets regulatory and financial support from the state while it also participates in the 
delivery of public services. The sector also competes with the private sector for market resources.  
Kuhnle and Selle (1992), model the relationship between the third sector and the state based on 
resources from the state. They categorized third sector organizations as near or distant depending on 
whether they are dependent or independent on resources from the state.  Pestoff (2005b) instead, 
evaluated the third sector organizations from a welfare mix perspective, conceptualizing that the 
sector tapped its resources from the state, the market and the community.  
The term third sector helps in providing an all-encompassing umbrella to voluntary organizations 
helping them overcome the differences amongst different national models (Borzaga, Nogales and 
Galera, 2008). According to the United Kingdom National Council for Voluntary Organisations 
(2009), the third sector refers to non-governmental organizations which are value-driven and 
principally reinvest their surpluses to further social environmental or cultural objectives. The 
council further defines the third sector to include the following organizations;  
a) Charitable foundations, trusts and general charities whose primary purpose is to award 
grants to other voluntary organizations, institutions or individuals to undertake works that 
will contribute to solving social problems.   
b) Civil society: Organizations of the civil society bring people together to pursue their 
collective interests while helping then to make a positive difference to their lives and/or the 
lives of others. 
c) Community organizations: Organizations that work within a confined local or regional 
focus. Community organizations may have a legal status or a constitution but there are 
numerous groups which have neither. 
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d) Cooperatives: These are autonomous associations of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social-cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise. 
e) General charities: Private, non-profit making bodies serving persons.  
f) Non-governmental organizations: Organizations working in the fields of global 
development, social and economic justice and the environment. 
g) Not for profit sector: Include non-profit organizations comprising those that are for private 
benefit, and those that are non-commercial (for instance housing associations). The category 
includes other organizations close to government such as universities and hospitals. 
h) Registered charities: Charities registered with the Charity Commission. A charity must 
register if it has a permanent endowment, a total income of more than Sterling Pounds 5,000 
a year or a ratable occupation of any land, including buildings. 
i) Social enterprises: Associations trading for a social purpose. They include cooperatives, 
community businesses, trading arms of charities and a variety of other businesses that use 
their trading activity to meet social goals. 
1.1.2: Non-Profit Organizations and the Social Economy 
Three approaches in the study of the third sector have developed over time depending on different 
specific traditions and national contexts (Defourny and Pestof, 2008; Borzaga and Defourny, 2001). 
These approaches are the non-profit approach, the social and solidarity economy approach and the 
social enterprise approach. The third sector, is the umbrella term embedding all these approaches.  
According to Laville, Fraisse and Lhuillier, (2008) social and solidarity economy concepts originate 
from the French tradition (European Economic and Social Committee, 2006). On one hand the 
social economy combines legal approaches to ethical and organizational principles but does not 
place a ban on distribution of profits. Solidarity economy on the other hand, is a type of a 
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development model that promotes citizen participation in the production of goods and services 
(Allard, Davidson, & Matthaei, 2008).  
 
Figure 1.2: Approaches to the third sector discourse. 
The social economy helps suplement or complement the existing social order. It focusses on 
addressing pockets of problems without changing the status quo (Ethan,2010). Through its work, it 
aims to address social exclusion using alternatives to conventional market and state-centered 
institutions. The social economy is also seen as a model around which social and economic life of 
communities are organized so as to help build inclusive economies (Noya & Clarence, 2007). The 
social economy hence plays an important role in solving problems of socio-economic inclusion and 
poverty. It fosters citizenship and social capital bringing about the enhancement of democratic 
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participation . The social economy therefore has an important role of not only improving the lives 
of vulnerable people but of entire communities. 
Viewed in the light of local development, the social economy is a necessary movement towards 
countering a globalization based on selfish agenda. Accordingly, this type of globalization 
concentrates wealth in a few individuals (Birkholzer, 2009) leading to the escalation of poverty, 
marginalization and deprivation in certain localities or communities. Social economy comes in to 
give globalization a humane dimension. There are a myriad social economy organizations. The 
European Parliamentary Committee on Social Affairs (2009) defines these organizations as private 
businesses, independent of the public authorities, which meet needs and demands of their members 
and those of general interest. These businesses have a capacity for providing innovative responses 
to social needs that emerge over time. In essence addressing people’s needs should be the end of 
these organizations.   
The social economy brings together cooperatives, mutual societies, associations and foundations. 
The main aim of these organizations is to benefit their members or a larger collective, rather than 
generating profit for investors (Borzaga, Nogales and Galera, 2008). The social economy 
organizations embrace democratic decision making processes and may either choose to limit 
distribution of profits or they may incorporate a non-distribution constraint in their operations 
(Laville, Fraisse and Lhuillier, 2008). 
The solidarity economy is also characterised by pursuance of the  resource mix approach. By its 
work it incorporates redistribution and encourages voluntary commitment; promotes a political 
dimension that looks at the interaction between the economy and democracy (Everling, 2003). 
According to Ethan (2010) solidarity economy promotes collaboration and commitment aimed at 
achieving transformative values. It integrates concepts such as reciprocity and redistribution. It also 
adds a socio-political dimension to the socio-economic dimension thus expanding it (Laville, 
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Levesque and Mendell, 2006).  The socio-political dimension is the aspect that accords importance 
to the voice of the civil society, while the socio-economic dimension concentrates on the reciprocal 
dynamics. The solidarity economy is hence viewed from a pluralistic dimension where there are 
myriad principles and a variety of resources on one hand and intermediacy location dimension 
placing it in between the public and the market on the other.    
The non-profit sector originated in the United States late 19th Century. The sector’s organizations 
mainly arose to supplement public action and help in the creation of public goods (Defourny and 
Borzaga, 2001). They organizations emerged due to reduced public service spending and to provide 
essential safety nets in deprived neighbourhoods (Milbourne, 2009). The goals of these 
organizations over time became  to maximize both social and economic values. Accordingly 
therefore, non-profits fall between the two extremes of social and commercial enterprises. They 
work to attract grants or through mobilizing resources from different sources including capital 
investments and other structured capital financing. They however are not allowed to distribute any 
residuals to shareholders  (Emerson, 2000).  
During 1960’s and 1970’s the non-profit sector was assisted to expand through state support. Over 
time this close connection with the state was withdrawn, encouraging the sector to become 
independent (Borzaga & Defourny, 2001). The state in order to continue supporting the sector 
awarded it tax exemption and this has become the main way in which the non-profit sector is legally 
defined (Dees, Emerson, & Economy, 2001). Organizations entitled to tax exemption are not 
expected to use their earnings to the benefit of their promoters. Organizations falling into this 
category implement a range of public benefit activities including schools, colleges, universities, 
hospitals, museums, libraries, day care centres and social services.  
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1.1.3: Social Enterprises and the Third Sector 
Social enterprises have been defined as new organizations, which constitute a transformation of the 
third sector. They are an entrepreneurial dynamic within the sector and their organizations are seen 
as multiple-goal, multi-stakeholder and multiple-resource enterprises (Defourny and Nyssens, 
2006). These organizations have complex mixture of goals comprising of social, economic and 
socio-political goals. They pursue specific social missions to benefit their local communities. The 
main impacts of their activities are social inclusion and enhanced civic participation thus enlarging 
the democratic space and production of social capital (Swyngedouw, 2005). They achieve their 
objectives through enlisting different stakeholders including volunteers, promoters, staff, and 
beneficiaries amongst others (Evers, 2001). 
 
Figure 1.3: Approaches to the social enterprise debate from different schools of thought 
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Social enterprises help in building bridges between diverse dimensions of the third sector. They are 
organizations which are active market actors and do rely on market and other resources such as 
grants, subsidies and other forms of monetary and non-monetary contributions. Conversely, they 
also address member’s needs and other broader community interests (Defourny and Nyssens, 2006). 
The most important factor used to identify a social enterprise is its explicit social mission in 
response to needs that are either inadequately met or not met at all by both public and market 
sectors. Achieving a social impact is the basic motivation on which a social enterprise is founded 
(Galera and Borzaga, 2009).   
The financial viability of a social enterprise depends on the efforts of its members to secure 
adequate resources to support the enterprise’s social mission. These resources can have a hybrid 
character and come from trading activities, public subsidies and from voluntary resources obtained 
as a result of the mobilization of social capital. Social enterprises hence can be said to be located in 
an intermediate space, at the crossroads of market, state and civil society (Evers and Laville, 2004). 
In this arena they pursue collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. 
1.2: A Historical Survey of the Social Enterprise Concept 
Dees, Defourny and Nyssens provide a historical account of the social enterprise concept on various 
accounts. They contend that the social enterprise debate gained prominence in the academic 
discourse over the last four decades. According to Defourny and Nyssens (2012) this concept 
surfaced in Europe in the 1990’s from isolated episodes such as the establishment of the Impresa 
Sociale Journal in Italy. In the US it can be traced to various writings on the same subject by a 
number of authors including Dees and Young (Young, 1997; Dees, 1998). However according to 
Light (2008), the social enterprise discourse is not yet mature as it is yet to determine its rightful 
space in the fields of entrepreneurship and economics.  
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Extensive interest in social enterprises caught the attention of policy makers leading to state 
recognition in different corners of the world. For example, as early as 1991, the Italian government 
passed a law creating social cooperatives (Vanek, 2001).  In time, scholars across the globe directed 
their efforts to studying the behavior of social enterprises. This interest in the subject led to the 
creation of different research groups in the world such as the Arnova, EMES, Social Enterprise 
Initiative (SEI) of the Harvard Business School, European Research Institute on Cooperatives and 
Social Enterprises (EURICSE) in the University of Trento and Social Enterprises Knowledge 
Network (SEKN) of Latin America among others.  
1.2.1: Europe 
The multi-disciplinary journal of Impresa Sociale, 1990, was published in the Italian language and 
offered an in-depth analysis of evolution and development of the Italian non-profit sector (Defourny 
and Nyssens, 2012). The journal looked at the contribution of the non-profit sector to social and 
economic growth in Italy overtime, culminating in the study of social enterprise practice and theory 
as the concept gained ground. It studied the evolution, characteristics, potential and limitations of 
initiatives of societal benefit organizations with a special focus on vulnerable populations. The 
journal also highlighted innovations in the organization of human and material resources within the 
non-profit sector and social enterprises. This journal did in time become an important point of 
reference for the Italian and European debate on the third sector, social economy and social 
enterprise discourses (Impressa Sociale, 2009).  
The earlier efforts in Europe such as those of the Impresa Sociale and other in-country efforts led to 
the EMES Research Network in 1996. EMES brought together researchers and research centers that 
had an interest on social enterprises in the European Union (Defourny and Nyssens, 2008). It was 
able to merge the European national differences by providing a common approach to the study of 
social enterprises. The activities of this network led to the publication of a seminal European work 
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on social enterprises entitled “Emergence of the Social Enterprise in Europe” (Borzaga and 
Defourny, 2001).  The EMES Research Network did not provide a precise definition of social 
enterprise in this pioneering work but identified nine indicators for the conceptualization of 
institutional features of a social enterprise in a European context (Spear and Bidet, 2010).  The first 
four of these features referred to the economic and entrepreneurial dimension, while the last five 
dealt with the social dimensions. The features are as follow: 
1) Continuous production activity for goods and/or services 
2) High degree of autonomy 
3) A significant level of economic risk 
4) A minimum amount of paid work 
5) Limited profit distribution 
6) An initiative launched by a group of citizens 
7) A decision-making power not based on capital ownership 
8) Participatory nature,  involving persons affected by the activity 
9) An explicit aim to benefit the community 
The EMES indicators were not meant to represent the qualification conditions of a social enterprise 
for any organization but rather they constituted a prescriptive criteria, describing an abstract 
construction. It was meant to enable researchers to position themselves within the large space of the 
social enterprise discourse (Fazzi, 2009). Based on the EMES indicators, Defourny and Nysenns 
(2012) defined a social enterprise as, a not-for-profit private organization providing goods or 
services directly related to its explicit aim to benefit the community. They further explained that a 
social enterprise embraces collective dynamics made of different stakeholders in its governing body 
and that it places a high value on its autonomy, bearing economic risks linked to its activities. 
Therefore, an ideal social enterprise would be seen as a multiple-goal, multi-stakeholder and 
multiple resource enterprise. A social enterprise hence refers to a specific type of enterprise 
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characterized by the pursuit of social objectives and by normative bonds to the distribution of 
profits (Fazzi, 2009). 
The contribution of the EMES Research network was quite important in Europe. The evolution of 
the discourse and specific features attached to social enterprises were unveiled in the different 
countries of Europe. It was found that different countries had different ways on how they 
implemented the idea of social enterprise (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001). European countries such 
as France, Portugal, Spain and Greece adopted the cooperative model following an initial 
experience of Italy. This model encouraged private organizations to assist the state in providing 
social services and fostering integration of vulnerable people. They additionally helped in 
developing economic activities aimed at work integration of socially excluded persons or long-term 
unemployed persons and those at risk of exclusion from the labour market.  
Other countries such as Belgium and UK adopted company models which had no legal forms but 
incorporated all types of business corporations that were not driven by profit maximization and 
enrichment of their members (Defourny and Nysenns, 2010). Following the example of UK and 
Belgium, in 2005, Italy passed a law on social enterprise, not restricting the social enterprise label 
to a particular form of an enterprise but, enabling various types of organizations including the 
investor owned to adopt the label of social enterprise (Galera and Borzaga, 2009).  
1.2.2: United States 
In the United States, the Social Enterprise Initiative by Harvard Business School was created in 
1993 to advance studies on innovative techniques for sustainable social progress (Defourny and 
Nyssens, 2012). The Initiative involved practitioners, academics and policy makers who came 
together to generate knowledge about social change brought about by social enterprises (Financial, 
2010). Through its work, the Social Enterprise Initiative did act as a catalyst for creating social 
value amongst its adherents. Over the years, the initiative has created over 500 social enterprise 
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cases and contributed to social enterprise research worldwide (Harvard Business School, 2012). 
More importantly, the initiative also contributes in the academic formation and consultancy in the 
areas of social enterprise.   
Progressively, foundations such as Schwab, Ashoka and Skoll emerged and were involved in 
venture philanthropy promoting social innovation as a central dimension of social enterprises 
(Kerlin, 2006). In the United States, the social enterprise discourse came to be seen in two 
perspectives; the social innovation perspective and the earned income perspective. The social 
innovation perspective attached Schumpeterian features of systemic innovation to social enterprises 
and exulted individual entrepreneur giving him/her, extra ordinary characteristics.  
The earned income perspective focused on the pursuance of market resources where profits are in 
turn invested to serve a social purpose (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). This perspective is also 
associated with venture philanthropy where investments are made with a social purpose that  goes 
beyond economic motivations (Yunus & Weber, 2008). Earned income comprises  fees charged for 
services or goods offered by the non-profit organizations. In recent times, earned income has 
exceeded donations as a source of funds for public charities in the US. However the earned income 
perspective has also been criticized as it may lead to a mission drift where an organization may 
concentrate on generating more income at the expense of achieving its social impact (Dees, 2003).  
1.2.3: Latin America 
In 2001, the Harvard Business School in partnership with business schools of Latin America and 
Avina Foundation founded the Social Enterprise Knowledge Network (SEKN) to boost the 
intellectual capital on social enterprise in Latin America. The network was created to promote 
social enterprise research, teaching and networking. It was hoped that the comparative experiences 
within and among countries, could play an important role in strengthening management and 
addressing challenges faced by the social enterprises of Latin America. Over time, SEKN has 
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developed publications on Latin American social enterprises and helped shape the academic 
discourse on the subject within the region. SEKN defines a social enterprise as, any kind of 
organization or undertaking engaged in activities of significant social value, or in the production of 
goods and services with an embedded social purpose regardless of its legal form (SEKN, 2011).  
1.2.4: Asia 
From the year 2009 to 2011, EMES enlarged the study of social enterprises to five countries in 
Eastern Asia namely China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. Opening the study to 
South East Asia was  done with the aim of searching for features of social enterprise dynamics that 
are rooted in the Asian history, tradition and social economic conditions (Defourny and Kuan, 
2011).  
The study found five typologies of social enterprises in South East Asia (Defourny and Kim, 2011). 
One of the typologies is the trading non-profit organization which sought to achieve financial 
sustainability through the delivery of social services. They charged fees for services or did set up 
subsidiaries to earn market income. The second type identified were, work integration social 
enterprises (WISEs) which provided stable or temporary job opportunities and employment related 
trainings to people at risk of being unemployed. WISEs took the form of social welfare enterprises 
or certified enterprises or other non-profit endeavours.  
The third included the non-profit cooperative in which collective self-employment and unmet needs 
were pursued on a cooperative tradition. Non-profit cooperatives included consumer, worker, 
farmer, and cooperatives for the elderly populations. The fourth was made up of the non-profit 
partnerships where private companies supported non-profits or established joint initiatives with 
non-profits organization to pursue a social mission. The last typology was the community 
development enterprise made of multi-stakeholder partnerships between profit making, non-profits 
making organization and the public in order to promote participatory local development. The last 
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two characteristics are similar to those established by activities of Professor Muhamed Yunus in 
Bangladesh. In 1971, he established the Grameen Bank in cooperation with the government while in 
2007, he established a Yoghurt Company in cooperation with Danone Company (Yunus and Weber, 
2008) 
1.3: Social Enterprise, Social Entrepreneurship and Social Entrepreneur 
It is evident that the third sector discourse has developed following distinct paths in different parts 
of the world such as in the United States, Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa. As the discourse 
matures and progresses, three concepts have come to be associated with it namely: social enterprise, 
social entrepreneurship and social entrepreneur (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). Each of these 
terminologies displays different contextual and distinct meanings in the field (Hulgard, 2010). Both 
social entrepreneurship and social enterprise derive their impetus in Europe and USA from the 
welfare crisis of 1970s to the 1980s, a period when policies on the discourse began emerging 
(Borzaga and Santuari, 2003). In Europe, social entrepreneurship paved way for the privatization of 
the public welfare services and brought about an experimentation of state-civil society cooperation 
(Hulgard, 2010).  
1.3.1: Social Enterprises 
Social enterprises are directly involved in production of goods and services on a continuous basis. 
The goods created or services offered are part of the solutions to the challenges they seek to address 
(Borzaga, Nogales and Galera, 2008). Social enterprises are voluntarily created by a group of 
people belonging to a community who share a need. The enterprises are governed by these people 
autonomously and are not controlled by resource providers be they public or private. The promoters 
of social enterprises assume total or part of the risk of the initiative (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). 
They increase the survival of the organizations through providing or helping in resource 
mobilization. 
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Social enterprises combine monetary and non-monetary resources, voluntary and paid workers. 
Many of them however have a minimal number of paid workers. Some social enterprises distribute 
profit in a limited way while others do not (Borzaga & Defourny, 2001). This helps in avoiding 
profit maximizing behaviour and ensuring that the organization sticks to the goal of solving the 
social challenges it faces in the communities. As far as decision making is concerned, the principle 
of "one member, one vote" applies and not the strength of capital investment. This tenet ensures that 
all people investing in the social enterprise have equal voices. Beneficiaries are also involved in the 
decision making process and hence they are not passive recipients of benefits but also part of the 
solution creation mechanism to the community challenges. They promote responsibility and a 
heightened civic participation at a local level. 
According to Defourny and Nyssens (2010) social enterprise discourse has a conceptual and a 
location specific theme. These conceptual definitions originate mainly from regional bodies. EMES 
for example, has given the discourse characteristics based on European experience. SEKN on its 
part has concentrated on the Latin American situation, while the Social Enterprise Initiative of the 
Harvard Business School, the Ashoka, Skoll and Schwab foundations have focused on the 
American experience (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). Most recently EMES has helped to bring out 
experiences of social enterprise in accordance to East Asia experience (Defourny and Kim, 2011).   
According to Defourny and Nyssens (2012), three important schools of thought on social enterprise 
have emerged over time; the earned income, the social innovation and the EMES approach. The 
social innovation models advanced by Ashoka emphasize the heroic activities undertaken by 
individual entrepreneurs in responding to a social problem in dynamic and innovative ways 
(Drayton, 2003). The earned income approach is propagated in the social business as developed by 
Yunus and Weber (2008). Accordingly, a social business is created and designed to address social 
problems. It is a non-loss, non-dividend business. It is also financially self-sustainable and its 
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profits are reinvested in the business, with the aim of increasing social impact or used to start other 
social businesses.  
There are similarities and disparities both at regional and global levels with respect to different 
ways in which the positioning of social enterprises between market, state and civil society has been 
conceptualized. Social enterprises in the United States are strongly positioned in between the 
market and the civil society (Defourny and Nyssens, 2012). In Europe, social enterprises are placed 
at the center of the civil society, market and the state, while in Asia they are placed in between the 
market and the state with some little involvement of the civil society (Defourny and Kim, 2011). 
The concept of the civil society in East Asia is nascent and is still unknown to the ordinary people, 
who are more familiar with neighbourhood or informal networks at different levels (Defourny and 
Kim, 2011). Apart from the local dynamics, the Asian model is also influenced by schools of 
thought from both the United States and Europe.  
Bode, Evers and Schulz (2004) in their study on WISEs in East Germany, advance the concept of 
social enterprises as hybrids in which organizations get formed simultaneously by a) public 
guarantees and interventions; b) concepts and pressures from the market and c) by influences from 
civil society. They also explain that social enterprises may transcend the well-known forms of 
hybrids and may adopt other important components. These other important components of 
hybridization may include a) the mix of resources from the state, market and the community; b) the 
mixed goal structures and c) a mix in the organizational culture within the domain of the three 
sectors. 
The activities of social enterprises connect entrepreneurship to social realities and vice versa 
(Steyaert and Hjorth, 2006).  By connecting entrepreneurship to social realities, the space of 
entrepreneurship is embedded into the society. It thus paves way for a multi-discursive construction 
of entrepreneurship beyond any economic or progress instrumentalist reductionism. Connecting 
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social issues into entrepreneurship enables social change to happen and leads to community 
transformation. Hence, social enterprises do express new forms of entrepreneurship. The social 
enterprise concept stresses social innovation processes undertaken by social entrepreneurs 
responding to a social problem in dynamic and innovative ways.  
Some studies have looked at social enterprises in the light of the size of intervention.  According to 
Drayton (2002) and Light (2008), a social enterprise provides solutions to large scale social 
problems. The focus on ‘size of intervention’ restricts actions of social enterprises to large 
interventions and disregards activities of small social entrepreneurs. That notwithstanding, Borzaga, 
Galera, Nogales (2008) in their definition of social enterprises included organizations providing 
access to basic services in their local communities. The size and magnitude of intervention in this 
case is therefore not important, but the mix between entrepreneurship and social mission. Extending 
the social enterprise discourse to the general field of entrepreneurship, Dees (1998), sees 
entrepreneurship as a complex social creative process that influences, multiplies, transforms, re-
images and alters the outlook of the space of society in which it is grounded and contextualized. 
Hence social enterprises do express a new form of entrepreneurship and are therefore establishing a 
separate domain of interest in the field of entrepreneurship (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001). 
Yunus and Weber (2008) equate social enterprises to social businesses. A social business completes 
and improves the structure of capitalism by emphasizing on the dignity of all people. Social 
businesses are hence set up to achieve both personal gain and pursue specific social goals.  Like 
other businesses, a social business employs workers, creates goods or services and provides them to 
customers consistent with its objective. A social business company is evaluated on its ability to 
create social benefits for those whose lives it touches. It may earn a profit, but the investors who 
support it do not take any profits out of the company except for recouping an amount equivalent to 
their investment over a period of time.  
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A social business company is cause-driven rather than profit driven, and acts as an agent of change 
to enhance social inclusion. It is not a charity, but a business in every sense and it has to recover its 
full costs while achieving its social objective. According to Cuskelly and Frances (2008) running a 
social business, requires a different mind-set from that of running a charity. A social business 
ensures that there is a good mix of both business and social objectives culminating in a positive 
societal impact (Yunus and Weber, 2008).  
As can be seen above, the understanding of social enterprises is broad. It brings together 
participants of the social economy, social investors and all organizations whose aim is not profit 
maximization but improving social impacts through their activities. Birkholzer (2009) looks at 
social enterprises as local players in development while Borzaga, Depedri and Tortia (2010) and 
Spear, Defourny and Favreau (2001) see them as agents of distribution of economic benefits to the 
socially excluded. Though there are diverse approaches towards social enterprises, there are some 
important elements of convergence which include social, environmental and financial impacts. 
Despite this convergence, measuring the performance of social enterprises presents a formidable 
challenge especially on the dimensions of environmental and social impacts (Savedoff, Levine and 
Birdsall, 2006). Though the social enterprise concept has been subjected to a plurality of definitions 
and has a context and location specificity, it is generally seen as the pursuance of market resources 
to finance social objectives (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001).  
These enterprises do play a great role to enable the excluded people become active participants of 
the economy and society. On a wider scale they give globalization a humane face, stripping its 
tendency to polarize individuals and economies both in the developed and developing world’s 
leading to social as well as territorial exclusion (Birkholzer, 2009).  They also promote ecological, 
cultural and other community goods and services. In a direct way, social enterprises are playing an 
important distributive role (Borzaga, Depedri and Tortia 2010), fighting poverty and social 
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exclusion, (Spear, 2001) and are creating jobs and promoting employment for the socially 
disadvantaged (Borzaga and Loss, 2002). 
Economic development pursued for its own sake tends to exclude many people. Social enterprises 
come in to provide an enabling environment for the inclusion of marginalized people and 
communities. Borzaga, Galera, Nogales (2008) strengthen this argument by identifying seven 
contributions made by social enterprises in economic development. These contributions are: a) 
production and provision of basic services to communities while also targeting individuals who 
cannot afford them; b) involving different stakeholders on matters of resource allocation; c) 
empowering communities in making decisions; d) creating employment and integrating those 
excluded from social economic opportunities; e) contributing to enhancing social capital and 
strengthening trust networks; f) contributing to the growth and development of remote areas and 
lastly, g) assisting to incorporate informal activities into the formal sector.  
Social enterprises have emerged as potent tools to combat poverty, promote human rights and 
development at the grassroots levels (Brine, 2010). Because of their local embeddedness, they are 
able to discover unique solutions befitting a specific context thereby contributing to human and 
economic development and ultimately to the achievement of the millennium development goals in 
the poor sections of the world. According to Mair, Robinson and Hockets (2006) social enterprises 
address basic needs, influence behavior change, help in allocating resources more fairly and 
contribute to formalizing human rights. Bourguignon (2004) demonstrated the power of distribution 
in reducing both intra country and global poverty. He argued that, growth combined with equitable 
distribution of resources enables many poor people to cross the poverty line resulting in a big 
middle income class and normalizing the income levels in the country. By their work, social 
enterprises are important additional distributive agents distinct from the state (Borzaga, Depedri and 
Tortia, 2010). 
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In addressing the poverty problem, social enterprises are in essence bringing a transformation of the 
traditional capitalistic paradigm where self-interest is the driving force behind all enterprising 
activities. The capitalistic paradigm induces the appeal for self-enrichment and creation of 
individual wealth disregarding other people’s conditions. As a result, it introduces a welfare 
paradigm through transactions that have equity problems. As a result of the equity problem one 
party to the transaction may be forced to transact against its dignity. Social enterprises could help 
humanity not only in solving poverty and environmental problems but also in resolving dignity and 
equity problems.  
Social enterprises do also help in the build-up of social capital. In the modern society, relational 
goods such as trust or friendship require coordinated effort and do suffer from coordination failures. 
The selfish capitalist processes have contributed in the suffocation of relational goods. Social 
enterprises come in to fill the void as they are value based and view people as the end and not the 
means to their mission (Bland, 2012). 
1.3.2: Social Entrepreneurship 
Though Young, (1999) argues that there is no common conceptualization of social 
entrepreneurship, Nichols, (2006) contends that social entrepreneurship is a term applied to the 
activities of grassroots activists, non-governmental organizations, policy makers, international 
institutions and corporations amongst others. These are organization which address a range of social 
issues in innovative and creative ways. The entrepreneurial approach to social problems addresses 
pitfalls of the market, government and philanthropy.  
According to Dees (1998), social entrepreneurship combines passion to address a specific social 
mission with the proficiency of business like discipline, innovation and high level determination. 
Hence, in addition to its innovativeness and the not-for-profit character, social entrepreneurship can 
include social purpose business and for profit activities. Examples of social purpose businesses 
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include profit community development banks or hybrid organizations mixing non-profit and for-
profit elements such as homeless shelters.  
According to Hulgard (2010), social entrepreneurship is different though closely related to the 
corporate strategies such as corporate social responsibility, corporate social innovation and the 
triple bottom-line. These bottom-lines embed the need for survival, addressing the social mission 
and taking care of environmental concerns. Social entrepreneurship means different things to 
different sectors of the economy. For example, the public sector in Europe sees social 
entrepreneurship as an experiment for more participative social policies that are responsive to the 
needs of the citizens (Ferri and Urbano, 2011). Within the third sector, social entrepreneurship 
represents a transition of the non-profit and voluntary associations towards becoming market 
agents.  Hulgard (2010), defines social entrepreneurship as the creation of social value, produced in 
collaboration with people and community organizations. This collaboration results in social 
innovations that usually imply an economic activity. Conversely, Bacq and Janssen (2011) define 
the same as entrepreneurial initiatives aimed at ecological, cultural and social change.   
Accordingly, social entrepreneurship has four important characteristics; social value, civil society, 
innovation and economic activity. Social value is linked to improvement of people’s welfare 
through their ability to access basic services. The second aspect limits social entrepreneurship to the 
civil society, setting it apart from the private commercial sector and the public sector (Young, 
2006). The realm of innovation highlights the fact that social entrepreneurship is about developing 
new approaches to social problems. The activities of social entrepreneurship have an economic 
impact on both the community and the enterprise (Drayton, 2006). In this case, social 
entrepreneurship has peculiar set of characteristics that distinguishes it from commercial 
entrepreneurship and non-entrepreneurial social activities. Social entrepreneurship is hence 
conceived differently in Europe and the United States due to different conceptions of capitalism and 
the role of the government in welfare activities (Bacq and Janssen, 2011).  
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In the United States social entrepreneurship is used to address the challenges of funding the non-
profits through the market and their relationship with the corporates. The United States social 
entrepreneurship model is based on individual actor’s financial success and short term financial 
profits. Social entrepreneurship is also used as a metaphor referring to innovative projects (Drayton, 
2006). On the other hand, in Europe, social entrepreneurship is part and parcel of the social 
economy. This model values collective action where the social entrepreneur is embedded in a 
network of support that helps his/her enterprise activities to succeed and has a longer term 
perspective (Hulgard, 2010; Bacq and Janssen, 2011).  
There are a number of distinctions that can be made between commercial and social 
entrepreneurship. Social entrepreneurship comes in to cover for market failure through its social 
mission. It also has a distinct way in which it mobilizes financial, material and human resources. Its 
performance measurement is key, making it more accountable to stakeholders (Borzaga, Nogales 
and Galera, 2008). Alternatively, commercial enterprises are constituted to create profits for their 
owners.  According to Steyaert and Hjorth (2006) social entrepreneurship has two dimensions; the 
first being the aspect of bringing market orientation to social issues by promoting 
professionalization of the non-profit and public sectors. The second dimension is that of 
entrepreneurial activities focused on solving local needs of communities.  
1.3.3: Social Entrepreneur 
Dees (1998) attaches specific value dimensions to the social entrepreneur who he also refers to as a 
‘social leader’. Accordingly, the social entrepreneur is envisioned as a value creator, agent of social 
change and a resourceful pursuer of economic opportunities. As an agent of change in the social 
economy, the social entrepreneur plays an important role by adopting a mission of creating and 
sustaining social value. In addition Dees provides that, a social entrepreneur recognizes and pursues 
new opportunities to serve a specific social mission while engaging in a process of continuous 
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innovation, learning and adaptation. Consequently, the social entrepreneur acts boldly without being 
limited by resources currently in hand and maintains a heightened sense of accountability to the 
constituencies served for outcomes created.  
Social entrepreneurs are reformers and revolutionaries in accordance to the Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur (Young, 1999). They however have an additional dimension of working to achieve a 
particular social mission. While working to achieve this social mission, they make fundamental 
changes in the way things are done in the social sector. According to Ashoka (2012), social 
entrepreneurs have bold visions, and they work to attack the underlying causes of problems rather 
than only treating the symptoms. By doing their work, they help in the creation of societal changes 
and bring about sustainable improvements (Thompson, 2002). Social entrepreneurs are also likened 
to conventional entrepreneurs because they break new grounds, develop new models and pioneer 
new approaches. Their innovation is captured in the way they structure their core programs or 
assemble the resources for their work. They also look for innovative ways to ensure continuous 
funding for their activities as long as they are creating social value. Though innovation is marred by 
uncertainty and risk of failure, they develop the ability to manage ambiguities and risks as they 
pursue their mission.  They treat failures of a project as a learning experience and not a personal 
tragedy (Light, 2008). 
Though social entrepreneurs may act at a specific locality, their actions have the potential to 
stimulate global improvements whether in education, health care, economic development, arts or 
any other social field. Social entrepreneurs are distinguished from commercial entrepreneurs or 
socially responsible businesses because of their mission to create and sustain social value 
(Barendsen and Gardner, 2004). For a social entrepreneur, the explicitness of the social mission is 
fundamental. Their profits are a meant to serve a social end and not to be an end in themselves. 
Social entrepreneurs are evaluated on their ability to achieve social impacts and they focus on long 
term social returns on investment. 
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Just like commercial entrepreneurs, social entrepreneurs recognize and pursue new opportunities. 
Problems within their communities may provide the opportunity to pursue entrepreneurial activities. 
They are able to do this because they are not simply driven by the perception of a social need or by 
compassion, rather they have a vision of how to achieve improvement of the community in question 
(Dees, 1998). According to Ashoka (2012), social entrepreneurs are individuals with innovative 
solutions to society’s most pressing problems. They are also ambitious and persistent. They tackle 
major issues and offer new ideas for wide scale change. The key element about social entrepreneurs 
is persistence combined with willingness to make adjustments as they get more experience. Social 
entrepreneurs never give up, they are constantly in search of ways to surmount obstacles. This is 
achieved because social entrepreneurs are constantly in a process of innovation, adaptation and 
learning (Ashoka, 2012). 
Social entrepreneurs exhibit a heightened sense of accountability by seeking to have a sound 
understanding of the constituencies they are serving. They make sure that they have correctly 
assessed needs and values of the people they intend to serve and the communities in which they 
operate. This requires close connections with those communities (Leadbeater, 1997). They 
understand the expectations and values of their investors, including anyone who invests money, 
time and expertise to help them. They seek to provide real social improvements to their 
beneficiaries and their communities, as well as attractive (social and financial) returns to their 
investors (Yunus and Weber, 2008).  Creating a fit between investor values and community needs is 
an important part of the challenge. When feasible, social entrepreneurs create market-like feedback 
mechanisms to reinforce accountability. They assess their progress in terms of social, financial and 
managerial outcomes and not simply in terms of their size, outputs or processes (Savedoff, Levine 
and Birdsall, 2006). They use experiential information to institute corrections as need arises.   
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Summarily, social entrepreneurship may be seen as the simultaneous maximization of public good 
for societal purposes through the increasing use of business like practices and entrepreneurial spirit 
(Hockets, 2010).  
1.4: Third Sector in the Developing World 
Salomon and Anheier (1997) present a seminal study of the third sector in the developing world. 
The study looked at the third sector in five developing countries; Brazil, India, Ghana, Egypt and 
Thailand. According to the study, these countries had a number of similarities. The first of these 
similarities was low per capita income, which meant that countries under study had tremendous 
social and economic needs which were difficult to meet through public and market interventions 
alone. All countries studied depended on agriculture with a tiny middle class. They were also 
struggling to democratize themselves, with some having authoritarian regimes.  
Welfare spending in these countries was also quite insignificant and fell below 20% of the total 
gross national product. The fact that these countries had a low welfare budget allocation meant that 
they would have a big size of the third sector in accordance to the market failure or government 
failure models. The model posits an inverse relationship between the scale of the government social 
welfare provision and the size of the third sector.   
A close connection was also found between the presence of religious organizations and the third 
sector activities. This has been attributed to the religious motivated sentiments of altruism and 
philanthropy (Grier, 1997). Salomon and Anheier postulated that Christianity and particularly 
Protestantism permit the flourishing of the third sector because of its emphasis on individualism and 
its strong independence from state control. Gaduh (2012) also found that different religions had 
different impacts on the rise of the third sector depending on the weight they assigned to charitable 
acts in terms of time and resources, supporting individual action, commitment to institution building 
and their relationship with the state.  
51 
 
All the countries studied were dependent on development assistance. For Egypt and Ghana this 
assistance accounted for substantial portions of their gross national product. Conversely, in India, 
Indonesia and Brazil foreign aid reliance was insignificant.  
Salomon and Anheier (1997) used their common framework made up of five characteristics to study 
the third sector in these countries. The framework was as follows;  
1) Organization: third sector organizations possess some institutional reality 
2) Autonomy: They are private and separate from the government 
3) Profit distribution: They do not distribute profits to owners or directors 
4) Governance: They are equipped to control their own activities 
5) Degree of voluntarism: They have a meaningful degree of voluntary participation 
They found that there was a sizeable set of organizations that met the criteria of third sector entities. 
The sector constituted formal organizations comprising of religious organizations, civil society 
actors and informal associations of people from various communities. Despite the presence of 
various organizations, this sector was found to be less developed in all countries under study. The 
sector was also smaller in comparison to that of the developed world in terms of resources and 
labour force. The most diffused words used to describe the sector were non-governmental 
organizations and non-profit organizations. Accordingly, the non-profit sector as a term was used 
mainly to refer to the non-governmental organizations. This had the problem of locking out many 
organizations of the third sector. Those locked out included professional associations, social welfare 
associations, credit and savings associations, self-help groups and other types of formal and 
informal associational and cooperation oriented associations.  
Another finding was the fact that the third sector resources were mobilized from both traditional 
and non-traditional sources of funding more than sourcing for funds from abroad. Much revenue 
actually came from domestic sources such as fees, income generating activities and other types of 
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transactional activities. Country variations also affected the scale and dynamics of the third sector 
activities. The variations included political regimes, religion, colonialism, constrained social 
development and legal treatment (Salomon and Anheier, 1997). In particular, the type of political 
regime determined the vibrancy of the sector. Authoritarian regimes would tend to discourage 
grassroots cooperation activities for fear that they could be politicized and be used to fuel 
revolutions (Branch and Cheeseman, 2007). A situation like this promotes a third sector that is not 
independent and which fits to the prevailing structures avoiding to challenge any excesses within 
the political order. In essence, the organizations arising in this case will be characterized by 
passivity and submissiveness rather than empowerment and autonomy.  
The major problem of the study carried out by Salomon and Anheier was the fact that it equated the 
term third sector to non-profit organizations. As has been indicated above, the non-profit 
organizations are a sub-set of the third sector amongst others such as the social economy 
organizations and the civil society organizations (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001; Borzaga, Nogales 
and Galera, 2008).  The second criticism anchors on the question of the non-distribution of 
organizational residuals which is mainly a characteristic of the United States non-profit sector 
(Avers and Laville, 2004). Most third sector organizations in the developing countries are 
constituted to help improve the economic conditions of their members despite having community 
dimensions and hence cannot refrain from sharing their residues (Chelogoy, Anyango and Odembo, 
2004). This sharing of residues however, does not affect their social welfare contribution within 
their communities or turn them to profit seeking organizations as they are committed to addressing 
the social mission that initially brought them together.  
1.5: Import for Theoretical and Empirical Research 
This study is based on two theoretical approaches; the EMES framework that mainly approaches the 
third sector from a welfare perspective and one advanced by Salomon and Anheier (1997 and 1999) 
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in both welfare and non-welfare economies. The two approaches have provided broad frameworks 
in which organizations of the third sector would be studied. Within the EMES framework, the third 
sector is conceptualised within the social and solidarity economies. Salomon and Anheier (1997) on 
their part conceptualise the third sector from a five criteria approach made up of organization, 
autonomy, profit distribution, governance and degree of voluntarism. With this criteria they studied 
dimensions of the global civil society from different economies embracing varying degrees of 
welfare. 
In both frameworks, organizations of the third sector are created by individuals and groups of 
people concerned about endemic social problems in their communities.  They aim to deliver social 
services to the poor and economically disadvantaged populations. Their initiatives become the basis 
for the establishment of self-help, mutual help, charity and voluntary community action. The 
frameworks also recognize that the needs of disadvantaged poor people are diverse and do require 
creative local actors. The EMES emphasis is on the welfare state while Salomon and Anheier 
emphasize other types of resources. The EMES framework has mainly been applied in Europe and 
in South East Asia (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001; Defourny and Pestoff, 2008 and Defourny and 
Kim, 2011). Salomon and Ahneier applied their framework in a more general way to study the third 
sector in advanced and developing economies (Salomon and Anheier, 1997; Salomon, et al., 1999) 
An organization, whether for-profit or otherwise, is a dynamic and an adaptive entity whose 
survival depends on its ability to perform various activities with greater efficiency. The organization 
hence, needs to be aware of various comparative dynamics and other factors within its environment 
capable of influencing its efficiency (Porter, 1985). Third sector organizations’ dynamism is 
embedded along three pillars; financial sustainability, social impact and environmental impact. 
Salomon et al. (1999) provide that, relationships with both national and international sources of 
resources are important for the third sector. While these organizations combine entrepreneurship 
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and social aims in different ways, they do so within the domains of the state, market and community 
(Borzaga and Tortia, 2007;  Pestoff, 2005a). 
EMES conceptualises third sector organizations to be at the crossroads of three stake-holding 
domains; state, market and community. The relationship of the sector within the domains is 
dependent on various issues such as welfare, legality, local cultures and traditions. Conversely, their 
ability to address social aims increases and strengthens relations with their stakeholders (Borzaga 
and Defourny, 2001). These domains help third sector actors pursue financial sustainability through 
devising incentive mixes to motivate involved stakeholders. Incentive mixes emerge as a key link 
between stakeholders and organisations, representing the main adaptive modality used by the sector 
actors to pursue their objectives. 
Activities of third sector organizations have positive impacts on communities and environment. 
They invest to generate social and environmental value as well as social and financial returns 
(Freireich, 2009). Though there are challenges in measuring social impact arising from data quality, 
attribution, methodological issues, confounding factors and biases, the localised knowledge and 
experience of third sector organizations overcomes these challenges (Savedoff, Levine and Birdsall, 
2006). Issues of quantity and quality are quite relative as impacts are measured depending on 
objectives and focus of different organizations. Some organizations may be reaching fewer 
beneficiaries but having to perform complex tasks as opposed to others reaching many but having 
less complex tasks to attend to. 
The two theories contribute significantly to the efforts of this study to bring out characteristics of 
the third sector in Kenya. In combining the two frameworks seven aspects of the third sector have 
been selected made of organization, autonomy, profit distribution, governance, degree of 
voluntarism, contribution to social inclusion and extent of entrepreneurial dynamism. These aspects  
will be used to provide a framework of analysis into organizations of this sector in Kenya. The 
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EMES and Salomon and Anheier’s frameworks will translate into tools for creating a common 
language and an understanding from which further discussions on the subject may be catalysed.  
In the empirical section of this study the contributions of the third sector will be testing  self-
perception of success of self-help organizations against the age of the self-help group, total number 
of members, number of economic empowerment activities, number of social welfare activities, 
number of educational activities, number of resource mobilization activities, estimated income and 
number of challenges.  
The premise or hypothesis underlying this study is that third sector organizations must possess 
certain capabilities in order to be successful. Success of an organization depends on how well it 
carries its roles and functions, its ability to survive and achieve satisfactory performance (Phelan 
and Lewin, 1999). It entails the ability to develop specific types of competencies and efficiencies 
over time enabling the organization to achieve its desired impacts (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2010) 
Alternatively success may also entail how well an organization’s vision is translated into actions 
and measurable impacts. According to Porter and Kramer (1999) success entails how well 
organizational plans are implemented or modified with respect to new information received from 
the environment.  
The capabilities tested in this study and have been supported by previous research are: 
1. Experience and age: Farinas & Moreno, 2000 using the data of Spanish Manufacturing firms 
observe that failure rate decreases with age. This means that organizational age determines how 
well and efficiently its functions are carried out. Hence younger firms are more likely to be 
concerned with resolving strategic issues such as determining appropriate opportunities, 
competitive strategy and immersing themselves in the new operational environment (Stichcombe, 
1965). They also have little knowledge of the external environmental factors in comparison with 
older organizations. Younger firms also suffer from lack of resources (Mohan-Neill, 1995).   Coad 
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& Tamvada (2008) on their side found that age has a negative influence on growth, meaning that 
younger firms are more likely to experience growth more than older ones. Since failure rate is more 
likely the younger the organization, and higher growth is more likely the younger the organization 
there is therefore however mixed evidence that firm growth influences success.   
2. Membership: Dyba (2005) demonstrates that membership is critical to organizational 
performance and improvement. Organizations of all kinds including those of the third sector are 
therefore required to incorporate a sufficient number of members believing in their mission. This is 
the rationale behind consumer or purchasing groups where members perceive that they can achieve 
some gains by cooperating with each other (Schotanus, Telgen, & de Boer, 2008). Some 
organizations such as cooperatives or micro-finance require many members to succeed in their 
operations. Achieving a certain threshhold as far as membership is concerned enables them to get 
required resources and capital to facilitate their operations and promote their objectives. Since 
community based organizations are meant to forster development in their local communities, having 
large membership signifies broad acceptance and ownership (Bhatliwala, 2002). A huge 
organizational following therefore would connote that the organization is addressing community’s 
felt needs. It would also mean that the development agenda propagated by the organization is 
popular and is able to attract community investments while assisting in the development of self help 
capabilities.   Schotanus, Telgen, & de Boer (2008) go further to provide preconditions for a 
successful collective action to include trust, formality, uniformity, common objectives, 
communication, enforcement of compliance, sharing gains and loses, commitment and support. 
3. Economic activities: Using longitudinal data of about two thousand firms, Pandya & Rao (1998) 
show that firm level diversification has positive impact on performance. The study found that on 
average, diversified firms showed better performance in comparison to undiversified firms on both 
risk and return dimensions. The same findings were made by Chiang (2010) who studied 
diversification among computer software organizations in the USA. Within the third sector this 
57 
 
diversification has been given names such as mixed economy of care (Kendall & Knapp 2000) or 
the pursuance of a mix of resources  (Borzaga & Defourny, 2001). Organizations able to pursue a 
mix of resources are better able to influence their performance in a better way. 
4. Social welfare: According to McMillan (2010) the third sector provides a myriad of social 
services including employment, personalised and responsive services and others such as social 
housing and domiciliary care for older people and populations under difficult circumstances.  In 
developing countries this sector plays a bigger role in poverty reduction and in assisting those on 
the brink of marginalization. Some of the work done by the sector in these countries includes 
addressing food insecurity, peace keeping, disaster mitigation and lobby and advocacy among 
others . Despite a great contribution of the sector in social welfare provision there is a dearth of 
empirical evidence on the same (Pestoff & Brandsen, 2012).     
5. Educational activities: Third sector institutions play an important role in education (McGuire, 
2010). They are felt in learning and skills provision, especially with respect to the most 
disadvantaged and excluded groups of learners. The sector has a role to mainstream provision of 
education for the disengaged or ‘hard to reach’ learners through provision of outreach and learner 
support services (Hancock, 2013). Educational activities may take the form of establishing schools, 
vocational institutions and higher learning institutions or alternatively building community 
capacities on specific areas of interest. There are various advantages of third sector involvement in 
education especially in the developing countries. Some populations and locations are very remote 
and do face marginalization, the sector comes in to bring inclusion. On the other hand the sector 
plays a role in human capital formation    
5. Resource mobilization: In addition to the common objective of normal firms, the third sector 
aims at solving particular problems experienced by communities (Borzaga, Nogales and Galera, 
2007). This means that unlike other organizations they need to develop superior abilities to acquire 
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and maintain resources in order to meet their objectives very effectively (Sheppard, 1995). Third 
sector organizations therefore have a very specific and unique position in any economy as far as 
resource mobilization is concerned. Defourny and Pestoff (2008) tried to capture this position by 
placing the third sector in between the public sector, private sector and the community.  This 
positioning implies that the sector pursues public, community and private resources, pursues both 
non-profit or profit making strategies and uses both formal and informal means to address and 
perpetuate its social impacts.  
6. Number of Challenges: A certain threshold of challenges is good for the organization and could 
help boost organizational performance. When an organization is overwhelmed by challenges then it 
will experience performance problems. These challenges could take the form of collective action 
challenges (Bennedsen, Wolfenzon, Anderso, & González, 2010), inability of organizational 
members or the board to fulfil their functions (Hauser, 2013), financial, legal and corruption (Beck, 
Demirgüç, & Mak, 2002), human capital (Marimuthu, Arokiasamy, & Ismail, 2009) among others. 
Organizations can only be able to withstand a certain level of challenges without affecting its 
performance, when this threshold is exceeded then organizational performance is affected 
negatively.  
7. Financial Resources: According to Bretherton & Chaston (2005) there is clear evidence that 
performing organizations have access to adequate resources. Access to resources becomes a source 
of their sustainable competitive advantage and superior performance. Though resource dependence 
approach assumes that access to resources whether financial or otherwise enables a firm to become 
a better performer there are other views to the contrary (Inmyxai & Takahashi, 2010). According to 
Grant (2002) having these resources may not be adequate as firms must be able to formulate 
strategy and to deploy such resources in order to achieve their desired impacts.  
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8. Gender diversity: Prihatiningtias (2012) found no link between gender diversity and 
organizational performance in Indonesia. This same result was supported by Marinova, Plantenga, 
& Remery (2010) using data from Netherlands and Denmark. Accordingly organizational 
performance is based on individuals. Gender diversity by itself therefore  may not lead to improved 
performance in the absence of a culture that promotes inter-gender collaboration. Consequently, 
firms may need to carefully consider what added value is likely to result from gender diversity in 
their organizations. Though gender diversity may not have an effect on organizational performance, 
it has taken centre stage because of the need to broaden the participation of women in development 
and lessen their marginalization (United Nations, 2002).   
9. Networking: Networks are important for an organization. Padgett (1993) using 1400 to 1434 
Florentine genealogy data demonstrates that  networks matter. According to this study a less 
affluent family of Cosimo de Medici was able to outdo a highly affluent family of Sforzi to assume 
the political leadership of Florence for more than a 1000 years. Other scholars have demonstrated 
that there is a positive influence of networking on competitiveness in both product or supplier 
markets. The organization's environment is much broader encompassing its social network of 
external contacts. These external contacts have implications for the organization's survival and 
livelihood (Grannovetter, 1983). It is also evident that firms organized in networks have higher 
survival chances and that prestigious partners help firms go to IPO faster and gain higher valuations 
than firms which do not have these partnerships (Korir, Maru, Kipruto, & Koskei, 2012). 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE THIRD SECTOR IN KENYA 
2.1 Background 
Kenya has a growing third sector which plays an important role in addressing existing socio-
economic problems (Matanga 2000). The sector plays an important role in addressing the lack of 
community capacity that majorly contributes to poverty escalation. It also addresses a variety of 
issues including; the provision of social services, civic participation enhancement, humanitarian 
assistance, education provision, improving the skills to sustain better agricultural production, rural 
and urban micro-enterprise development, sustainable community health services, environmental 
protection, infrastructure development and employment creation (Sall, 2009). The third sector 
actors also addresses gender concerns through special support to women and their organizations.  
In Kenya, the terms “third sector, social economy and social enterprises are quite new as opposed 
to the terms voluntary sector, civil society organizations (CSOs), non-profit organizations (NPOs) 
and civil society (Kingoro and Bujra 2009). The  civil society is an umbrella term that embeds non-
profits, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),  community  based  organizations  (CBOs),  faith 
based organizations (FBOs), trade unions, farmers’ associations, academia, professional 
associations, students movements, service clubs, foundations, trusts, kinship and traditional welfare 
associations and other socioeconomic and cultural groupings (Chelogoy, Anyango and Odembo 
2004; Gamba and Komo 2005; Kanyinga and Mitullah, 2007).  Despite the fact that third sector as a 
term has not been used in earlier studies with reference to these organizations in Kenya, they meet 
some of the criteria set by Salomon and Anheier (1997) and also do bear semblance to the third 
sector and social economy organizations in other parts of the world. In this study they will be 
refered to as third sector organizations. 
In Kenya, the third sector is made up of formal, quasi-formal and informal community service 
organizations. Formal organizations are those that have a clear registration regime. Quasi formal 
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organizations  have no clear registration regime while the informal associations such as cultural and 
kinship and neighbourhood groupings are not registered at all, but do play a socio-economic 
empowerment role to their members.  
 
Figure 2.1.1: Formality-informality continuum of the third sector in Kenya 
These organizations (formal, quasi-formal and informal) address challenges faced by economically 
disadvantaged people. They are present in remote and backward regions where for-profit firms 
would find it unsustainable and unprofitable to invest or where the government has allocated little  
resources. Their work sustains economic development at micro levels. Their contribution is quite 
unique and distinct from that of the private sector (market) and the public sector (government) 
(Omiti and Nyanamba, 2007). 
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The growth of the modern Kenyan voluntary sector can be traced back to the colonial period in the 
1900s.  It included NGOs mainly linked to churches and voluntary and charitable organizations 
(VCOs) that were concerned with social welfare. Among the earliest non-governmental 
organizations  to operate in Kenya were the Young Women's and Young Men's Christian 
Associations (YWCA and YMCA) which started operating in the early 1930s (Chelogoy, Anyango 
and Odembo, 2004). Earlier on, in 1908, the first cooperatives were established to market 
agricultural produce for white settlers. Up to 1940s cooperatives and associations were a preserve of 
White Settlers as the colonial administration discouraged natives to form or join them. The colonial 
prohibition was relaxed 1945 leading to the formation of several Kenyan-based associations, 
cooperatives and other charitable organizations concerned with welfare and survival needs 
(Cooperative Alliance of Kenya, 2009).   
Since gaining independence in 1963, the successive regimes in Kenya have intermittently sought to 
incorporate third sector organizations in combating poverty, illiteracy and disease. This is because 
government alone is unable to address the challenges effectively (Wanyande and Okebe, 2009). In 
the 1960s, churches were the largest providers of social services including health care, primary and 
secondary education. Other important players of the sector were NGOs, cooperatives and self-help 
groups. Micro-finance joined the fray in the 1980’s.  
The Kenyan third sector also comprises international NGOs. International NGOs invest their 
resources to address poverty challenges, strengthen the Kenyan institutions and develop the 
capacities of local civil societies. The third sector in Kenya is unique because it contains the 
informal organizations who operate without registration or any license respectively (Republic of 
Kenya, 2009a).  Informal third sector organizations are not formerly recognised in law,  hence 
exposing them to a myriad challenges including  lack of access to markets and related benefits, 
limited access to information, infrastructure, lack of linkages with  important networks and  
inadequate  access  to  business  skills  and  technology (Mittullah, 2010). Formal, quasi-formal and 
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informal civil society organizations have made a unique contribution in the constitution of the third 
sector in Kenya. Their contributions are tied to the specific type of sector challenges, registration or 
non-registration, degree of formality and informality, associational problems and resource related 
issues.  
In line with the foregoing discussions, the objectives of this chapter will be to provide a general 
picture of the work done by some of the third sector organizations in Kenya. The chapter presents a 
descriptive analysis of faith based organizations, cooperative movement, non-governmental 
organizations and micro finance institutions respectively. These organizations have been chosen 
because they display third sector attributes while working to address community based challenges. 
The following themes will inform the study of the said organizations:  
 History, events and important influences attributed to the work of the specific organizations 
 Characteristics, institutional nature, relevance and viability, size and potential 
 Effectiveness in solving the socio-economic and welfare challenges  
 Entrepreneurial dynamism 
Important historical influences on the third sector in Kenya have also been studied at length in this 
chapter, and they include; the pre-colonial cooperative activities amongst the different communities, 
activities of the colonial government and activities of the post-independent Kenyan government in 
regulating and supporting the sector and lastly cultural contributions to the growth of the sector 
through the Harambee spirit.     
2.2 Policies and Cultural influences on the Growth of the Third Sector in Kenya 
2.2.1 Pre-Colonial Kenya 
The traditional Kenyan practices in various communities give strong proof that cooperation and 
self-help culture existed long before the onset of colonialism. Traditional practices were either in 
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the form of household work (Martin, 1990), communal work or contribution towards individual and 
communal causes (Hakansson, 1994). The indigenous communities of pre-colonial Kenya 
developed different names for self-help and cooperation activities (Mbithi and Rasmusson 1977). 
Among them are King’arua among the Taita, Bulala among the Luhya, Ngwato among the Kikuyu, 
Nyoluoro among the Luo, kithinga nyumba for the Meru, kipagenge among the Kalenjin, iskashato 
among the Kenyan Somali, and egesangio among the Kisii to name just a few (Ouma 1987).  
According to NGO Law Monitor (2011), traditionally, Kenyans lived in communities characterized 
by strong patterns of social ties and relations.  People came together to promote mutual interests, 
pool resources, express ideas and participate in the governance of their communities as the 
communal structures afforded them the vehicles to do so (Ochieng, 1991).  These structures 
included ethnic and kinship groups, such as families, clans and lineages, as well as councils of 
elders and age groups (Sobania, 2003).  
The traditional society was characterized by collective ownership. Community members were 
responsible for producing needed goods and services and ensuring that basic needs of all members 
were met (Ouma, 1987). They would also assist each other in times of difficulties and hardship 
(Kenyatta, 1965). The same traditional spirit of mutual aid that existed and functioned during the 
pre-colonial times found a new expression in the late 1960s when the Harambee movement came to 
epitomize a national self-help movement (Ngau, 1987).  
2.2.2 Colonialism and Local Community Development through Self-help  
The contribution of the colonial government in developing cooperation and self-help ideas amongst 
Kenyans took the form of community development approach that was focussed on addressing social 
welfare  (Wallis, 1976). Community Development had its origins in the British colonies in 1922. 
The objective of this strategy was to provide adequate community-based skills to Africans. In order 
to accelerate community development of the natives, in 1925 the British Education Policy in 
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Tropical Africa focused on addressing the welfare of the community and inculcating ideals of 
citizenship and service (Martin, 1990). In 1935, the policy focused on cooperation, initiative and 
self-help, aimed at improving the conditions of the native communities (Smyth, 2004).   
In 1944, community development activities were directed towards implementing mass education 
(White, 1996). Schools in the colonies were divided into three categories; village, regional and 
urban and had a role to educate the local population. The colonial government also created schools 
to educate a native elite that could serve at the lower ranks of the colonial civil service. Alongside 
education, efforts were directed towards fostering democratic values and enhancing cooperation. 
Strengthening democracy was considered fundamental in order to change people’s lives for the 
better. Mass education on the other hand was implemented to eliminate illiteracy among the young 
and the old members of the community. Mass education strategy was adopted in Kenya because it 
had been applied successfully to educate the working populations in Britain (Brockliss and Sheldon, 
2012). In 1947, the British Colonial Office developed a paper with a focus on local government in 
Africa.  At this time, and in successive years, more efforts were laid on reforms and development of 
colonies in preparation for the creation of self-government among the natives. Hence, the colonial 
government started encouraging programs that stemmed from local initiatives (Holford, 1998).  
In 1946, a Social Welfare Organization was established as a section of the colonial administration to 
spearhead community development endeavours. From 1950 to 1961 this organization was headed 
by the Commissioner for Community Development. Later, from 1954 to 1963, the Social Welfare 
Organization became a department of the Ministry of Community Development. Under the Ministry 
of Community Development, Kabete Jeans School, later named Kenya Institute of Administration, 
was established in 1925, for purposes of training village guides (Republic of Kenya 2009a). In 1946 
it trained Social Welfare Workers  who later became Community Development Assistants. 
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Between 1946 and 1952, several social (community) welfare centres or halls were constructed in 
Kenyan Districts (Mwiandi, 2006). The centres played a community empowerment role by 
providing informal education, venues for meetings, and enabling social interaction and recreation to 
take place. These centres were managed by Community Development Assistants with the help of 
District Officers for Community Development (Wallis, 1976).  
The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of major social welfare work. During this 
time, Family Remittance Officers, later known as Civil Reabsorption Officers, were posted to some 
districts to help the veteran soldiers in reintegration into the society (Lewis, 2001). In 1949, Civil 
Reabsorption Officers were re-appointed as District Officers for Community Development. The 
settlers however did not support the new created roles of the District Officers for Community 
Development, leading to their eventual disbandment.  
At the same time, the colonial government also encouraged women’s self-help work amongst the 
African communities (Wiper, 1971). This self-help activity took the form of spinning and weaving 
at small centres, which were established and run by European women. The centres later grew into 
District Home Craft Centres or District Training Centres. Several women from the centres formed 
women’s clubs once they returned to their native communities. By 1950’s women’s clubs had been 
established all over Kenya. In the same year, these clubs were placed under the women section of 
community development (Wallis, 1976). 
In the late 1940s the community development approach changed its focus from social welfare 
activities to community betterment. Later in 1950s, women’s clubs also became involved in 
community betterment activities (Wallis, 1976). The community betterment work done included 
fencing, pit latrines construction and improvement of houses.  In 1957, Community Development 
Officers replaced community development assistants and had the role of implementing community 
betterment work. The community betterment work during this time also included soil conservation, 
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homestead improvement, farm planning, building of cattle sheds, bush clearing, construction of 
roads and constructing water dams. This work was done by self-help groups and continued up to 
1963 (Berman, 1992). 
While implementing the community betterment work, the colonial government used force to get 
people to work (Martin, 1990). People were not remunerated for their participation in community 
work, instead they were penalized for non-participation. Hence, people viewed the idea of 
community development negatively and they loathed it (Mbithi and Rasmuson, 1977). Despite its 
challenges, with time, Community Development activities took the form of provision of social 
welfare centres, training institutions for community development workers, setting up agricultural 
pilot schemes for demonstration purposes, establishment of women’s clubs and community 
betterment work (Lewis, 2000).  
There are a few reasons that justify the efforts of the colonial government in initiating community 
development approach in Kenya. Firstly, the Cold War presented a threat of proliferation of 
communism in the world (Martin, 1990). The USA saw community development as a strategy 
which could build stable domestic societies, and as a result help check the communist threat. The 
USA therefore, invested in community development propagation in Kenya through the colonial 
government. Secondly, this program was restricted to African areas as a measure to reduce tension 
between Europeans and the natives (Mbithi and Rasmusson, 1977). The tensions at the time were as 
a result of the European settlement into large arable areas of African land, forbidding Africans from 
growing cash crops, restricting free movement of Africans and racial discrimination in all walks of 
life (Honsby, 2012). Hence, it was hoped that the community development programme would 
contain Africans in their localities by keeping them occupied. 
The community development approach was criticized by Mbithi and Rasmusson (1977) for having 
had several weaknesses. First, force was used to coerce people to do community work, hence 
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making it punitive instead of being seen as a development tool. Secondly, as a planning model, 
community development emphasized generalized methods of implementation and was intolerant of 
competing and better ideas.  It also ignored micro level variations by being insensitive to various 
localized contexts. Thirdly, abstract development planning was considered superior and was 
imposed on communities. Knowledge was also presumed to only flow from top down, hence the 
grassroots voices in the development discourse were quelled and forced to become passive. Trained 
community development officers were considered more knowledgeable in comparison to the 
community members with whom they worked together. The approach also fostered human rights 
abuses by constraining the natives in settlements and diverting their attention from actively 
pursuing their rights. 
2.2.3 Development Endeavours in Post-Independence Kenya  
The end of colonialism left Africans with an increased number of unmet needs and gaps, especially 
as modernization under colonial rule had changed the African habits and expectations (Jennings, 
2008). This meant that, during the initial years of independence, countries had to struggle to find 
creative ways of addressing these gaps (Amutabi, 2009). Some countries tried and registered 
notable successes, challenges and frustrations in planning and implementing development 
endeavours. Much of the frustration was based on inability to achieve broad based development for 
rural populations (Kehinde, 2004).   
As a result of weak colonial legacy, most African development programmes at independence 
proved to be weak, alien and irrelevant to the nature of grassroots developmental effort (Mbithi and 
Rasmusson, 1977). This realization made several countries attempt localized approaches to 
development in order to improve self-reliance through the use of indigenous resources. This was to 
ensure that projects were designed to meet local needs. For example Tanzania adopted the Ujamaa 
(communitarianism) policy. This policy was created to propagate African socialism, family values 
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and brotherhood (Nyerere, 1987). Ujamaa was built on the assumption that capitalism was 
exploitative and prone to cause class conflict amongst the poor and the rich in Tanzania. It aimed at 
introducing a classless, non-exploitative society characterized by equitable distribution. 
Unfortunately, Ujamaa failed to address opportunism amongst the elite and was therefore met with 
mass resistance (Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003).  The Tanzanian government on its part used force to 
ensure compliance to the policy in order to make Ujamaa successful (Boesen , Madsen and Moody, 
1977).  
Another example is that of Zambia, where a policy of Humanism was introduced. Humanism aimed 
at creating a unique value economy based on African and Christian heritage. The government took 
stakes in most enterprises in order to discourage exploitation by owners of capital. In the late 1980s 
it was estimated that 80% of the Zambian economy was made up of state run enterprises. 
Unfortunately, the nationalized industries later became wasteful and inefficient (Bigsten and 
Mugerwa, 2000). Both Ujamaa and Humanism failed to attract grassroots support and were seen as 
top-down development strategies. They did not generate popular support and participation from 
citizens and were characterized by government high-handedness. Hence, they had little chance of 
withstanding the sweeping democratic changes dictated by the structural adjustment programmes in 
the 1980s. The Harambee policy in Kenya did manage to survive however, though with enormous 
challenges and tensions between the elite and the masses (Ngau, 1987).  
The national development approaches propagated immediately after independence were meant to 
meet needs that the colonial state had either explicitly ignored or had paid scant attention to 
(Young, 2004). This was the case of the Harambee movement in Kenya, which was able to express 
itself both at the elite level and also within the networking endeavours of grassroots village 
communities. The associational activities of these village communities were later seen in the light 
of “the economy of affection” (Heyden, 2006). The economy of affection was built on notions of 
trust and mutual obligation. It provided entitlements not only to daily subsistence but also to 
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assistance in times of stress. Accordingly, the economy of affection characterized the mode of 
existence within and outside the formal structures. It provided a safety net for the poor and also 
served to enhance development by transferring surpluses from the formal to the informal sector and 
vice versa. At the same time it incentivised the poor to provide resources to build up needed 
development infrastructure within their community. Even when the formal institutional structures 
expanded their mandate, the economy of affection continued to provide for those in need.  
 
2.2.4 Post-Colonial Reorganization of Kenya’s Development  
 
Figure 2.2.1: The work of the third sector in Kenya 
 
In mid-1960’s, development committees were established at the provincial and district levels, 
alongside the creation of posts for provincial planning officers  and District Development Officers. 
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The role of the above committees and officers was to ensure the coordination of rural development 
work at district and provincial levels (KHRC and SPAN, 2010).  This was followed by the 1974-
1978 Development Plan that consigned the district to as a planning unit while entrusting District 
Development Committees with the responsibility for formulating and administering district plans. 
In 1983 the government redefined the District Development Committee’s role as District Focus 
Approach (Wallis, 1990). The District Development Committee was made up of the District 
Commissioner, District Development Officer, departmental heads of all ministries represented in 
the district, leaders of the national party, clerks of local authorities and representatives of 
development oriented parastatals.   
Though the District Focus Approach as a tool was developed to empower rural populations, it failed 
in this mission and instead served to constrain popular participation in planning, implementing and 
evaluation of programs (JICA 2008). The District Focus Approach organs made of  provincial and 
district development committees were in reality established as a reaction to the perceived need to 
control self-help and associative activities. The two development committees exercised this control 
by discouraging self-help activities and meetings of perceived political opponents. They also only 
provided financial support to economically oriented projects that made substantial use of labour and 
were in line with government policy. The policy that time, categorically rejected social projects for  
fears that they could easily be politicized (Branch and Cheeseman, 2007). 
2.3 The Harambee Self-help Movement in Kenya 
2.3.1 Background  
The term Harambee is commonly used in reference to cooperative, mutual and self-help socio-
economic development efforts in Kenya. Harambee embodies ideals of cooperation, mutual 
assistance, joint effort, mutual social responsibility and self-reliance. It is seen both as an informal 
grassroots development strategy (Akong'a, 1988) and as a formal strategy that mobilizes resources 
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for local development (Godfrey and Mutiso, 1973). It is a tool that contribute to the process of 
development by blending together efforts of the people, community service organizations and the 
government in a co-operative endeavour (Male, 1976).  
Harambee has a deep cultural meaning in Kenya and various activities are associated with it 
(Mbithi and Rasmusson, 1977). The term was popularized during anti-colonial political activism in 
the 1950 and 1960s (Odinga, 1967; Ouma, 1987). After independence the term was mainly used by 
Kenya’s political elite in their speeches to connote mutual self-help activities (Chepkwony, 2008). 
Most common definitions of the term Harambee are “pulling together”, “pooling together” or 
“mutual assistance and development”. People at the grassroots see Harambee self-help groups as a 
way to solve their individual and community socio-economic and welfare challenges (Male, 1976). 
The development planner on the other hand sees Harambee as a tool to mobilize additional 
resources for local development (Republic of Kenya, 2009a). Hence it is a way or a strategy in 
which development and welfare of the people is enhanced. 
The origin of the term Harambee has been a bone of contention among scholars. According to 
Ombudo (1986) the term Harambee originates from a Bantu word Halambee that means “let us pull 
together”. The word was originally used by porters at the coastal parts of Kenya like Mombasa, 
Lamu, Malindi and later throughout the country. Sobania (2003) attributes the term to a Swahili 
 
work slang or work gang cry that comes from two words “aaa” which means “ready” and “mbee” 
meaning “push”. According to Transparency International (2001), Harambee is a colloquialism of 
an Indian origin which translates to pooling effort. The word entered Kenya via members of the 
Indian community employed in Kenya-Uganda railway construction during the colonial period. 
Etymologically, it is derived from two words “Hare” meaning “Praise” and “Ambe” meaning one of 
the Hindu Gods associated with wealth and good health. These words would be shouted in different 
turns by supervisors and other workers during times of collective strenuous effort.  
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2.3.2 Harambee and Kenyan Nationalism 
Harambee is also considered as an integral element of Kenyan Nationalism. The word was adopted 
as a political slogan to ignite nationalistic feelings against colonialism in the 1950s and as a 
development slogan in post-independence Kenya (Odinga, 1967). It has also been engraved in the 
Kenyan coat of arms (Chepkwony, 2008). It encourages Kenyans to give their best in order to 
complete any task at hand for self, mutual and community development. Harambee therefore is a 
unique Kenyan institution, rooted in the African tradition of mutual responsibility. In traditional 
communities, people pooled efforts in activities which required intensive labour such as hut 
building, cleaning virgin land and bringing in the harvest (Ouma, 1987). Harambee has also been 
described as a way of life in Kenya and a traditional custom for Kenyans (Republic of Kenya, 
1979). Accordingly, the word Harambee is used to symbolize micro and macro self-help aspects of 
local development in Kenya. It became a major social-political and economic force for both rural 
and urban societies (Male, 1976). It is evident that the Harambee Movement became a complicated 
composite dynamic of both grassroots and elite interests.  
One of the first major national Harambee efforts in the 1920s raised funds to send the would be 
Kenya’s first President to England to petition the British Government for the return of African lands 
(Transparency International Kenya, 2001). Following independence, Harambee was integrated into 
the development strategy as a form of cost sharing between government and project beneficiaries. 
Initially beneficiaries contributed cash, materials or communal labour to government initiated 
projects for example laying water pipes and providing labour for rural access roads (Thomas, 1980). 
The concept evolved quickly as communities started initiating projects such as schools, health 
centres, and water projects. which they would finance by public fund raising on the expectation that 
the state would provide the recurrent expenditures (Ngau, 1987). 
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2.3.3 Harambee and Development Resource Mobilization 
At a national level, Harambee was envisioned as a key strategy to pool resources in a bid to 
promote development. In this regard, it was seen as a way of mobilizing resources in order to 
provide equal access to education, health and social security in a cooperative manner. It was also a 
rallying platform through which poverty, illiteracy and disease would be fought (Republic of 
Kenya, 1965). Hence Harambee enabled people to come together and pool resources in order to 
create a firm foundation for progress. It also re-asserted the strength of a people bound by a 
common goal to take responsibility for their own development (Transparency International Kenya, 
2001). 
The Harambee movement has since developed to become diverse and it comprises projects run by 
community members on a cooperative basis for their own benefit and their immediate community. 
It also entails fundraising to address individual or mutual problems or to build local projects, and 
mostly refers to mammoth fund raising rallies for government projects (Godfrey and Mutiso, 1973). 
The Harambee movement is associated with self-reliant communities who pursue community 
organized action through mobilization and efficient use of local resources in the build-up of 
stronger social networks (Mwiria, 1999). This not only acts to improve local capacity in terms of 
planning, management and participation in implementing local development activities but it also 
improves people’s confidence and self-reliance (Chieni, 2001). 
The Harambee self-help movement did survive various attempts by the executive to hijack and 
cripple it, and seemed to have carved its own unique identity. This crippling was in the form of 
resource allocation creating a feeling of deprivation in the politically less favoured sections and 
massive dependence in the favoured sections (Male, 1976). The movement was also marred by 
other challenges such as bureaucratic control (Ngau 1987), politicization (Barkan and Holmquist, 
1989) and massive corruption (Honsby, 2012).  
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In 1966, there was a rift in the government which led to the formation of an opposition party by 
dissenters. The executive then established a powerful government, whose control was grounded in 
the ability to direct political activity at the grassroots via the prefectural structure of the provincial 
administration.  This system was designed as a mechanism to root out any impending opposition 
within the government. In addition Kenya became a de facto one party state in order to suppress the 
opposition (Branch and Cheeseman, 2007). Dissenters were made to remain on the fringes of power 
and their ability to build ground support was curtailed. In the meantime the government put in effort 
to ensure that the Harambee movement did not provide any political forum to the opponents. It also 
instituted a licensing regime, administered by the provincial administration to deny opponents 
political legitimacy that patronizing Harambee projects afforded (Waiguru, 2002).   
In the 1970s, the projects were becoming bigger in scale as opposed to the original Harambee 
initiatives which had small projects such as dispensaries, primary schools, and village polytechnics. 
During this time, the local elites were initiating tertiary institutions such as hospitals, post-
secondary training institutes among others (Mbithi and Rasmusson, 1977). This evolution had two 
problems; they inflated the government expenditure on projects whose establishment it had no 
control and secondly, patronage on the projects had become an effective tool of political 
mobilization, making any notable challenge to established politicians difficult (Ngau, 1987). In 
response, the government introduced a further regulation, which required Harambee projects to be 
registered with the Ministry of Social Services in order to be eligible for Government assistance 
(Transparency International Kenya, 2001).  
2.3.4 Political influence on Harambee 
The evolution of the Harambee from 1980’s onwards has not been studied as extensively as in the 
1970s. However, its politicization in the 1980s was more pronounced than earlier. The 1980's 
marked what has been referred to by political scientists as the era of elite fragmentation, political 
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liberalization and state informalization (Branch and Cheeseman, 2007). In 1982, Kenya experienced 
an abortive military coup which was mainly engineered by forces who had been deliberately 
excluded from political benefits. The coup had dramatic consequences, with the government 
banning all manner of opposition by declaring Kenya a de jure one party state. Political exclusion 
of the opponents became severe during the 1980s (Yeager and Miller, 1993).  The government also 
resorted to coercive measures in order to cow the opposition. During this same time, there was the 
introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programs popularly referred to as the SAPs which were 
meant to accelerate economic reform through liberalization and structural reform. The SAPs 
introduced transformation in a wide ranging trade and macro-economic policies impacting on 
production costs and incentive structures (Wanyama, 2009).  
In order to ensure that the dissenters were completely weakened, the patronage of the Harambee 
movement was put under the control of the president in the 1980s (Widner, 1992). Communities, as 
well as local people, lost the Harambee initiative to the provincial administration who would coerce 
contributions from the public towards presidential Harambees. By the turn of the decade Harambee 
had become effectively nationalized.  The strong patronization of the Harambee by the political 
elite had the effect of weakening and crowding out the self-help aspect of the Movement (Ngau, 
1987) with the fact that contributions from the political elite accounted for  more than 70% on many 
occasions (Waiguru, 2002).  
The time horizon for the one party state in Kenya was shortened by a strong movement of political 
liberalization that swept across Africa in the 1990s. As part of a short term survival measure, 
government officials resorted to great corruption (Branch and Cheeseman, 2007). There was also 
deliberate de-institutionalization of some of the state organs. Militia gangs were formed, aided or 
abated by the state’s security operators with a main reason to create zones of support for the 
government and the ruling party (Waki, et al. 2008). The government repressed the opposition 
movement by torturing, and detaining its protagonists. The international community responded by 
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halting foreign aid and financial support to Kenya pending political and economic reforms 
(Murunga and Nasongo, 2007).  
With the intense pressure from both within the country and from international circles, Kenya 
reverted to a multi-party political system in 1991. With the return of multi-partism Harambee, 
became a competing strategy amongst opposing parties. The fundraising Harambee activities would 
hence increase around the electioneering periods. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Harambee 
movement evolved from being a community resource mobilization strategy into a theatre of 
political contest (Waiguru, 2002).  These contests continued to the 2000’s when civil societies 
alarmed by the negative trend that threatened the very nature (i.e. the self-help aspect)  of 
Harambee demanded for a close supervision and accountability in the political patronage of the 
movement. The main concern of civil societies hangs on the notion that political patronage cripples 
the self-help aspect of the Movement (Transparency International Kenya, 2001).  
The growth of the Harambee self-help movement since the 1960’s to present demonstrates that 
cooperating for mutual help and community development is esteemed in Kenya. The Movement 
was a dynamic combination of peasant spontaneity, development dynamics, and political dynamism 
(Ngau, 1987). The state bureaucracy, the participation of the masses and the benefits that accrued to 
both the grassroots populations and the elite, provided an unprecedented growth in Harambee 
activity. Different actors have provided idiosyncratic dimensions of growth to the movement in 
accordance to their interests. Though the peasants used it to attract resources to help in addressing 
their needs, they were also overwhelmed by development staff, bureaucracy and political elite who 
sought to put their participation under control. The political class on the other hand, had to respond 
to the demands of Harambee in order to retain their legitimacy. This dynamism had a perverse 
distortion on the self-help nature of Harambee (Barkan and Holmquist, 1989). 
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Government and external assistance to local Harambee self-help was helpful in some instances and 
harmful in others. An overabundance of external assistance led to disadvantages such as ignoring 
local needs, wastage of resources where there was sufficiency, and creating a sense of dependency 
(Male, 1976). According to Widner (1992), when people are over-assisted, no matter how 
vulnerable they are, they assume that the world owes them a living.   Little or lack of assistance on 
the other hand brings in the feeling of relative deprivation and loss of self-confidence and 
discourages people from taking an active role in development. Hence, where self-help diminishes, 
alienation is experienced with some communities becoming unhappy with the central government. 
This alienation was seen in the Harambee when force was used to induce participation (Ngau, 
1987). 
Leadership was quite important for the Harambee Movement.  Patronizing the Movement meant 
that one could easily outdo political opponents. Patronage brought about intense leadership rivalry 
by the elite. At times this competitiveness and wrangles led to discontinuity of projects and 
duplication of efforts (Matanga, 2000). Consequently, there were a couple of uncompleted 
abandoned projects. Leadership squabbles also tended to take away the peasant ability to control the 
flow of projects (Wallis, 1980). Hence in the 1970’s a number of Harambee projects were under-
utilized and had placed a burden on the people and the elite more than was feasible (Okumu and 
Holmquist, 1984).  
Ngau (1987), states that there was a relationship between the size of the projects initiated and the 
political leadership position held by the elite leaders of Harambee projects. Leaders with higher 
positions tended to initiate more costly projects than those in lower positions. In many cases, the 
peasants did not have a voice once the big projects had been chosen. They just participated in these 
projects hoping that they would benefit from them. Harambee leadership in several instances did 
serve to advance the interests of the political elite and not so much those of the community.  On the 
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other hand, some ethnic communities benefitted more than others from Harambee projects 
(Tsuchiya, 1978).   
Harambee had a dimension that was spontaneous, populist, informal and based on peasant 
initiative. The grassroots micro self-help spontaneity posed considerable problems when they were 
considered in the light of governmental central planning (Republic of Kenya, 2009b). It also 
became a political impossibility to deny permission to communities that strongly desired a 
Harambee project (Ngau, 1987). This tension came to affect the quality and nature of Harambee 
Movement in Kenya.  
Local administrators played an important role in the continuity of projects because of their seeming 
stable jobs and legitimate administrative power as opposed to politicians (Mbithi and Rasmuson, 
1977). They became part and parcel of the implementation committees and the main actors capable 
of attracting resources to a particular project.  This had the effect of making projects be identified 
with their knowledge. Administrators used their administrative powers to deal with associational 
problems and enforced contributions required for the Harambee projects (Barkan 1994). 
Community development staff subsequently deviated from their role and assumed an aura of 
importance and authority.  The reason being that they were considered the technical experts and it 
was within their mandate to approve or disapprove projects for registration and government funding 
(Ngau, 1987).  They asserted their authority by withholding information, either dispensing or 
withholding government aid and approval of projects (Waiguru, 2002).  They had serious 
difficulties in relating to small scale actions of self-help groups and were antagonistic towards 
grassroots initiatives; which caused resentment and withdrawal.  The community development staff 
in various circumstances had the effect of changing the concept of self-help to social welfare 
(Throup, 1993).   
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In time, the Harambee Movement became constrained in the space between the peasant economy, 
political elite leadership, community development staff and the provincial administration.  There 
was occasional rivalry between the provincial administration and the community development staff, 
each playing around with the legitimate authority bestowed on him or her (Wamwere, 1993).  This 
led to unpleasant scenarios where the community members started receiving conflicting directives 
from multiple authorities. As this situation worsened a disinterest was created in Harambees. The 
community development workers and the political elite did much to change the self-help concept of 
Harambee to a political philanthropy. The bureaucrats on their side forcefully extracted resources 
for development from the community members (Ngau, 1987).  
Political influence was judged based on the amount of contribution made and other prominent 
personalities attracted to a particular Harambee fundraising function (Transparency International, 
2003).  In this way, Harambee was used to create a political oligarchy preserving a few people in 
power (Everingham, 1997). It became difficult for other persons to enter into politics as Harambee 
provided a system in which the political class could consolidate their hold on the communities. 
Politicians therefore were pre-disposed to corruption and the Harambee Movement provided a sure 
way to legitimize stolen public funds (Wamwere, 1993).  During electioneering periods the number 
of Harambee fund-raisings increased at alarming rates. In the long-run, in a subtle way, Harambee 
initiated a process that was slowly becoming a subversion of democracy as politicians used it to 
bribe voters (Transparency International Kenya, 2001).  In 2003, the Government instituted a 
taskforce to study the weaknesses of Harambee in order to improve its efficacy for development in 
Kenya. The following phrase was quoted directly from the report of the taskforce: 
Harambee has become a means of distributing poverty amongst the poor. In politics, 
Harambees have become auctions, where poor voters sell political offices to the highest 
bidder,… even presidency. … Eventually this has led to the commercialization of leadership 
and power. … Harambee has given Kenyans not the best but the richest leaders…. rendered 
81 
 
… good ideas and ideals obsolete. Through Harambee, the most corrupt have become local 
heroes, celebrities and role models for the youth and encouraged Kenyans to embrace 
corruption (Parliamentary Taskforce on Harambee, 2003). 
The findings of the taskforce were incorporated in the Elections Act 2012 that advised that 
(Silverman, 2000; Birgegaard & Genberg, 1994) Harambees be banned during electioneering 
periods. At the regional level, Harambee tended to amplify the developmental differences across 
regions (Barkan and Holmquist, 1989). This was attributed to the fact that there were different 
propensities in the regions to mobilize resources for projects. Hence regional inequalities became 
evident, as Harambee was used differently across the country thus bringing about a sense of relative 
deprivation. The rich regions fared better and the poor performed poorly (Male, 1976). 
Opportunism was another problem that weighed heavily on the Harambee Movement. Some people 
embezzled money that was raised for Harambee projects while others  issued huge cheques meant 
to attract attention that later bounced (Waithima, 2012). This forced the government to introduce a 
code of conduct to deal with the problems of opportunistic behavior in the Harambee Movement 
during late 1970’s and early 1980’s and in 2011 it banned all Harambee fundraising activities by 
politicians eight months before elections (Republic of Kenya, 2011a). 
The Government exercised control on Harambee Movement through local administrative machine 
made up of chiefs and community development staff. Community development committees were 
introduced in 1964 to channel enthusiasm for self-help to useful directions (Republic of Kenya, 
2009b). In 1970’s however, it became evident that the Harambee projects had been politicized and 
that the autonomy of many self-help groups were in jeopardy. Stringent requirements for projects 
approval were introduced and the bureaucracy strengthened (Ngau, 1987). Harambee was thus 
placed under the direct control of the community development division of the ministry of 
cooperatives and social services. The heavy regulatory regime created disincentives for locally 
based development (Transparency International, 2003).  
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Response within the local communities in Kenya to the increasing contradictions, and 
disillusionment within the Harambee Movement, took various forms such as apathy, withholding 
voluntary efforts, and refusal to participate (Ngau, 1987). Individuals and groups chose to withdraw 
or defy the conventional Harambee  activities, or to engage in other forms of community action 
which they would be in control of. These efforts were in the form of cooperative activities for 
mutual assistance, mainly taking the form of self-help groups (Ochanda, 2012a). 
2.3.5 Harambee and Grassroots Self-help Endeavours 
The formation of grassroots self-help organizations is linked to the failure of political leadership, 
administration and community development staff and conventional approaches to social problems.  
The preference for the grassroots self-help organization meant to a greater extent that people wanted 
to have greater control their own lives (Ochanda, 2012a). The grassroots organizations tended to be 
informal, populist in nature and were bound by ideology rather than bureaucracy. Despite this fact, 
the bureaucracy still maintains the policy making mandate, ensuring that Harambee movement 
evolves to become a formidable development instrument in Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 2009c).  
The cooperative and associative activities in Kenya are mainly inspired by the Harambee culture. 
The post-independence Harambee vision encompassed local initiatives that contributed to the 
development process by enabling inclusion and equitable distribution of resources. The Harambee 
Movement had both a centralized bureaucratic image, and a localized spontaneous grassroots 
image. The bureaucratic image emanated from the policy and the political elites. The spontaneity 
image was associated with local village people and initiatives which took the form of self-help, 
mutual help and community development activities. Harambee fundraising and any other means of 
resource mobilization including entrepreneurship were pursued by both sides of the divide as 
important means to which local citizens, by addressing their own issues, contribute to the 
development agenda. 
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2.4 Religious Organizations in Kenya  
2.4.1 Background 
Religious organizations are key agents of social and economic development in Kenya and Sub-
Saharan Africa. They do this through their work of empowering the poor and having a presence in 
economically backward areas of countries (Kamaara, 2000). According to Olarinmoye, (2012) 
religious organizations are silent actors in development, who provide alternatives to secular 
approaches of addressing socio-economic issues. Their spiritual teachings based on a transcendental 
power gives hope, meaning and purpose to the poor (James, 2012).  
In countries dominated by oppressive regime, they are associated with the struggle for democratic 
and socio-economic transformation (Okulu, 2003a). They are also recognised for their work in 
policy and advocacy which contributes to restructuring local and international political ordering.  
Barro and Mcleary (2003), equate religion to culture on its ability to influence social interactions 
and economic outcomes. Accordingly, religion  affects personal traits such as honesty, work ethic 
and altruistic behavior. Different religions have unique philosophical orientations as far as service 
and justice is concerned. For example; Hinduism highlights social service, Judaism calls for justice, 
Christianity invokes preference for the poor, Islam demands action and charity, while African 
Traditional Religion emphasises support for the weak (Magesa, 1997; Mbiti, 1999). Different 
religions also, have different symbols which according to Durkheim (1912)  represent not only God, 
but the society as well. Religion is hence, not only a source of individual values but also of social 
identity (Gaduh, 2012). It enhances cooperation and collaboration as manifested in behavior 
comprising of  willingness to helping, trusting and tolerating one another.  
Contribution of religion in Kenya can be seen on three fronts; first, it acts as a medium for 
facilitating connectivity between humans and deities; secondly, it is a framework for morality and 
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ethics that appeals to people’s conscience; third, it contributes to providing the infrastructure that 
facilitates human welfare and development (Ochanda, Were, Wamalwa and Kabugi, 2003). In 
concrete terms, religion contributes to solving human and ecological problems. According to John 
Paul II (1997) religion invests in people’s hopes by being present in both sad and happy situations 
of their lives. It promotes common good by addressing distributive injustices, inequalities, 
corruption, underdevelopment and oppression through direct interventions or advocacy. Though this 
may be seen as a distinct mission of religion it is complementary to that of the state.  
Religious actors have been present in the lives of Kenyans in Various ways. Okullu (2003a) 
demonstrated that these actors do play a big role in the society by accompanying the weak. This is 
seen in their work of feeding hungry populations, assisting refugees, providing water and 
intervening in dispute situations among others. According to Magesa (2004) enunciates that 
religious actors have kingly, prophetic and divine roles. The kingly role is manifested through 
provision of services and infrastructure to address temporal needs. The prophetic role brings change 
to the unjust socio-economic and political structures in the society. The divine mission is that of 
pre-destination. Njoroge (1999) shows that religious accompaniment is vivid in Kenya through 
different interventions.   
The purpose of this section is to discuss the contribution of religious actors to social economic 
welfare in Kenya.  In so doing, the section will first examine the development of religion in Kenya 
in the light of its positive and negative contributions. Secondly it will analyse its contribution to 
health and education sectors. Then by studying the umbrella religious organizations’ activities, it 
will shed light on other contributions made by religious actors in Kenya. The contribution of 
religious actors will be considered in the light of the broader third sector in Kenya. 
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2.4.2.Religion and Socio-Economic Welfare 
Literature on religion and development focuses on relationship between economic development and 
Protestantism, Catholicism and Islam (Grier, 1997). This literature originating from Weberian time 
associates the propensity to develop economically with certain religions. These religions have better 
work ethic, better personal moral values and entrepreneurship abilities. Moreover, most studies tend 
to focus on religion and economic development (Ajaegbu, 2012; Olarinmoye, 2012). The other 
strand of literature looks at secularization effect. They argue that as societies become richer, 
religion becomes less significant to them. They  hence, suggest that there is a positive correlation 
between non-believing and affluence (Peterson, 2007).  
 Studies contend that estimating  the contribution of religious actors in development is a challenge 
because of lack of data (Botchewey, 2007).  Community development activities of religious actors 
can be seen in areas comprising social capital building, peace building, health services and 
education provision among others. While religion has the ability to offer hope for the revitalization 
of society, it is capable to either motivate or discourage participation in civic activities and to reject 
or accept a particular social ordering (Escobar, 1997).  
Religion can also become a negative force degenerating into militancy, promoting horrific violence 
and prejudice hence limiting any progress towards social solidarity. In this regard, Kim (2007) 
argues that religions are capable to degenerate to conservatism, bigotry or extremism. In 
discouraging civic participation, they could make adherents to be concerned more about the 
transcendental order other than reality. Hence, religion becomes an alternative to civic order and not 
its component (Candland, 2000).  Aloofness from civic participation by religious actors was 
criticised by Okullu in 2003. Accordingly, higher civic involvement enables religion to contribute 
to social change which generates the social capital for community development, complementing 
state and market forces (Okullu, 2003b).   
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Religious actors also contribute to the promotion of justice and equality. Their actions may help 
break harmful constructs resulting from prejudice, poor distribution mechanisms and generally 
accepted oppressive tendencies. On this,  Kim (2007) gives an example of  Indian culture where 
negative social constructs are used to oppress groups of people delineating them to lower castes. 
Religious organizations in India have been working to change these constructs. In the USA, 
religious actors played an important role in changing the construct of the masses against racism 
through leading civic campaigns in the 1960s. 
 In this case, religion can be used to empower the oppressed to stand against injustices. It does this 
by challenging them not to accept negative social labels tagged on them and  encourages them to 
emulate attitudes consonant with a positive self-image.  Religion has an ethical contribution which 
is an important reputational signal preceding all social interactions. It can have an impact on 
believers’ relationship to socio-political issues and also global development. In today’s highly 
secularized context, religion has taken the form of supporting global development and strengthening 
activist pressures for social policies to end human miseries (Freston, 2007).    
Kham & Bahar, (2008) find that relationship between religion and development is likely to be 
complementary as long as there is inter religious understanding that occurs when different religions 
promote attitudes of moderation as opposed to extremism. They also found that peaceful co-
existence between various religious groups within a country, was fundamental for development and 
betterment of people’s welfare. Accordingly, they argue that in societies where belief in God is 
more pronounced, values of honesty, hard work and integrity would be more prevalent leading to 
reduction of uncertainties and improved efficiency in social interactions. Therefore the “God” 
aspect of religion becomes a uniting factor amongst different religions.  
Religion therefore contributes to enhancing economic growth and development by promoting  
positive attitude towards honesty. Since the concept of ‘truthful living’ is a major emphasis in 
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religious practice, it induces a sincere attitude in all interactions and dealings. Truthful living may 
increase social capital, levels of trust and reduce levels of corruption and criminal activities. It may 
also encourage thrift, which could stimulate saving, investing and therefore economic growth.  
Faithfulness to religious teachings may lead to better health when followers desist from “sinful” 
activities such as drug abuse, overeating, gambling,  among others (Magesa, 2013). Religious 
teachings also promotes positive regards towards the vulnerable and weaker members of society. 
The public are made to understand that sharing and caring are important dimensions of being a 
religious person. In promoting the sharing dimension, different religions have different practices 
such as the Zakaat amongst the Moslems, the idea of “being a brother’s keeper” among the 
Christians and helping the weak among the African Traditional Religion adherents. Practically all 
religions of the world have incorporated the aspect of charity as an important dimension of their 
existence (McCleary, 2008).  
Possible negative effects of religion on social economic welfare include religious restrictions on 
capital accumulation, profit-making, credit markets and interest. Religious practices may increase 
resource allocation towards faith activities and infrastructure, thereby removing resources from 
market and social welfare activities (Grier, 1997). Where considerable time and resources are 
directed towards faith activities, economic, social welfare and production activities suffer. The 
transcendental aspect of religion, despite having a predestination dimension have also practical 
challenges. Unscrupulous religious actors may exploit it negatively to enforce spurious beliefs.   
Some of these beliefs could take the form of miracles on either health or financial well-being. As a 
consequence, people’s medical conditions get complicated resulting in deaths as they boycot 
medical attention. Other examples where spurious beliefs may be propagated are associated with the 
rise of churches that are based on “prosperity gospel”  which tend to attract the poor looking for 
“deliverance from poverty” while at the same time ripping them off their income (Association of 
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Bible Students, 2007). Where care is not taken, religions could turn into dangerous cults. Such cults 
could degenerate into terrorist groups propagating fundamentalist ideas (Magnus, 1996), 
encouraging  ritual murders (McIntyre, 2012) or cultic suicides (Wasswa, 2002) 
 2.4.3 Historical Background of Muslim and Christian Religions in Kenya 
The earliest history of foreign religion in Kenya and East Africa is associated with an uneasy 
relationship between Islam and Christianity. This history is divided into various historical periods. 
The first period is presumed to have started in the 6
th
 Century ending in the 13
th
 century. This was a 
period of early settlement of the Arabs in the coastal areas of Kenya and East Africa. This period is 
associated with Hijira where convert Muslim Arabs were migrating  from place to place escaping 
animosity directed to them by non-Muslims in their countries. Several of these migrants had earlier 
trading relationship with East Africa, hence when the persecution started, East Africa became their 
safe haven. In the coastal towns of Eastern Africa, they were welcomed by the Swahili people and 
the local Bantu ethnic communities (Bosha, 1993). The new Arab migrants settled in Lamu, 
Mombasa, and other coastal towns. With time, interactions with the Swahili and other ethnic 
communities led to intermarriages. The Arabs learnt the local culture and the Swahili language and 
in turn, the natives adopted Islam as a religion. 
The second period commonly referred to as the Shirazi epoch is associated with the settlement of 
Arab dynasties along the Eastern Africa Coast and on the Comoros Islands between 13
th
 and 15
th
  
Centuries. While the early interactions were limited to the coastal areas, there is some evidence of 
penetration into the interior mainly for trade. Initially, the wealth of the Shirazis was gotten from 
sea trade with Arabia and the Persian Gulf and not with the interior of Eastern Africa (Vittori & 
Bremer, 2009). With time the Arabs in partnership with the Swahili moved inland, trading in cloths 
from India, beads, spices, metal like swords and daggers and other items from Asia. From the 
mainland they got leopard skins, tortoise shells, rhinoceros horns, ostrich feathers, wax, ivory, 
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slaves, cloves, and gold (Mukuthuria, 2009). There is no evidence of forced Islamization at this 
time. Islam was adopted voluntarily by local communities and also among the slaves.  
The Shirazi period ended with Portuguese colonization of the region in early 16th century. The 
Portuguese, led by Vasco da Gama were interested in trading with India and the Far East and also in 
diminishing the influence of Islam which had threatened Portugal and Spain (Nthamburi, 1982). 
The Portuguese, in order to achieve their mission formed an alliance with an Ethiopian Christian 
Monarch. This intention made Portuguese to encounter hostility from Muslims who had earlier 
settled in all the places they went along the Eastern Coast. They were later welcomed in Malindi, 
partly because the ruler of Malindi was always at war with his more powerful neighbour in 
Mombasa.  The Portuguese then established that there were gold deposits along the Coast in the 
hands of hostile forces. In order to gain a monopoly over the gold trade, Portugal sent an army in 
1505 which managed to gain control of the hostile territories.  
Little attempts were made to convert the local populations to Christianity. However there were 
small episodes of conversions to Christianity between 1500 to 1600. For example in 1506, 40 
people were baptized. In 1591, an apparent heir to the Sultan of Zanzibar was also baptized which 
caused much tension. In 1599, 600 people were baptized including the exiled ruler of Pemba who 
was in Mombasa. Conversions to Christianity continued in a slow pace as the natives loathed the 
Portuguese who were considered inhuman and had a negative reputation of stealing and cruelty. 
The behaviour of the Portuguese had a negative effect on their plans to convert the East Africans to 
Christianity.  
In 1631, the Arabs made a successful offensive against the Portuguese. From then on the struggle 
for dominance continued till 1729 when the Portuguese were defeated and expelled from East 
African Coast to Mozambique. After the defeat of the Portuguese, few Christians, mainly Indians 
from Goa remained. There were no Christians from the indigenous population. The fall of the 
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Portuguese was mainly associated to the lack of local support as they sacrificed it in  pursuance of 
commercial aims. Their denouncing of Islam also played a part in creating major opposition against 
them.  
The third period coincides with the defeat of the Portuguese and the rise of the Sultan of Zanzibar 
who hailed from Oman during the 1800s. The Sultan extended his hegemony to Mombasa after 
having conquered it. He promoted trade with Mombasa by providing spices, ivory, cloves, cowrie 
shells, and slaves. Zanzibar on its part imported cloth, firearms and hardware (Vittori and Bremer, 
2009). The Sultan of Zanzibar did not actively promote Islam in the interior. Islam was nevertheless 
adopted among both slaves and some of the inland ethnic communities, especially those associated 
with trade.  
Slave trade was quite a horrific human activity, exposing people to much suffering. The pains of 
slave trade in East Africa attracted the attention of David Livingstone a missionary from the 
London Missionary Society  (1840- 1843). Livingstone came to Africa as a missionary cum 
explorer (BBC, 2012). He worked hard to end slave trade and by 1863, slavery had been abolished 
officially in Europe and in America although illegal slave trade continued. The published works of 
David Livingstone opened the African continent to trade and missionaries activities (Livingstone, 
1857). These works provided an important impetus for colonization of Africa by European powers, 
and also to Christian missionary activities (Livingstone, 1865).  During this same period Ludwig 
Krapf  began his Missionary activities in 1844, courtesy of the Church Missionary Society and later 
the Methodist Church. Krapf worked until 1862 during which he translated the Bible’s New 
Testament into Swahili. Catholic missionaries also made their way into Kenya in 1863 after having  
established themselves permanently in Zanzibar. 
Early missionaries’ work in Africa provided adequate data capable of arousing interest of their 
countries. This led to the Berlin West African Conference of 1884-1885, where Africa was 
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partitioned and eventually colonized by European powers. This had implications for religious 
activities and helped in ending slave trade in East Africa. Penetration was also made easier into the 
interior, paving way for greater diffusion of both Islam and Christian religions (Nthamburi, 1991: 
Vittori and Bremer, 2009). Christian activities continued to increase with Independent Churches of 
Africa and the Pentecostal Churches joining the fray by mid-1800s and more so during the 
colonization and after independence.  
Independent churches arose out of the desire to indigenize Christianity by incorporating African 
traditional religious world views. These indigenous religions resented the decadence that they felt 
was tolerated by mainstream Christianity. They also abhorred domination by European settlers, 
forced labor, segregation on the basis of colour, and assault on African people, practices and culture 
(Imunde & Padwick, 2008).  The strength of African Independent Churches was in their spiritual 
and social capital. They have a greater influence at the grassroots (Imunde & Padwick, 2008).  
There are other churches that are considered independent or evangelical.  By 2007 the office of the 
Attorney General in Kenya had registered a total of  8,520 churches in Kenya, with 6,740 
applications for registration waiting to be processed. It was also estimated that by 2009 Kenya could 
have roughly 10,000 registered churches (East African Standard, 2007).  
2.4.4 Religion in present-day Kenya 
 Approximately 83% of Kenyans are Christians. Of the Christians, Catholics form about 23% of the 
population while 47% of the Christian population are Protestants. Other Christians form 13 percent 
of the population.  Islam in Kenya is a religion of approximately 11.2 percent of the population, or 
approximately 4.3 million people.  
Table 2.4.1: Religion in Present Kenya 
Religion Number Percentage 
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Protestant 18,307,466 47.66% 
Catholic 9,010,684 23.46% 
Other Christian 4,559,584 11.87% 
Muslim 4,304,798 11.21% 
No religion 983,361 2.56% 
Traditionalist 635,352 1.65% 
Other religion 557,450 1.45% 
Hindu 53,393 0.14% 
Total 38,412,088 100% 
Source: Kenya Bureau of Statistics 2010  
The Muslims in Kenya are mostly found in the Coastal regions and North Eastern Province. 
However there are pockets of Muslims in other areas of the country. The majority of Kenyan 
Muslims are Sunni, followed by the Shi'a.  2.5% of the population do not profess any religion, 1.7% 
profess African Traditional Religion while 1.5 is made up of other small religions in Kenya.  
2.4.5 Religious Organizations, Slavery and Colonialism in Kenya 
It is impossible to discuss about Christian and Muslim Religion in Kenya without touching on the 
subject of slavery. The scourge of slavery will forever continue to haunt Africa. Slavery seems to 
have been sanctioned by major religions especially Christianity and Islam. It is said that while 20 
million Africans were sold into slavery about 80 million died during the hunt for slaves (Bales and 
Soodalter, 2009). Subsequently, because of the ills of slavery, religious actors became part of the 
movement that championed for its abolition. Their actions pushed their governments to intervene in 
order to stop the vice (Livingstone, 1857). According to Nthamburi (1982), the missionaries put up 
facilities for reintegration of slaves along the coastal areas of East Africa including Zanzibar and 
Comoros. They assisted different types of slaves; those who had escaped from their masters and 
those bought back to freedom either by missionaries or the British naval forces plying the Indian 
Ocean. The reintegration settlements were governed with cruelty and little freedom was allowed to 
the freed slaves. The slaves were subjected to bad treatment, beatings and scourging at the hands of 
missionaries (Temu, 1972). They were used as a source of cheap labour under the pretext that they 
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were being taught skilled trades and manual work.  However the missionaries did also assist the 
freed slaves with literary education.  
Several studies indicate that early missionaries invited their home countries to annex and colonize 
countries in East Africa thus, “the cross preceded the flag”. Apologists maintain that missionaries 
were convinced that in order to effectively deal with slave trade, European governments had to 
assume responsibility of introducing legitimate trade and education in the region. Accordingly, 
government’s work would supplement missionary efforts (Nthamburi, 1991). Dissenting views 
sustain that the missionaries had no different plans from the colonizers, in fact they only came to 
prepare grounds for them (Mukuthuria, 2009) and aided the colonization process at its initial stage. 
This view is supported by Jomo Kenyatta, first president of Kenya as quoted by Walker (2002); 
When Missionaries arrived, Africans had the land while the Missionaries had the Bible. 
They taught us how to pray with our eyes closed. When we opened them, they had the land 
and we had the Bible (Walker, 2002:144). 
According to Kenyatta (1965), Colonization was just as worse as slavery; and a great assault on the 
African culture.  It also led to the occupation of African lands by white settlers who condemned 
Africans to forced and cheap labour, high taxation and racial segregation. In 1919 the colonial 
government promulgated a policy on forced labour. Despite being associated with the colonialists, 
the missionaries undertook advocacy on behalf of Africans to challenge the excesses of the colonial 
government.  Missionary protests led to the issuance of the 1923 Devonshire paper that directed 
colonial government to ensure that African interests were made paramount.  
The year 1952 is associated with the inception of Mau Mau uprising. The Mau Mau was a Kenyan 
liberation movement created to fight for the return of African lands from colonialists through armed 
struggle. Missionaries sided with the government’s position on Mau Mau.  The colonial government 
used excessive force against the adherents of Mau Mau. Missionaries and other religious leaders 
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never raised a voice in the face of these atrocities against the local populations. Their quietness 
strongly indicated that they were actually part of the huge colonial enterprise and that they had to 
play it safe in order to continue benefiting from colonialism.    
2.4.6 Some Contributions of Religious Organizations in Kenya 
One of the major contributions of Christianity and Islam in Kenya has been the proliferation of the 
Swahili language. Swahili has facilitated communication among different ethnic communities, and 
acted as a medium through which education and trade take place (Bosha, 1993). Swahili language is 
spoken in most countries of East and Central Africa; Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo Brazzaville.  Early manuscripts of the Swahili Language 
date back to 1780 and are written in Arabic Alphabets. Originally Swahili was used to spread Islam 
amongst the local populations by Arab preachers, it hence got influenced by Arabic language 
(Bosha, 1994). The first Arab Imams customarily switched to Arabic whenever the local languages 
and Swahili did not provide appropriate translations for their message. Through Islam religion many 
Arab words became part of the Swahili language.  
When the Christian missionaries came to Kenya, they translated the Bible into Swahili and helped 
in the creation of the Swahili dictionary. They also introduced into Swahili, words that had no 
equivalent meaning from their countries. Apart from religious actors, the proliferation of Swahili as 
a lingua franca in Eastern Africa is attributed to many other factors such as trade, colonization and 
governmental policies after independence (Nthamburi, 1991; Mukuthuria, 2009). Apart from 
Swahili, English too was gradually introduced as an important medium of communication among 
the Eastern African countries by Missionaries. English became the language of academic instruction 
and commerce.  
Religious organizations were mandated by the colonial government to implement education, health 
and other community development infrastructure for Africans. This signifies that collaboration 
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between religious actors and the State in Kenya on matters of socio-economic development started 
in 1900s.As a result of this mandate, religious organizations introduced vocational training 
institutions, special schools for the physically challenged and homes for old people who had no one 
to care for them. Today, over fifty per cent of medical work (hospitals and clinics) in the rural areas 
falls under the ambit of religious actors. They are also heavily involved in rural development 
programs and agriculture improvement through cooperatives, farm input provision and in field 
extension services. The religious actors are hence seen as partnering with the government in helping 
to alleviate human suffering.  
After independence, the religious organizations got more immersed in development and advocacy. 
They extended their presence in the arid and semi-arid, remote and marginalised regions, 
constituting the poorest populations in Kenya. In these regions, basic government welfare-services 
such as education, health and water provision are lacking. The regions also suffer from constant 
disputes as a result of scarce resources. Some of these disputes have assumed serious proportions at 
times leading to fatalities (Mayoyo, 2012).  The disputes are also caused by negative exploits of 
ethnicity, political and other interests (TJRC, 2013). In adverse situations, faith organizations help 
to maintain calm and initiate reconciliation processes. Where there are fatalities they provide 
emergency support and psycho-social assistance.  
Religious organizations have been engaged in a wide range of services as broad in scale as those 
delivered by secular and state counterparts. Their services  Include education, health, economic 
empowerment and in-kind support to the poor. They also do offer humanitarian relief in crises as 
well as other less conventional forms of service such as legal aid and human rights advocacy. The 
scale of their service provision varies from one context to another. According Tadroz (2010) 
religious actors account for 50 per cent of health service provision in the Democratic Republic of  
Congo, 40 per cent in Kenya and Lesotho, and 55 per cent in Uganda. 
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2.4.7 Religious Organizations and Education in Kenya  
Involvement of religious actors in the education sector in Kenya can be traced back to colonial 
days. According to Eshiwani (1990), formal education was introduced to the people of Kenya by 
missionaries as a strategy for evangelism. The missionaries dominated in the provision and 
administration of education throughout the colonial period. Some of the centres they established 
grew into large institutions and are among the best schools in the country. According to Shidende 
(1996), some missionaries believed that they had a mandate to reform the social sector of African 
life. This was to be achieved through equipping Africans with Christian education.  
Eshiwani, (1993) notes that by the time of independence in 1963, religious organizations had played 
a big role in establishing educational institutions and continue to do so today. It is for this reason 
that the government included religious sponsors in the management of public secondary schools in 
its policy of 1968 which was revised in 1980 (Mabeya, Ndiku and Njino, 2010). Wainaina, (1991), 
indicated that churches were allowed to open schools and take part in preparing syllabuses for 
Religious Education in post independent Kenya. 
Mosomi (2008), maintains that in recognising their function as sponsors, religious actors are always 
consulted with regard to staffing, representation in school committees and board of governors in 
their sponsored schools and other educational projects. They are also allowed the use of school and 
project buildings free of charge. The table below shows the distribution of the sponsorship of 
Kenyan secondary schools by different actors. 
Table 2.4.2: Sponsorship of Kenyan Secondary Schools 
Secondary school location No of Schools Percentage 
Religious 1,042 61.80 
Government 232 13.76 
Local Authority 30 1.78 
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Community 136 8.07 
NGO/CBO 6 0.36 
Private 240 14.23 
Total 1,686 100 
Source: Republic of Kenya open data project, 2011  
65% of school sponsors are religious organizations. Most of the religious sponsored schools i.e. 967 
are considered to be public schools meaning, that the government provides recurrent expenses.  73 
of the religious sponsored schools are private and are on a 100% sponsorship by the religious 
organizations.  
Table 2.4.3: Sponsorship of Health Facilities in Kenya 
Facility Frequency Percentage 
Religious 1,058 26.85 
Government 2,222 56.40 
Local authority 111 2.82 
NGO/CBO 69 1.75 
Private 354 8.98 
Other ministry 126 3.20 
Total 3,940 100 
Source: Republic of Kenya open data project, 2011  
26.85% of health facilities sponsors are religious organizations. A few of these facilities operate 
under the auspices of the ministry of health. The government through the ministry of health runs 
56.40% of all health facilities. 8.98% of the facilities are sponsored by private practitioners while 
the CBOs and NGOs sponsor 1.75%. Other government ministries sponsor 3.20%.  
Table 2.4.4: Sponsorship of Different types of Health Facilities 
Facility Religious 
sponsor 
Other 
sponsors 
total 
Hospital MoH and Mission District, sub districts 85 121 206 
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Referral Hospital and Provincial Hospitals  0 10 10 
Health Centres 140 536 676 
Dispensaries 803 1,640 2,443 
Private Hospitals  0 1 1 
Private Clinics and Medical Centres 0 206 206 
Nursing Homes and Maternity Hospitals  17 206 223 
Special Treatment Hospitals  7 55 62 
Institutions Health Facilities- Schools, Universities, 
Employer 
4 329 333 
 1,056 3,104 4,160 
Source: Republic of Kenya open data project, 2011  
The health facilities classification is in accordance with the government of Kenya’s open data 
portal. The religious health facilities include 7.75% hospitals, 0.18% referral hospitals, 72.77% 
dispensaries and 12%health centres. Other facilities are 0.45% private hospitals, 2.07% clinics and 
medical centres, 1.35% special treatment hospitals and 1.17% institutional health facilities.  
2.4.8 Other initiatives by Religious Organizations 
2.4.8.1 Interventions against the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
Religious actors have been involved in prevention, care and support programs against HIV/AIDS. 
Within churches and mosques, it is now natural to discuss HIV/AIDS and related issues (Diakonia, 
2008). As a result, stigma of HIV/AIDS has been reduced and more people today, are seeking 
health services and living positively. Religious actors have also been criticised for not openly 
discussing HIV/AIDS initially as they considered it too controversial. They are hence considered to 
have indirectly contributed to the pandemic’s escalation (Haynes, 2007). The blame is exacerbated 
by the fact that they did not accept scientific and artificial efforts to prevent the spread of the 
disease (Ouko, 2007). Today, however, there are many structures, both formal and informal to 
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address the AIDS issue within religious communities (Amanze, 2010).  These structures address 
issues of stigma, psychosocial care, material assistance and prevention (KARDS, 2003). 
2.4.8.2 The Inter Religious Council of Kenya 
In 1983, the umbrella religious bodies in Kenya formed the Inter Religious Council of Kenya 
(IRCK). The IRCK is not an umbrella body but a coalition of all faith communities in 
Kenya.  IRCK encourages religious communities to pursue interfaith dialogue and collaboration for 
common action whenever necessary. It also encourages mobilization of moral and social resources 
to address shared concerns. In its work with different religious bodies, IRCK places strong 
emphasis on organic solidarity and harmony.  
IRCK is a community of religious leaders brought together by a common cause. Some themes 
addressed by IRCK’s programs comprise health and children, governance and economic justice, 
peace and conflict transformation, gender and youth empowerment, community development and 
trainings to religious leaders.  Health programs mainly target children and women. IRCK also 
provides psycho-social support to hundreds of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). Of concern 
to IRCK are issues of maternal, child health and survival.  
In promotion of social and economic justice, IRCK has programs on social budgeting, community 
monitoring and social intelligence report. The IRCK peace and conflict transformation takes the 
form of ‘arms down’ campaign which advocates for active non-violence.  Youth are taken through 
an alternative rites of passage which includes formal and life skills education. This program 
involves the active participation of religious leaders who meet regularly to iron out issues that could 
lead to inter-religious and inter-ethnic violence. The organization trains religious leaders on various 
topical issues affecting society. This training is always done on the premise that those trained will 
take the teachings down to their followers. IRCK works to promote human dignity and inter-gender 
equity. The main beneficiaries in this area are the survivors of gender based violence especially in 
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areas prone to domestic violence. In their gender programs, they also address issues facing the 
youth.  
2.4.8.3 The Kenya Episcopal Conference 
The Kenya Episcopal Conference is the top governance arm of the Catholic Church in Kenya. It is 
governed through 15 commissions. Seven of which deal with matters relating to Catholic doctrinal 
issues and internal management. Two commissions are involved with inter-religious dialogue. 
Other commissions encompass education, justice and peace, development and social services, 
health, social communication, migrants and seafarers. Some of the practical works pursued by the 
Catholic Church include relief and emergency activities, school feeding programmes, construction 
of dams, peace building and HIV/AIDS mitigation.   
The Catholic Church has also established several universities, health facilities and educational 
institutions in Kenya. The social development activities of the Catholic Church have been localized 
within dioceses through structures known as “Caritas” or development offices. These bodies 
implement programmes according to the needs of their dioceses. The KEC also has engagements at 
national levels in line with the themes of its commissions.      
2.4.8.4 National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCK) 
The National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCK) was established in 1913. It is a protestant 
umbrella body bringing together 26 church members, nine associate members made up of 
associations and interfaith institutions, and six fraternal members who only have a relationship with 
NCCK.  
Some of the projects operated by NCCK encompass civic education, famine response, HIV/AIDS 
mitigation, gender empowerment, working with pastoralist communities, refugee project, peace 
building and conflict transformation. NCCK has both national and grassroots programmes. The 
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umbrella body implements national programmes while the local member churches respond to local 
needs. It also runs a number of universities and several training institutes on behalf of its members. 
The members of NCCK have many local programs depending on the needs of their followers. 
2.4.8.5 Organization of African Independent Churches (OAIC) 
OAIC draws its membership from grassroots Christian churches whose values and beliefs stem 
from African Tradition, Hebrew and Christian Scriptures (Imunde and Padwick, 2008).  Their 
practice of worship is a continuation of African Traditional values into the Christian faith. Though a 
majority of these denominations have few followers, there are a few large indigenous churches with 
membership numbering in millions. Member of OAIC churches of are generally drawn from the 
poor and less educated inhabitants of the rural areas and informal urban settlements (shanty areas 
and slums).  
OAIC is involved in community health programs. Its members also work to promote sustainable 
livelihoods through enhancing the abilities of their members in production and other income 
generating activities. They have programs on peace and reconciliation amongst different 
communities. On social justice they advocate for equal distribution of resources (OAIC, 2013).  
2.4.8.6 Supreme Council Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) 
The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) is the umbrella body of all Muslim 
organizations, societies, mosque committees and different Muslim groups in Kenya. Membership to 
the Council does not include individual Muslims but groups and associations.  
The Council implements five major programmes; education, HIV/AIDS, civic education, civil 
society empowerment, peace building and conflict transformation. Some of the social programmes 
operated by the Council include homes for destitute children, schools, radio station and health 
centres. SUPKEM, through the community mosques responds to local needs at grassroots levels. 
102 
 
2.4.9 Summary of religious interventions 
In summary, religious organizations do contribute to the social economic welfare of Kenyans. 
Government data shows that they are involved in education and health. The case studies of religious 
umbrella organizations indicates that they are involved in peace building, assisting the socially 
excluded and the vulnerable, agriculture, water and the development of remote and hardship areas. 
They also contribute in areas such  as community, gender, civic and economic empowerment, youth 
formation,   civil society strengthening and media.   
Religious organizations make a formidable contribution in infrastructure building and solving 
practical challenges. They help end harmful cultural practices, promotion of peaceful coexistence, 
social integration and provision of a myriad of social services.  Through their work, they help 
complement government efforts in improving the quality of life of the masses.  
Their work demonstrates that they are an important element of the third sector in Kenya. They 
address local challenges in innovative ways. Their programs cut across all sections of the society. 
Their investments are also found in the most difficult, marginalised and remote areas. Religious 
investments have a strong humane element.     
2.5 The Cooperative Movement in Kenya 
2.5.1 Background  
The cooperative movement is associated with economic liberation and empowerment of many 
people and communities in Kenya (International Cooperative Alliance, 2012). Its development has 
largely been a success story with the country being supposed to have an organized cooperative 
sector and huge membership in comparison to other countries in  Sub Saharan Africa (Muthuma, 
2011). The movement in Kenya employs more than 250,000 people both directly and indirectly.  
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The cooperative movement has an important socio-economic significance. It plays a crucial role in 
enhancing food security, building social capital, promoting socio economic welfare and contributes 
to improving the gross domestic product (Republic of Kenya, 2004a). It traverses the rural and 
urban; formal and informal; micro and macro sectors of the economy. The  sector plays a role of 
stimulating the spirit of enterprise and assisting individuals and communities socio-economically 
better of thus enhancing social inclusion. As a result of this, the government has been keen to 
sustain it (Republic of Kenya 2008q). 
Despite its positive role, the cooperative sector has had many challenges (Wanyama, 2009).These 
challenges include poor management, insufficient capital, inadequate technical capacity and 
negative political interference. In order to address these challenges, the government has been 
investing in strengthening its governance and technical capacity. In order to promote the growth and 
proliferation of the sector, the government also plans to encourage community based organizations 
and groups to transform into cooperatives (Republic of Kenya, 2008c).  
The cooperative movement development in Kenya is well documented. However, the role played by 
the movement in reinforcing the third sector has not been given much attention. Existing studies 
have explored the development of the sector (Ouma, 1987), its contribution in the build-up of social 
capital, evolution of its sub-sectors (Muthuma 2011; Kuria 2012), policy evolution (Manyara 2004) 
and use of information and communication technology in the cooperative world (Gunga, 2011).  
This section intends to study:   
 How the cooperative movement has promoted socio-economic welfare of Kenyans 
 The role played by the cooperative movement in the build-up of Kenya’s third sector.  
In order to meet the above objectives, the section will examine the evolution, policies and the socio 
economic aspects of the of the movement.  
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2.5.2 Historical background of the cooperative movement on Kenya 
2.5.2.1 Cooperation in Pre-Colonial Kenya 
Cooperation plays an important role in the lives of Kenyan people and emanates from the pre-
colonial times of the traditional societies. Cooperation was  in essence a vital aspect and dimension 
of the indigenous culture (Ouma 1987). Traditional cooperation facilitated achievement of social 
economic and welfare needs. Despite being an important aspect of traditional life, cooperation was 
spontaneous and it did not have formal structures. Formalization of the  cooperation structures into 
cooperatives were developed during the colonial era. At this time, cooperatives came to serve as 
avenues of effecting community development initiatives, introducing the culture of thrift and played 
a role in education (Gamba and Komo, 2005). These new aspects of cooperation replaced the 
traditional cooperation practice (Ngigi, 2004b).   
2.5.2.2 Cooperative Development in Colonial Kenya 
Pioneer cooperative activities were started in the dairy and grain sectors. These earliest efforts could 
be traced to 1908, when the Lumbwa Cooperative society at present day Kipkelion in the Rift 
Valley Province was created to purchase fertilizer, chemicals, seeds and other farm inputs. It was 
mandated to market farm and dairy produce and address other challenges of technological 
constraints so as to take advantage of economies of scale at the time (Bwisa 2010; Adler and 
Munene, 2000). Apart from marketing, the society was also charged with the collection of 
members’ milk for collective processing. In 1925, the settlers dairy farmers around Naivasha 
formed the Kenya Co-operative Creamery  and in 1928 the farmers around Nanyuki set-up the 
Nanyuki Co-operative Creamery.  In the beginning, the three co-operative creameries operated 
independently of each other and were export-oriented. Unfortunately during that time, the 
depression of 1930s shrunk international markets for dairy products. This economic downturn had 
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the result of forcing the three creameries to turn their attention to the much smaller domestic market 
and in 1931, all the creameries merged under the Kenya Cooperatives Creamery (Ngigi, 2004a). 
In 1895, the Church Mission Society started experimentation on wheat production in Machakos. 
These experimentations enabled the first commercial wheat production in 1904, by settler farmers 
on 1200 acres. As wheat production was gaining ground, the settler farmers registered Unga Ltd in 
1908, to help in processing of grains (Anadajayasekaram, et al. 2007). By 1919, wheat was planted 
in over 12000 acres establishing it as a commercially viable crop. In the same year the settlers 
established the British East Africa Maize Growers Association  which evolved to become the Kenya 
Famers Association in 1923. Earlier on in 1922, settlers in Uasin Gishu formed the Plateau Maize 
Growers Association  which also constructed a grain mill. The Plateau Maize Growers Association  
enacted a legislation requiring all the wheat produced in Uasin Gishu to be sold through it. Later in 
1927, it merged with Kenya Farmers Association.  At this same time, another association was 
formed in Nairobi known as Wheat Grain Growers Association which incorporated Kenya Grain 
Mills Ltd. In 1928, Unga acquired controlling interests in Kenya Grain Mills forcing Wheat Grain 
Growers Association to become part of the Kenya Farmers Associations (Haxley, 1957). Hence, 
after 1928, Kenya Farmers Association became the sole representative organization for most of the 
settler grain farmers. With time, it assumed a monopolistic position on grain issues in Kenya 
(Makanda and Ohemke, 1995).   
Experimentation with cash crops continued in various parts of Kenya in early 1900s (Bigsten and 
Coullier, 1995). It was found that fertile lands in the interior highlands of Kenya and in Uganda 
were productive and conducive. The fertile areas attracted the interest of settlers. In order to open 
up landlocked interior for farming and trade, a railway was built from Mombasa towards Uganda 
(Kapila, 2011). When the railroad was complete in 1906, thousands of settlers moved into the 
interiors to establish plantations which mainly concentrated on cash crops. The earliest cooperative 
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that was formed to market the cash crops was the Kenya Planters Cooperative Union. It was 
charged with the responsibility of processing and marketing coffee (Honsby, 2012). 
Cooperatives in Kenya during the early colonial period focussed on agricultural activities. Their 
primary aim was to promote and protect the interests of white settler farmers and to enhance their 
productivity and generate reasonable income to run the affairs of the colonies. They also exported 
cash crops that were required to fuel industrialization in Britain (Wanyama, Dolvetere and Pollet, 
2009). To achieve their tipple goals of enhancing productivity, financing colonial government 
affairs and fuelling industrialisation in their home countries, the British farmer possessed about 20% 
of Kenya’s fertile lands. This rendered many natives landless and disgruntled. The settlers 
christened the possessed lands “white highlands”. These lands were mainly located near the Kenya-
Uganda railway line (Karanja, 1996).  
The greatest challenge faced by settlers during this period was the continuous and steady supply of 
labour, generation of enough revenue for routine administration and financing of development 
activities. In order to solve these challenges, the settler government imposed heavy head and hut 
taxes on the native population (Weber, 2009). The colonial state also discouraged native farmers 
from growing cash crops and establishing cooperatives; this would have affected the settler 
economy by interfering with labour outflow in their farms and estates (Kimler and Bates, 1982). 
Natives were also denied the advantage of marketing and transportation of their produce which in 
turn  forced them to rely on Asian middlemen for the sale of their produce (Kanogo and Maxon, 
1992). 
Economic inequalities, exclusion from political participation, high taxation and the poor payments 
received from the middlemen during the colonial period led to the birth of several African 
associations (Kenya Land Alliance, 2004). Pioneer indigenous associations included East African 
Association and Kikuyu Central Association formed in 1920s. Young Kavirondo Association, 
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Ukamba Members Association, North Kavirondo Central Association  and Kikuyu Provincial 
Association were all formed in the 1930. These associations, advocated for consideration of 
African land claims and greater educational and economic opportunities. The Associations also 
served as welfare organizations concerned with the personal improvement of their members. 
(Kenya State House, 2001).  
These associations gradually formed the basis of resources mobilization to facilitate organized 
resistance against colonial injustice. Their activities later led to changes in government policy with 
regard to issues of African participation in the cooperative movement and political participation. 
During the early stages of organized resistance, African welfare associations made attempts to 
register as savings and credit associations under the Department of Co-operative Development.  
Their attempts were rejected by on grounds that natives were not yet ready for such an initiative 
(Alila and Obado, 1990). As stated earlier, the settlers blocked all attempts by natives to benefit 
from the cooperative movement in the early 1930s.  
The first legislation to regulate and govern cooperatives in Kenya is the Cooperative Societies’ 
Ordinance Act of 1931 (Adler and Munene, 2000).  This saw the registration of Kenya Cooperative 
Creamery in February 1931 and Kenya Farmers Association the same year and thereafter Kenya 
Planters Cooperative Union in 1937. Since during this time the natives were forbidden from 
growing cash crops, the bulk of their production was mainly food crops (Nangulu, 2001). 
Eventually, the colonial administration was forced to enact the 1945 Cooperative Ordinance that 
allowed the participation of the natives in the cooperative movements as a result of several factors. 
These factors encompassed  the Great Depression of 1930s, pressure from emerging native 
associations and from Colonial Office in Britain. The new law also permitted native farmers to plant 
cash crops (Kanogo and Maxon, 1992). This law was eventually  followed by establishment of the 
Department of cooperatives and the office of the Registrar of Cooperatives in 1946. These 
institutions were created to support native cooperatives (Manyara, 2006). 
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After the 1945 Cooperative Ordinance, the growth of cooperatives did not pick up as expected. By 
1952, only 160 cooperatives had been registered. This is because many natives were suspicious that 
the colonial government would use the cooperative movement to exploit them (Ouma, 1987). This 
mistrust fizzled away in the 1950s, as the cooperative movement slowly became popular among 
farmers and colonial civil servants. Farmers too, did join the movement because it offered better 
prices for primary products (Nangulu, 2001).  
At this time, the political climate was also changing, as the resistance movement was becoming 
more apparent culminating into a war of liberation. The liberation war was dubbed  Mau Mau an 
acronym connoting Mzungu Aende Ulaya, Mwafrika Apate Uhuru (the white people should go to 
Europe for the African to be independent). The  Mau Mau rebellion became intense, forcing the 
colonial government to declare a state of emergency in 1952 (International Communist League, 
2011). The period was also generally characterized by strong sentiments against colonialism in the 
entire country. With this deteriorating political climate, the colonial state encouraged the formation 
of cooperatives in order to provide markets for the African farmers and build a middle class as a 
strategy to deal with radicalism (Kanogo and Maxon, 1992).  
The registration of cooperatives became rapid in 1951. An initial development in cooperative 
development was made in 1954 when the Swynnerton Plan was developed. It was a strategy to 
improve agriculture and better land tenure among the natives (Gamba and Komo, 2005). The 
colonial administration was directed to promote native’s output through improved farming 
practices. This was to be achieved by availing high yielding seeds and other farm inputs. Improved 
farming practices would lead to high returns within and out of the country. With high returns, the 
colonial state would make adequate revenue. Moreover, it would also boost the natives purchasing 
power and demand could be created among natives for products made by European firms (Nangulu 
2001).  
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The years 1951-1959 saw the registration of 511 cooperatives. In the 1960s, there was a dramatic 
relaxation of government supervision and control. This move was geared towards encouraging the 
creation of as many cooperative societies as possible. At the same time, the colonial state created 
the Special Crops Development Authority to promote growing of tea by natives under the auspices 
of the ministry of Agriculture. The Special Crops Development Authority was renamed Kenya Tea 
Development Authority  after independence in 1963. The number of cooperatives continue to grow 
and by 1963 their number was estimated at 1000 (Kanogo and Maxon, 1992).  
2.5.2.3 Cooperative Development in Independent Kenya 
After independence, the new government saw the cooperative movement as a vehicle to introduce 
African Socialism and strengthen ties amongst people from different regions of Kenya (Republic of 
Kenya, 1965). The government established the Kenya National Federation of Cooperatives in 1964 
as the apex body for the movement and thereafter in 1965, registered the cooperative bank (Bwisa, 
2010). In the same year the government published the Sessional Paper 10 entitled “African 
Socialism and its application to planning in Kenya” which outlined the government plan to 
eradicating poverty, ignorance and disease. According to the sessional paper, the idea of promoting 
cooperation and self-help among Kenyans was to become key in the country’s development process 
(Republic of Kenya, 1965).   
The sessional paper was then followed by the enactment of the first Cooperatives Societies Act, Cap 
490 in 1966 based on recommendations of the International Labour Organization (Wanyama, 2009). 
This  legislation stipulated  the  conditions  under  which  a cooperative  society  could  be  
registered  and  outlined typologies of activities  and  internal structuring  of primary cooperatives 
and secondary cooperatives (unions). The Act established the office of the Commissioner of 
Cooperatives, who had the dual roles of registration and cooperative development. Under this Act, 
the Government acted as regulator, financier and manager of the movement. The commissioner was 
110 
 
empowered to ensure that all cooperative societies complied with the provisions of the law. 
According to Muthuma (2011) the commissioner was also allowed to inspect account records of any 
cooperative society at any time, appoint or approve auditors of societies, hold an inquiry into 
operations of a society, appoint a care-taker committee for troubled societies or dissolve them as a 
last resort. 
During the first decade after independence, the cooperative movement experienced challenges on 
governance, financial capitalization and human capital. The movement became a vehicle to enrich a 
few people and institutionalize power in the hands of the privileged (Ouma, 1987). Hence, in 1967, 
the Nordic Cooperative Development Programme, World Bank, United States and Germany 
extended assistance to the Kenyan Cooperative Movement to help it address some of these 
challenges (Wanyama, 2009). The Nordic Cooperative Project established a Cooperative College in 
order to address human capital challenges faced by the movement. The college became the main 
training institution for the cooperative movement. It organized training courses for cooperative 
managers and union staff (Muthuma, 2011). In addition to international assistance, the government 
availed free credit and free extension services to cooperatives. Later on, in order to solve the 
distributional problems, the government introduced the policy of equalization of incomes based on 
acreage (Kanogo and Maxon, 1992).  
 In 1970, the government developed Sessional Paper 8 on cooperative development, which focused 
on diffusion and growth of the cooperative movement. In 1974, the cooperative department was 
transformed into a ministry of cooperative development with a mandate to develop the sector into a 
viable and competent economic actor (Republic of Kenya, 1987). Producer cooperatives became 
directly linked to parastatals (state corporations) and statutory boards which were run by the state. 
At this same time, primary agricultural cooperatives and state corporations were facing challenges, 
prompting the publication of sessional paper 14 of 1974 on cooperative development policy. This 
paper had two important motives; it urged primary cooperatives to view state corporations as 
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collaborators and stipulated government protection of the movement against competition 
(Wanyama, 2009). An important development in the history of the cooperative movement in Kenya 
was the development of the Kenya Cooperative Insurance Services in 1979 as a distinct company. 
The company extended insurance services to cooperatives in rural areas which were of little interest 
to mainstream insurance providers (Kanogo and Maxon, 1992). 
Some of the identified problems faced by cooperative movements in 1980s were lack of cooperative 
education, poor investments, misuse of positions and deteriorating honesty and integrity by the 
cooperative societies (Hussi, et al. 1993). The government was also blamed for poor supervision 
and control, and heavy interference. Some of the problems had their genesis at the dawn of 
independence. Special advantages and privileges that were accorded to cooperative movement by 
the government were abused, opening room for nepotism, corruption, gross-mismanagement and 
financial indiscipline (Wanyama, Dolvetere and Pollet, 2009).  
2.5.2.4 The liberalization period 
Structural Adjustment Programmes were also introduced by the World Bank in the 1980s in order 
to accelerate liberalization and institutional reforms. The Structural Adjustment Programmes  
introduced transformation in wide ranging trade and macro-economic policies impacting on 
production costs, incentive structures and cooperative sector competitiveness. The liberalization of 
the sector was institutionalized in 1986 with the publication of Sessional Paper on Renewed Growth 
and Economic Management of the Economy. This sessional paper removed all government 
monopolistic tendencies, divested government investment in commercial activities and encouraged 
the private sector to run and invest in the government owned organizations and parastatals including 
the cooperative sector (Parsitau 2008; Anderson, et al. 2005).  
Key in the liberalization process at the end of the Cold War, was the reduction in the public sector 
budget and consumption, removal of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, withdrawal of direct and 
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indirect protection of certain industries and restructuring of all public organizations (Rono, 2002). 
The cooperative movement was strongly affected by this reform process. The government cut down 
the budget for cooperative development department and withdrew key services from the movement 
(International Cooperative Alliance, 1996). This was done with the expectation that cooperatives 
would adjust quickly and organize themselves to provide these services. This time was also 
characterised by adverse economic conditions. The government on its part, pursued a massive 
divestiture strategy from most of the sectors that were heavily dependent on its assistance. The 
sudden removal of government protection made cooperatives to become economic orphans in the 
country leading to the collapse of several cooperative societies (Mbogoh, 2000).   
The liberalization of the market attracted new actors in the sectors where cooperatives had enjoyed 
a monopoly. The market was now comprised of many sellers and buyers, who were guided by 
efficiency, competitive pricing and transparency (Wanyama, Dolvetere and Pollet, 2009). In the 
agricultural sector, the marketing practices changed radically. Previously, the ownership of the 
produce rested with the state marketing board, which then delegated the same to cooperatives. Thus, 
cooperatives could claim ownership of the produce until the point of export when ownership 
reverted back to the marketing board. In the liberalized market system, ownership of the produce 
became rather disjointed. An individual farmer owned it up to the point he/she sold it to the next 
owner, who could either be a private buyer or a cooperative society (Bangura, 1992). Cooperatives 
had to compete with other players to buy and sell agricultural produce if they were to remain in 
business.   
This new marketing environment had fundamental implications for the cooperative movement. For 
instance, since membership in agricultural cooperatives was previously motivated by the desire to 
get access to the only marketing channel for produce, the availability of several market channels in 
the new era posed a threat of  reduction in cooperative membership as members now had the option 
to sell their produce to alternative buyers. This meant that cooperatives had to offer something 
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unique in order to be competitive and relevant (Gamba and Komo, 2005). Hence, several 
cooperative societies merged to form cooperative unions in order to start value addition activities 
for their members’ produce. Cooperatives, faced by private market players who were very efficient 
and competitive, succumbed to various consequences; some were able to successfully fit in the new 
market structure and became competitive while others had difficulties to adjust and thus their 
survival was in jeopardy (Wanyama, 2009). 
2.5.2.5 Period of Intense Sector Legislation  
The Cooperatives Societies Act 490 was eventually repealed and replaced by the cooperative 
societies Act, No 12 of 1997. This new law was created to address the weaknesses of Cap 490 and 
the emerging challenges faced by the cooperative movement (Manyara, 2004). Later in the same 
year, Sessional paper no. 6 of 1997 on “Cooperatives in a Liberalized Economic Environment” was 
created. They did set an important pedestal for the professionalization of the sector. It provided for a 
member based, autonomous and member controlled movement. Government controls were also 
abruptly removed in attempts liberalize the cooperative sector. This move left a regulatory vacuum, 
a chaotic reorganization and haphazard structuring of the sector. There were hence many mergers, 
disputes and splits. Quite a number of cooperative societies were split into small and uneconomic 
units. Mismanagement and opportunism became rampant. Despite these challenges and 
pandemonium in the sector, by 1999, 7000 cooperatives had been created across the country 
(Muthuma, 2011). To worsen the situation, in 1999, the Ministry of Cooperatives was dissolved 
becoming a department in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. This downgrading 
resulted to less budget and staff for the sector.  
In 2002, the opposition movement under the National Alliance for the Rainbow Coalition  assumed 
power replacing the Kenya African National Union which had ruled the country since 1963. The 
new government introduced policies geared towards rehabilitation of the national economy and 
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poverty reduction (Republic of Kenya, 2004a). In 2003, the ministry of Cooperatives was revived 
under the name Ministry of Cooperative Development and Marketing. In the same year the number 
of registered cooperative societies had reached 10,297 with a total membership of 5.9 million and 
an income of about Euro 74,000,000 (Kenya Shillings 7.4 billion) contributing to 30% of national 
saving (Owen, 2007). In 2004, a draft Sessional Paper on Cooperative Development in Kenya was 
developed. According to the Paper, the country had registered 10,700 cooperatives with more than 6 
million members and mobilized savings of over Euro 1.05 billion (Kenya Shillings 105 billion).  In 
the same year a Cooperatives Amendment Act was enacted paving way for creation of Savings and 
Credit Cooperative (SACCO) Societies law (Republic of Kenya, 2004b).  
The Savings and Credit Cooperatives Societies Act was finally enacted in 2008. It provided for the 
formation of the Sacco Societies Regulatory Authority, creation of depositors protection fund, 
amongst other provisions  such as  licensing,  regulation  and  supervision. Credit cooperatives were 
to be allowed to engage in trade or investment activities to diversify their income; foreign  trade, 
money  transfers  and  other  banking  services  prescribed  by  the regulatory  authority (Republic 
of Kenya, 2008a). The  Act  did  introduce  minimum liquidity  and  capital  requirements  that  
credit  cooperatives  were  to  comply  with.  Financial statements of credit cooperatives were 
required to comply with the prescribed disclosure requirements outlined in the international 
financial reporting standards (Republic of Kenya, 2008d).  Under  the  Cooperative  Societies  Act 
2008,  the credit cooperatives were only required to retain 20% of their surpluses in statutory 
reserves and would  usually  pay  off  the  rest  in  the  form  of  interest  or  dividends  to  their  
members. It also allowed the Savings and Credit Cooperatives Societies to receive deposits from 
members and non-members through a service known as front office savings activities. The Act also 
set stringent minimal requirements for Savings and Credit Cooperatives Societies taking deposits 
comprising minimal core capital of Euro 100,000 (Kenya Shillings 10,000,000), managerial moral 
suitability and a comprehensive four year business plan (FSD Kenya, 2011). 
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In 2007, the government published Vision 2030, in which contribution of the cooperative sector was 
recognized with respect to strengthening the agriculture sector, reducing exclusion faced by 
informal sector, accessing financial services to masses and in improving production of goods and 
services (Republic of Kenya, 2007). According to the government, the innovativeness, commercial 
orientation and ultimate modernization of various sectors in the economy depended to a great extent 
on the effectiveness of the cooperative movement. The government was therefore mandated to help 
improve the technical and management capacity of cooperatives.   
In order to solve the problem of exclusion brought about by informality, government was to 
encourage formation of producer groups and link them to formal market operators (Republic of 
Kenya, 2008a). Cooperatives were also to be encouraged to get involved in value addition activities, 
housing activities, promoting cultural tourism, preserving indigenous cultures and enhancing 
penetration of financial services to excluded populations. To strengthen community based 
organizations, government was to encourage them to upgrade to cooperatives (Republic of Kenya, 
2008d).  This move however, would need special considerations of and a special sub-sector law 
introduced (Thomas, 2004). 
Another policy on cooperative development was instituted in 2008. This policy aimed at 
restructuring, strengthening and transformation of cooperatives into vibrant entities against poverty 
through wealth and employment creation (Wanyama, 2009). In the same year, the Ministry of 
Cooperative Development and Marketing  developed a strategic plan for the period 2008 to 2012. 
The plan was to support the growth of the sector through strengthening its customer orientation, 
financial viability, business process effectiveness and learning processes in order to achieve 
sustainable growth (Republic of Kenya, 2009a). The Ministry’s strategic plan was followed by a 
marketing strategy which focused on revitalizing the cooperative movement, making it a true 
instrument for socio economic empowerment (Republic of Kenya, 2009b).  
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2.5.3 The evolving industrial organization of the cooperative movement in Kenya 
From the 1900s to-date the evolution of the cooperative sector in Kenya has been quite dynamic. 
While some of the components of the cooperative movement structure have endured, others became 
vestigial with time. Factors that continue to influence the movement include government policies. 
liberalization wave, global economic conditions, intra and extra organizational dynamics, and 
cooperative industry dynamics (Kuria, 2012). 
 At the onset of cooperative movement in Kenya, the sector was mainly organized around 
experimentation on agricultural activities; cash crops, grains and dairy farming. It is evident that 
much sector re-organization before 1930s took place in terms of acquisitions and mergers across the 
different co-operators. The legislation of the sector came in the mid 1930’s and this had an 
important implication in setting the pace for the growth of the sector. In the early years, the 
cooperative sector did not have a definite structure but was characterised by independent 
cooperatives, coalition and acquisitions. 
After independence in 1963, the government reorganized the sector. The cooperative structure was 
organized into three tiers made up of grassroots cooperatives, cooperative unions at the district level 
and national cooperatives organizations (Karanja, 1974). It  also established the cooperative bank of 
Kenya, another structure that would be important in the development of the cooperative movement 
(Alila and Ikiara, 1993). The government then published the Cooperatives Societies Act cap 490 of 
1966 and created the office of the Commissioner of Cooperatives that replaced the Colonial 
Registrar of Cooperatives (Hans, 1988).  
In 1964, the government created the Kenya National Federation of Cooperatives as an apex body 
tasked with the promotion of cooperative development, uniting and harmonizing activities of the 
movement. The apex body was to become a focal point on matters associated with cooperative 
policy and law, conflict resolution and representation both at national and international forums 
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(Wanyama, 2007). Generally, Kenya National Federation of Cooperatives was tasked to be the 
official national and international voice of Kenyan cooperative movement (Hussi, et al. 1993). It 
drew its membership from grassroots cooperatives, district unions to the national cooperative 
organizations and by 1990 it had a membership of 8,000 cooperatives.  
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Figure 2.5.1 
 
Source: Author 
However over the years Kenya National Federation of Cooperatives started performing poorly in its 
mandate as it veered from its conceptual role and assumed technical activities undertaken by 
national cooperative organizations and district cooperative unions. It also experienced problems 
such as nepotism, gross mismanagement, inability to pay its International Cooperative Alliance  fee 
and bad leadership. By 1990s it had lost about 96% of its subscribers and was headed for collapse 
(Wanyama, 2009). In 2005 the Ministry of Cooperatives stepped in to save it. The federation’s 
leadership was replaced with a transitory technical team. By 2007 the new leadership had revised 
the by-laws of the apex body and endorsed a new governance structure. This governance structure 
had five components; general assembly as the supreme and ultimate authority comprising of 75 
delegates, the national governing council composed of eight national cooperative organizations 
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chairpersons. The technical committee was made up of the executive officers of the national 
cooperative organizations, regional and national representatives consisting of the commissioner of 
cooperative development, executive director and seven elected regional representatives and lastly, a 
secretariat comprising the executive director and the heads of the four organs.  
The transitory team managed to create a new funding strategy for the apex body. It demarcated the 
cooperative movement into national cooperative organizations and other cooperatives. National 
cooperative organizations less than Euro 500,000 (Kenya Shillings 50,000,000) turnover would pay 
a subscription fee of Euro 500 (Kenya Shillings 50,000), while those with an income of Euro 
2,500,000 (Kenya Shillings 250,000,000) would pay Euro 5,000 (Kenya Shillings 500,000). District 
union cooperatives and primary cooperatives with an income of less than Euro 50,000 (Kenya 
Shillings 5,000,000) would pay a subscription fee of Euro 50 (Kenya Shillings 5,000) while those 
with a turnover of Euro 3,500,000 (Kenya Shillings 350,000,000) and above would pay Euro 1,000 
(Kenya Shillings  100,000). All cooperatives were required to pay an annual membership fee of 
Euro 30 (Kenya Shillings 3,000) and buy shares with a nominal value of Euro 20 (Kenya Shillings 
2,000).  The re-engineering process continued to 2009 when Kenya National Federation of 
Cooperatives was dissolved and a new apex body known as the Cooperative Alliance of Kenya 
formed to replace it. Cooperative Alliance of Kenya was mandated with the task of uniting the 
cooperative movement, policy advocacy and being a spokesperson of the movement in and out of 
Kenya, improving awareness about the movement and enlisting support for the movement 
(Cooperative Alliance of Kenya, 2009).     
An important structure for the cooperative movement created after independence was the 
cooperative bank, registered in 1965 and licensed as a bank in 1968. The bank became the first 
post-independence national cooperative organization (Bwisa, 2010). It joined earlier national 
cooperative organizations comprising Kenya Famers Association, Kenya Cooperative Creamery 
and Kenya Planters Cooperative Union. The bank aimed at mobilizing savings and credit for the 
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cooperative sector. 70% of its shares were allocated to the cooperative, while 30% was held by 
individual co-operators. In 2008, the bank sold Kenya Shillings 700 million shares through a 
successful public offer which reduced the cooperative movement shares to 65%. The bank 
mobilized a capital base of Euro 135,000,000 (Kenya Shillings 13.5 billion) by the end of 2008 
(Wahome, 2008). Averagely, the bank lends approximately Euro 35,000,000 (Kenya Shillings 3.5 
billion) to Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies to boost their liquidity so as to meet members’ 
demand for loans associated with personal emergencies and recurring seasonal expenses. Lastly, by 
2011 the bank was employing an average of 3193 staff with a large branch network, penetrating and 
taking services to all areas of Kenya (Cooperative Bank of Kenya, 2012). 
In order to help the sector cushion against risks 1978, the first insurance company known as 
Cooperative Insurance Services was incorporated (Kuria, 2012). The idea of introducing co-
operative insurance in Kenya was first conceived early in 1968 by the Kenya National Federation of 
Co-operatives. These consultations continued up to 1972 when initial attempts were made at 
creating the Insurance Agency. This led to the registration of a Co-operative Insurance Society of 
Kenya in 1975, under the Co-operative Societies Act CAP 490. In 1999 Cooperative Insurance 
Services changed its name to Cooperative Insurance Company of Kenya  (Oyebanji, et al. 2010). 
This change was necessitated by the liberalization climate which demanded agility and dynamism. 
Cooperative Insurance Company then opened its services to other sectors of the economy while 
maintaining its special relationship with the cooperative sector. The cooperative movement still 
retains ownership of Cooperative Insurance Company. To-date, the insurer is the largest insurance 
company in Kenya employing 800 staff and has branches in all major towns (Kenya Companies, 
2012).  
The most powerful component of the cooperative sector in Kenya is made up of the Savings and 
Credit Cooperative Societies. They have their origin in colonial times when Africans started welfare 
association groups to address social and economic challenges faced by their members (Muthuma, 
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2011). Though the natives were not allowed to form cooperatives, their associations not only 
provided avenues for addressing welfare needs but were later seen as a threat to the colonial 
establishment (Republic of Kenya, 1964b). This led to the enactment of the 1945 ordinance which 
provided an enabling environment for natives to join the cooperative movement. The first to join 
and benefit from the cooperatives included colonial civil servants. The participation of the civil 
servants in the movement led to its growth from 1950s onwards. Earlier savings and credit 
cooperatives societies were a component of other cooperatives. They however did not fit in well 
leading to a feeling that there was a need for an association that would address their needs. As a 
result, in 1973 the Kenya Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives Societies was formed to 
respond to those needs (Oyebanji et al, 2010). It’s main objective were to promote and develop the 
savings and credit cooperatives, provide information, foster education and training, consultancy and 
research, representation of the Savings and Credit Cooperatives Societies, risk management and 
general managerial assistance. Members of Kenya Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives come 
from diverse economic backgrounds based on common bond such as salaries, farm activities, trade, 
informal sector artisans (referred to as Jua Kali in Kenya), transport business and community based 
Savings and Credit Cooperatives Societies (Mudibo 2005; Wanyama, 2009). The first major success 
for Kenya Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives Societies on policy advocacy was the 
enactment of the 2004 Cooperative Societies Amendment Act that paved way to the Savings and 
Credit Cooperatives Societies Act of 2008. The Act allowed the formation of the Sacco Societies 
Regulation Authority.  
In order to ensure the development of rural areas, the government introduced the idea of rural 
savings and credit cooperative societies in 1990s. This was done by directing cooperatives to turn 
their financial services into savings and credit cooperative societies. This move was meant to 
separate financial services from non-financial services. In early 1990s the government found that 
mixing the credit and savings activities with other non-financial services was becoming costly to the 
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cooperative societies. Different typologies of rural Savings and Credit Cooperatives Societies 
emerged to cater for specific agricultural activities, such as tea, coffee, dairy, among others (Nair 
and Todd, 2007). To respond to the needs of the rural Savings and Credit Cooperatives Societies, 
the Kenya Rural Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies Union was registered in 1998 as a 
cooperative union. By 2009, it had a membership of 48 rural Savings and Credit Cooperatives 
Societies. Kenya Rural Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies offered services such as advocacy, 
credit, and training. It trained its members on microfinance, cooperative principles, HIV awareness, 
management and accounting. Additionally, Kenya Rural Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies 
is involved in product development and inspection of Savings and Credit Cooperatives Societies. Its 
advocacy role directed to championing for a new Savings and Credit Cooperatives Societies law 
and favourable taxation (Wanyama, 2009 and Oyebanji et al 2010). Kenya Rural Savings and 
Credit Cooperative Societies is a loosely integrated network.  
All Kenya Rural Savings and Credit Cooperative Union members also belong to the  Kenya Union 
of Savings and Credit Cooperatives, the industry-wide umbrella organization.  Its members are 
large with an average membership of more than 25,000. Its largest savings and credit cooperative 
society has more than 120,000 members. All its savings and credit cooperative societies offer Front 
Office Service Activities. Some have extensive rural networks covering several districts, operate 
mobile banking units, have Automated Teller Machines, and offer money transfer services. 
Following difficulties in several commodity markets in the recent times, these Savings and Credit 
Cooperative Societies started to diversify their membership, including opening up of their common 
bond (Nair and Todd, 2007). 
Another important structure of the Kenyan Cooperative Movement is the National Cooperative 
Housing Union . It was registered in 1979 under the Cooperative Societies Act cap 490 in response 
to the efforts  of humanitarian  organizations  involving  trade unions, churches and cooperatives 
that felt the need  to  have an umbrella organization that would address rapid urbanization and 
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proliferation of slums. National Cooperative Housing Union was created to address these issues and 
in time it became the apex body for all the housing cooperative societies in Kenya. Through its 
members made up of 210 housing cooperative societies countrywide, it serves approximately 
200,000 people (Oyeyinka et al. 2010). National Cooperative Housing Union’s  vision  is  to  
facilitate access  to  decent  and affordable  shelter  through  the  Cooperative Housing  model.  It 
contributes  to  improved shelter  and  quality  of  life  among low-income  communities  through  
training, education, technical and financial services. It’s services and activities are spread out 
nationally with the majority of the target group being women and youth. The  union’s addresses  
housing and shelter needs in both  rural  and  urban  areas through its primary cooperatives (Adler 
and Munene, 2000). It also has a  non-financial services component that is accessible to non-
members.   
Kenya Planters Cooperative Union  is another national cooperative organization  incorporated  at 
Ruiru by coffee growers’ cooperative societies in 1937. It is owned by 300 co-operative societies, 
representing about 700,000 small scale farmers and about 2,000 plantation estates in the country. 
The union was formed as a stockist organization for essential farm inputs such as fertilizers, 
chemicals, tools and machinery. These inputs were later resold to farmers at affordable prices. The 
union was also involved in extension services, provision of credit and value addition activities. In 
1945, it was incorporated for the second time as a limited company under the Company Ordinance 
Act of 1933. This meant that Kenya Planters Cooperative Union was now having a double 
registration as a limited company and also as a cooperative society. Though these registrations 
implied that the union could effectively offer diversified services to its members that time, it 
affected badly its stability and financial performance in later years. In 2008 media reports warned of 
imminent collapse of the union following a study commissioned by the European Union. The coffee 
miller was struggling with a heavy debt burden occasioned by unpaid bank loans and farmer debts.  
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The challenges of Kenya Planters Cooperative Union continued deepening with Kenya Commercial 
Bank placing it under receivership in October 2009 over Euro 6,440,000 (Kenya Shillings 644 
million) debt. Creditors descended on its assets a year later, with auctioneers advertising intended 
sale of its buildings. In a bid to save the union, the Ministry of Cooperative Development and 
Marketing placed a caveat emptor was on its assets (International Cofee report, 2009). The Union 
disputed the debt through a case filed by its new receivership directors. They asked for a forensic 
audit to be done and figures reconciled before any payments were made (Wahome, 2011 ). In 
September 2011, the government intervened by pledging a rescue package of Euro 7,000,000 
(Kenya Shillings 700 million) in the 2011/12 national budget to rescue the miller. The government 
was also to spend over Euro 40,000,000 (Kenya Shillings 4 billion), writing off debts owed by 
farmers, as it moved to entice them to return to coffee farming and benefit from prevailing high 
international coffee prices. By the financial year 2011/2012 the rescue package was yet to be used 
pending the outcome of  the lawsuit which was expected to provide directions guiding parties on 
settlement modalities. The litigations led to the stop of its activities and its facilities were rendered 
idle.  Finally, to respond to farmers needs the Ministry of Cooperative Development and Marketing 
formed the Kenya Coffee Co-operative  Exporters in 2011. The body took up the marketing of 
coffee thus leaving Kenya Planters Cooperative Union with no direct role in facilitating coffee 
business in the country. Kenya Planters Union on its part continues struggling but faces a high 
danger of its imminent collapse. 
As earlier discussed the Kenya Cooperative Creamery  also a national cooperative organization was 
as a result of a merger between primary societies and an apex processing creamery. Its goal was to 
give  a single voice to dairy farmers and provide an ample scope for their representation. The 
cooperative was charged with the responsibility of improving milk production and market 
dominance. It was also to keep the diary sector abreast with technological improvements. It aimed 
at improving these challenges by reducing challenges associated with collective action. In order to 
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achieve its aims, Kenya Cooperative Creamery successfully lobbied for enactment of the Kenya 
Dairy Industry Act; Chapter 336 of the Laws of Kenya, in 1958. The Act provided for the creation 
of Kenya Dairy Board  to regulate the dairy industry.  
 In August 2000 KCC was re-incorporated as KCC Limited 2000 (abbreviated KCC-2000) and was 
acquired through a competitive bidding process (AFCA, 2010). In 2003, the government reclaimed 
KCC from the private investors and re-registered it as the New Kenya Co-operative Creameries Ltd 
in June the same year with the intent of revamping it and selling it to farmers upon its stabilization 
(Wanyama, 2009).  However, Muchira  (2012) postulates that  revamping the New KCC does not 
appear as rosy. The process has been marred by managerial and financial challenges just as the case 
with its predecessor, Kenya Cooperative Creamery. 
Table 2.5.1: Cooperative membership 2003 to 2007 
Type of cooperative 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
SACCOs 3,500,000 3,642,000 4,602,000 5,420,000 6,286,000 
Agricultural 1,153,000 1,024,000 1,140,000 1,238,000 1,318,000 
Other non agric 265,000 319,000 333,000 370,000 334,000 
Cooperative unions 624 625 639 639 569 
Source: MoCDM 
The loss of the monopoly status, coupled with the business-oriented demands of the market, has 
seen a great restructuring of the cooperative industry in Kenya. For instance, though agricultural 
activities remain predominant in the cooperative ventures, those that are no longer profitable (like 
cotton and pyrethrum in Kenya) are increasingly being abandoned in favour of others (like dairy, 
savings and credit) that are more viable on the market. Hence many of these cooperatives have been 
forced to diversify in order to survive. This move towards diversification of ventures partly 
explains, for example, why Kenya is witnessing substantial growth of cooperatives in the financial 
sector. Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies have more members and exhibit phenomenal 
growth than all other types of cooperatives. As mentioned earlier, Savings and Credit Cooperative 
Societies are made on the basis of a common bond. There are six types of Savings and Credit 
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Cooperative Societies formed by the following bonds: salary based, rural based, traders, jua kali, 
transport and community based.  
Table 2.5.2: Annual Cooperative movement turnover 2003-2007 (Millions Kenya Shillings) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
SACCOs 9,761 10,359 11,609 13,511 14,409 
Agric coops 8,519 8,602 9,297 10,204 10,467 
Other non agric 963 251 275 305 238 
Coop unions 963 763 746 746 1,145 
Source: MoCDM. Exchange rate Kenya Shillings 100 = Euro 1 
In order to keep afloat, cooperatives are steadily becoming multi-functional by taking on activities 
as demanded by members and market forces.  For example, most agricultural cooperatives in the 
above table are also venturing in savings, credit and value addition. To this end, cooperative 
ventures in Kenya are increasingly becoming market-driven and responsive to changing 
circumstances so as to increase competitiveness and member returns. They continue to seek and 
exploit new market niches, products and invest in quality management. Their pricing and interest 
rate policies are increasingly responding to the prevailing market conditions rather than blindly 
being a function of state policy, as was the case in the past.  Cooperatives are also hiring 
professionals and investing in strong management systems to respond adequately to competition. 
They are also displaying preference for a growth oriented approach in terms of asset base, business 
turn-over, market share and profitability (Yeboah 2005; Tesfaye, 2005).  
Table 2.5.3: Types of cooperatives 1997 to 2007 
 
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 
Savings and 
credits 3,179 3,538 3,925 4,200 4,678 5,122 
Agricultural 3,784 4,199 4,372 4,166 4,304 4,414 
Other non agric 1,276 1,325 1,382 1,838 1,885 2,000 
Unions 83 89 89 93 99 99 
Source MoCDM 
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There has been a general positive trend in the development of the various types of cooperatives as 
can be seen in the table above. One possible explanation is that liberalization facilitated purification 
and revamping of the cooperative sector. Competitive  co-operatives survived the liberalization 
process while insolvent and non-competitive ones were closed down. In addition,  new co-
operatives that were run professionally and were less dependent on state support emerged.  
Cooperative and third sector fit 
 There are two distinct categories in the cooperative movement; agricultural and non-agricultural 
(Wanyama, 2009). Available data has shown a steady in both categories. Agricultural cooperatives 
work to market members’ produce, assist in value addition, provide extension and training services. 
They procure farm inputs and machinery, selling them to farmers at affordable prices. They also 
help their members access financial services. Most agricultural cooperatives are based in places 
easily accessible by rural farmers and may either be crop based or animal based. Crop cooperatives 
are involved in the production and marketing  of fruits, vegetables, legumes and grains, coffee, tea, 
tobacco, cotton, pyrethrum and horticultural plants. Animal based cooperatives are involved in the 
production and marketing of dairy products, poultry, fish and other animal products.  
Non-agricultural cooperatives are mainly urban based, though few may be found in rural areas. 
They mainly offer  financial services including savings and credits. Some activities of these 
cooperatives include creative and visual arts, transport sector, informal sector, also popularly known 
as the Jua Kali sector and in the housing sector. Their services are not only limited to finance, they 
also try to respond to other needs of their members. Other service packages offered by these 
cooperatives include medical; enterprise and investments research, consultancy training and 
education, insurance services, information communication and technology and livelihood 
empowerment.  
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For the better part of the history of the cooperative industry in Kenya, agriculture and credit have 
been the ‘traditional cooperative’ sectors. Agriculture cooperatives were pioneer cooperatives in the 
colonial days, followed by the credit cooperatives which mainly developed among urban class 
workers. With time, much reorganization has happened in the cooperative sector that has interfered 
with the traditional cooperative industrial organization, and the traditional constructs of the sector. 
Cooperative development in Kenya was partly influenced by the colonialist regime and strived to 
find its own evolutionary path after Kenya’s independence. In order to improve the effectiveness of 
the cooperatives, the colonial state encouraged vertical integration of cooperatives to form apex 
bodies such as the Kenya Farmers Association, Kenya Planters Cooperative Union and Kenya 
Cooperative Creamery. In an attempt to promote organic harmony within the cooperative 
movement, post-independent government established Kenya National Federation of Cooperative as 
the apex organization. Hence, the structure of the cooperative movement maintained a federative 
structure for most part of 1960s to 1980s.  
With time the national cooperative organizations and Kenya National Federation of Cooperatives 
experienced problems due to poor management and inability to offer quality services to its 
members. This led to a fragmented movement with a decentralised fluid structure as the apex bodies 
slowly lost their mandate.  Due to their inability to provide members with competitive services, 
some non-performing apex organizations lost their significance in the liberalized economy.  
2.5.4 Summary 
The liberalization process found most cooperatives already unstable. Some of the problems faced by 
the movement faced included a persistence of low business efficiency, weak capital base, heavy 
indebtedness and limited credit-worthiness. Other challenges comprised weak entrepreneurial 
capability of managers and board members as well as unbalanced organizational structures 
(Birgegaard and Genberg, 1994). Several producer and marketing cooperatives had been ill-
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prepared to face a liberalized economy, implying that they faced the danger of imminent collapse 
and withering in the new era. Only competitive cooperatives did survive the demands of 
liberalization era and have continued to grow in business and membership (Wanyama, 2009). The 
challenges brought about by market liberalization is part and parcel of the industrial re-organization 
process that faced the cooperative sector.  
Savings and credits cooperative societies became more successful with time and replaced  
agricultural cooperatives as the dominant model in Kenya. Three main reasons accounted for their 
success; first, they largely relied on their own financial resources to transact, thereby avoiding the 
pitfall of dependency.  Second, being in the financial sector, their services were always on demand 
unlike agricultural co-operatives that were dependent on the performance of farming activities. 
Their activities were also in tandem with the new market economy and they tended to respond to 
the ever imminent need for access to capital by needy segments of society in Kenya. They also 
reached large numbers of depositors and used their savings to provide diversified range of loans to 
individual members (Zeller, 2003).  
Their third key strength was their ability to reach out to people who would have otherwise remained 
excluded from financial markets. These cooperatives reached many poor people because of their 
breadth of outreach. Besides, they also ventured into other ‘non-traditional’ sectors like housing, 
consumer, cottage industry, distilleries and social-welfare investments. 
2.6 Non-Governmental Organizations in Kenya  
2.6.1 Background 
Non-Governmental Organizations  are increasingly being recognized as potent forces for social and 
economic development and valuable agents in the promotion of qualitative and quantitative 
development of the economy (Republic of Kenya, 2006c; 2006d). They contribute to rising 
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productivity and also act as agents of distribution. Their work also  contributes to enhanced 
employment creation and improved rural-urban balance.   
Origins of non-governmental organizations in Kenya can be traced to the emergence of church 
based and independent secular organizations, which pursued voluntary development initiatives 
during the colonial era (Chelogoy, Anyango and Odembo, 2004). In the 1940s numerous social 
groupings were formed mainly consisting of women groups. It is considered that these groupings 
were the precursor of present day, Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organizations (MYWO), the apex 
body representing women issues in Kenya. Apart from women groupings, there were local 
charitable organizations, large church based initiatives such as the Young Men Christian 
Association (YMCA) and the Young Women Christian Association (YWCA) that were operational 
in Kenya by 1930. Indigenous ethnic welfare associations such as the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare 
Association (KTWA) were also formed by the migrant workers who travelled to the cities to look 
for employment opportunities. Some of these organizations took political overtones during the 
decolonization struggle. Other service based associations sprang up after the Second World War II 
among them being war veterans associations, occupational associations and professional bodies 
(Mbote, 2000).  
By independence in 1963, the non-governmental organization sector did not have a proper 
regulatory framework.  In order to address this anomaly, in 1964, the government established the 
Kenya National Council of Social Services, a company limited by guarantee without share capital to 
act as an umbrella body for the sector. This body was placed under the ministry of culture and 
social services. At that time, non-governmental organizations only provided welfare activities as 
development was conceived as the responsibility of the state (Munio and Musumba, 1995). Apart 
from the establishment of Kenya National Council of Social Services, there were no further 
attempts to legislate them. Non-governmental organization were hence registered under various 
laws including the company Act, the Societies Act, Trust Act or as community based organizations 
131 
 
under the Ministry of Culture and Social Services. Lack of clear administration system for non-
governmental organizations accounted for the dearth of proper statistics on the sector prior to 1990s 
(Mbote, 2000). 
The 1980s were characterized by civil strife, conflicts, internal displacements, and a deterioration of 
the socio economic and political stability (Honsby, 2012). The state reduced its role in welfare 
service provision because of  the demands of the structural adjustments programmes. A need 
therefore arose for non-governmental organizations to help fill the resultant gaps. The haphazard 
liberation of the economy had the effect of hurting many poor people and denied them access to 
basic services such as education and health (Rono, 2002). Apart from addressing welfare needs, 
non-governmental organizations reconstituted themselves to address challenges brought about by 
distributive injustice. They positioned themselves to champion against social exclusion and 
marginalization of communities as well as individuals. Non-governmental organizations also took 
the responsibility of pushing for political reforms and favourable policies especially during the 
1980s when there was a general decline of political freedoms (Kingoro and Bujra, 2009).   
As a result of the general political environment decline in the 1980s, some unscrupulous non-
governmental organizations sprang up, which  concentrated in business activities and ignored their 
social mandate. Others pursued activities that considered a security risk to the country (Mbote, 
2000). Some non-governmental organizations had enormous resources from international donors 
which were not used well. Others, possessed enormous powers that threatened government 
sovereignty (Kanyinga and Mitullah, 2007). The concerns on security, prompted the government to 
set up an inter-ministerial task force on non-governmental organizations in 1986. The task force 
recommended that the non-governmental organizations sector be coordinated within a development 
framework. Non-governmental organizations on their part, sensing the possibility of a restrictive 
policy regime, managed to successfully lobby for a provision on self-regulation (Ndegwa, 1996). 
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2.6.2 Regulating the Sector 
After independence, non-governmental organizations were coordinated by the Kenya National 
Council of Social Services under the Ministry of Culture and Social Services. By 1986 it became 
apparent that the Kenya National Council of Social Services had failed on its mandate to coordinate 
the NGOs as it was marred by inefficiencies. It was also evident that the work of non-governmental 
organizations in development was phenomenal. The Ministry of Culture and Social Services 
presented a proposition to the cabinet to legislate and coordinate activities of non-governmental 
organizations.  The proposition did not materialize and by 1989 the coordination of non-
governmental organizations was taken over by the office of the President (Mbote, 2000). In 1990 
the non-governmental organizations coordination Act of Kenya was enacted and got the presidential 
assent in January 1991. This Act envisaged the establishment of a single regulator of all charitable 
organizations operating in Kenya. However, this has not been possible since non-governmental 
organizations continue to be registered under various laws (NGO Coordination Board, 2009). 
Part 1(2) of the Act defined NGOs as “private voluntary grouping of individuals or associations not 
operated for profits or for commercial purposes but which have organized themselves nationally or 
internationally for the promotion of social welfare, development, charity or research through 
mobilization of resources” (Republic of Kenya, 1990). The Act established a governmental agency 
known as the Coordination Board under section 7 and a self-regulatory agency known as the non-
governmental organizations Council under section 23 to govern the non-governmental organizations 
operations. Among others, the work of the board entailed maintaining the register of non-
governmental organizations, coordinating and facilitating their work, scrutinizing their  reports, 
advising the government, providing policy guidelines for them, approving the council reports and 
providing a code of conduct for them. The act placed the non-governmental organizations 
coordination board under the office of the deputy President within Ministry of state for National 
Heritage and Culture (Republic of Kenya, 2009d). The Council was empowered to adopt an 
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independent structure and rules and to ensure self-regulation of non-governmental organizations  
via the code of conduct on matters of funding, foreign affiliation, national security, training and 
institutional building. 
In 1992 the rules and regulations non-governmental organizations council for interpreting and 
implementing the Act were approved (Republic of Kenya, 1992a ). In 1995 the Council prepared 
the non-governmental organizations code of conduct. The code outlined the following values: 
probity, self-regulation, justice, service, cooperation, prudence and respect. The Act had sections 
within it considered unfavourable to non-governmental organizations prosperity.  These sections 
covered aspects of duration and validity of registration, power of appeals and council membership. 
Non-governmental organizations successfully lobbied the government for compromises and 
amendments on the law.  
In 2006 the office of the President developed a sessional paper on non-governmental organizations. 
The sessional paper sought to address impediments affecting optimal performance by non-
governmental organizations. According to the paper some of these impediments included weak 
operational definition of  non-governmental organizations, registration, policy, self-regulations, 
arbitration within the non-governmental organizations council and sector governance. These 
problems made the non-governmental organizations sector become subservient to international 
governance. They experienced wrangling at the level of the council and were also vulnerable to 
misappropriation of resources and were exposed to lack of transparency and accountability. The 
policy sought to establish modalities for better collaboration between the sector, government and 
other stakeholders. It expanded the 1990 definition of non-governmental organizations by according 
them four traits that have contributed to the distinctiveness of the sector. The traits designated the 
sector as being made up of organized institutions that are voluntary, self-governing, self-regulating  
and not for profit.  The paper also allowed for government sub-contracting to non-governmental 
organizations based on competitiveness.  
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In 2009, the non-governmental organizations coordination board carried out a national survey 
aimed at generating information to assist it improve its regulatory functions and boost sector 
effectiveness. The survey was also necessitated by low compliance on requirement of annual 
returns. The challenge of low returns made the work of quantifying the actual sector’s contribution 
difficult for the board. It also made it hard to identify opportunities for improving sector 
effectiveness (Republic of Kenya, 2009d). The survey generated several insights, among them 
being a realization that the non-governmental organizations sector had evolved considerably since 
the enactment of the non-governmental organizations coordination Act of 1990. The sector had also 
expanded beyond the current ability of the board. It presented an opportunity for stimulating 
economic growth and improved social welfare and simultaneously created room for abuses. 
Several  non-governmental organizations could not be traced by the survey, leading to the 
conclusion that they had either ceased operations without informing the board, had filled wrong 
information about their addresses or had shifted from their original area of operation. It was hence 
recommended that there was a need to review the regulatory framework in order to ensure 
professionalism. Armed with the survey findings, the board presented a suggestion to the 
government for a risk based proportionate approach in regulating the sector. In 2012 a bill was 
presented in parliament to change the present mandate of the board into an authority. The bill 
proposed solutions to the short comings identified in the 2009 survey and specified that non-
governmental organizations may engage in economic activities through subsidiary bodies (Republic 
of Kenya, 2012a) 
Dating back to 1970s, relationship between non-governmental organizations and successive 
governments in Kenya has always been uneasy. The government has been accused of frustrating 
their efforts, harassing, attacking, incarcerating and even assassinating non-governmental 
organizations staff and leaders, and restricting operations (Tristan, 2009). The sector also faced the 
predicament of being deregistered arbitrarily without further recourse. Before the 1990’s, 
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government restricted associational activities through the Public Order Act and the chief’s Act. 
Non-governmental organizations were required to get certificates for all their meetings. This 
regulation was successfully challenged in 1996 (Bagaka, 2012). Another challenge facing the sector 
is the issue of donor influence and control. A significant portion of their budget is donor driven 
which could easily result to their ineffectiveness to respond to local needs as “he who pays the 
piper plays the tune” (Kanyinga and Mitullah, 2007). More still, with the increased economic 
instability in donor countries funds are drying up, and the sustainability of the sector is becoming a 
problem. Other sectoral challenges include; short term focus which does not augur well with their 
continuity and sustainability, internal democracy challenges, misappropriation of resources and 
accountability to its stakeholders: government, the public and donors (Republic of Kenya, 2009d).  
2.6.3 Sector Growth  
The numerical growth in the number of the non-governmental organizations has been phenomenal 
over the years. The number of non-governmental organizations in 1980s was twice that of 1970s. 
There was astronomical growth in their number from 1980s to 1990s. While the growth of 1990s 
was five times that of 1980s, it was 200% that of 1970s. By the end of the 2000’s the number of 
NGOs in Kenya had reached about 6075. The growth recorded in the 2000s is attributed to the 
impact of globalization and increase in the democratic space 
Table 2.6.1: NGO Number by Years 
Year Number 
1970s 120 
1980s 250 
1990s 1,254 
2000s 6,075 
Source: Sessional Paper No.1 on NGOs of 2006 and Kanyinga and Mitulah (2007) and NGO 
Coordination Board (2009) 
The sector has been growing at a rate of 400 organizations per year (NGO Coordination Board, 
2009). According to above survey, non-governmental organizations are spread all over the country 
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and vary from small organizations operating locally, to international organizations with regional 
programmes. They also range from organizations run by small teams of volunteers to mega 
organizations employing hundreds of fully paid staff of diverse professions using sophisticated 
systems and procedures. 
Table 2.6.2: Classification by NGO type and concentration 
Type Number (Total = 170) Percentage Distribution (total = 
170) 
International 26 15% 
National 117 69% 
Regional 29 17% 
Rural 112 66% 
Urban 61 36% 
Source: UN 2004 Kenyan NGOs Directory 
According to UN database of 2004, about 66% of the non-governmental organizations were 
working in urban centres while 36% in rural areas. Approximately 26% categorized themselves as 
being international and 69% national. 17% categorized themselves as regional. These results are 
consistent with those obtained by the non-governmental organizations  coordination board in 2009 
where they found that national non-governmental organizations  were about 63% of the entire non-
governmental organizations sector while the international were 18%.  
By 2012, eleven thousand Euro 110 (Kenyan shillings 11,000) was paid to register national non-
governmental organizations, while Euro 220 (Kenya Shillings 22,000) was required for 
international non-governmental organizations.  
By 2007, the non-governmental organizations Coordination Board had registered 5929 non-
governmental organizations. However 22% of the registered non-governmental organizations could 
not be traced in the 2009 survey. The distribution of the remaining 4692 non-governmental 
organizations is as follows: North Eastern Kenya has 2%, North Eastern and Eastern provinces are 
the neediest areas in Kenya. The fact that there are a few number of non-governmental 
organizations in these regions signals the lack of conducive infrastructure. Nairobi has 41% of all 
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non-governmental organizations  in the country. There is a tendency for new non-governmental 
organizations  to set up offices in Nairobi while preparing to establish offices in their registered 
areas of operation. Rift Valley happens to have the second largest proportion (21%) of non-
governmental organizations  in Kenya.  Many reasons explain this trend. Rift Valley is the biggest 
province in Kenya with many urban centres. Much of the violence after the 2007 elections took 
place in this province, prompting several non-governmental organizations  to move there in order to 
promote peace building.   
2.6.4 Resource Mix in Non-governmental organizations 
Non-governmental organizations have many approaches to mobilize resources for their activities. In 
the figure above, 33% of non-governmental organizations utilize membership fee as a key strategy 
for resource mobilization. Mitulah and Kanyinga (2007) established that membership fee makes up 
a dominant source of revenue for the sector. In their study the proportion of membership fee was 
81%. In this study it is 33% but it remains the most popular means of resource mobilization. 
Despite the fact that membership fee is quite popular, it was found to only contribute to an overall 
5.6% of the resource needs of the organizations. Local donors include community members or 
contributions from some religious organizations or from government devolved resources.  
Figure 2.6.1 : Sources of Annual Budget and size of resources 
 
Source: UN 2004 Kenyan NGOs Directory  
Membership 
33% 
Local Donors 
22% 
International 
donors 
30% 
Earned 
income 
15% 
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The local donors contribute about 22% of the required resources. Mitulah and Kanyinga (2007) 
established that local donors contributed 5.6% of total resource needs. 15% of non-governmental 
organizations  have their own income generating activities. Lastly, 33% of the sector’s resources 
emanate from use donor resources. These results differ from Mitulah and Kanyinga (2007) and the 
non-governmental consortium (2009) which place donor dependency at 80% to 95% respectively.   
2.6.5 Non-Governmental Organizations Contributions to Social Welfare 
There have been various estimations of the contribution of the sector to the economic development 
of Kenya. The 2006 sessional paper no. 1 on non-governmental organizations, estimated that in 
2003, they had revenue of approximately Euro 800 million (Kenya Shillings 80 billion). In 2007 
Mitulah and Kanyinga estimated a turnover of Euro 2,000,000 (Kenya Shillings 20 billion) 
annually. The Non-Governmental Organizations Coordination Board in 2006 financial year made 
an estimate of annual revenue totalling Euro 68,000,000 (Kenya Shillings 68 billion). The total 
gross domestic product of Kenya in 2006 was Euro 13,910,000 (Kenya Shillings 1.391 trillion). 
This means that during 2006, the contribution of the sector to the economy was approximately 
5.5%. This sector makes a significant contribution to the economy of Kenya by contributing directly 
to the GDP, delivering development, social welfare and creating jobs.    
Table 2.6.3: NGOs’ contributions to social welfare 
 
Frequency (total= 
170) % (total =170) 
Community Support and 
Development 96 56.47% 
environment 63 37.06% 
Housing 25 14.71% 
Agriculture and nutrition 67 39.41% 
education 122 71.77% 
Health 140 82.35% 
Childcare 45 26.47% 
Arts and culture 27 15.88% 
Aging 15 8.82% 
Disabled 22 12.94% 
Source: 2004 UN NGO directory 
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The UN 2004 non-governmental organizations Directory divided the sector’s interventions into 
social, political and economic categories. Each of these broad areas was further sub-divided into 
specific interventions as in the table above.  Accordingly, majority (57%) carried out community 
support and development activities. Community development is a broader term referring to 
community self-help and mutual assistance activities meant to help individuals or build up 
community based infrastructure such as roads, schools, bridges or the provision of an important 
public good like water (Republic of Kenya, 1964a).  
Education occupies about 71% of non-governmental organizations interventions. Organizations 
working in this sector provide early childhood education, primary, secondary, tertiary or adult 
literacy education. 82% of them offer health related services. These services include physical and 
mental health, HIV/AIDS mitigation programs and family planning services. The 2009 survey 
decried that there were very few non-governmental organizations addressing the population 
problem in Kenya yet population explosion is a major problem to the country. 39% of non-
governmental organizations address issues of agriculture, food and nutrition in Kenya. Food 
security is a great concern, as the country is always being hit by famine, the latest being in 2008   
(Gettleman, 2008). 
Table 2.6.4: Types of economic interventions by NGOs 
 
Frequency (total 
=170 
% Dist 
(total=170 
Management and finance administration 26 15.29% 
Small business and enterprise 
development 73 
42.94% 
Vocational skills and employment 
creation 58 
34.12% 
Credit and savings 35 20.59% 
Microfinance  26 15.29% 
Cooperatives 17 10.00% 
Poverty eradication 84 49.41% 
Source: 2004 UN NGO directory 
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49% non-governmental organizations work to eradicate poverty. According to (Golle, 2006) non-
governmental organizations help in poverty eradication through their innovative approaches in 
targeting the poor. In Kenya, their work was recognized as relevant in solving problems faced as a 
result of rural and urban poverty. They do this through the build-up of community resources and 
assets. An example being their work in nurturing entrepreneurial skills among the poor. They do 
this by providing a number of financial services through institutions such as cooperatives or micro 
finance. However the greatest contribution of non-governmental organizations has been that of job-
creation. Mitulah and Kanyinga (2007) estimated that the sector directly employs approximately 
four hundred thousand people and engages the services of one hundred and fifty thousand 
volunteers. Some of these receive payments for their voluntary services. 
Non-governmental organizations have also been credited for their work in integrating vulnerable 
persons who would otherwise not be employed. Among them are the disabled, former prisoners and 
women. Non-governmental organizations helped in mitigating the effects of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes in Kenya. The Structural Adjustment Programmes reduced the role of government as a 
provider of social services in areas such as education and health. These services were termed as 
non-productive sectors of the economy, and pressure was put on the private sector to fill the void 
left by the state  (Rono, 2002). Poor children could not access primary school education and also a 
sizeable population could not access health services as a result of cost sharing. 
Table 2.6.5: Types of political interventions by NGOs 
 
Frequency (total =170)  % distribution 
National policy 36 21.18% 
Democracy 58 34.12% 
conflict resolution 47 27.65% 
Human rights 65 38.24% 
women rights 3 1.76% 
peace and security 45 26.47% 
Violence 42 24.71 
Source: 2004 UN NGO directory 
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Issues of human rights have always topped the agendas of non-governmental organizations and this 
has kept excesses of the state in check. Respect for human rights continues to be a challenge and is 
addressed by about 65% of the non-governmental organizations. Kenya has also had important 
transitions from a single party regime to multi-party politics. Non-governmental organizations have 
ensured that the populace is educated on the intricacies of democracy and governance processes. As 
can be seen in the figure above, 58% implement activities to enhance democracy. In 2007, violence 
erupted in the country after the presidential election results were disputed. This violence made non-
governmental organizations realize that the Kenyan society had many cracks that needed to be 
addressed. There was also a need to educate people on peaceful coexistence and on finding peaceful 
solutions to conflicts. Lastly, non-governmental organizations, through advocacy, worked to ensure 
that policies are made to benefit society. Advocacy in essence gives an important voice to weaker 
members of the society.  
Table 2.6.7: NGO capacity building strategies 
 
Frequency (total=170) % (100%=170) 
Training and capacity building 104 61.18% 
Gender mainstreaming 76 44.71% 
Research 46 27.06% 
Communication/information 89 52.35% 
Science and Technology 14 8.24% 
Computer literacy 36 21.18% 
Institutional building 27 15.88% 
Advocacy 12 7.06% 
Source: 2004 UN NGO Directory 
As the development discourse leans towards developing skills and tools for strengthening societies, 
non-governmental organizations tend to use various strategies to empower communities. Capacity 
development is a fundamental mandate of the sector. Much of the sector’s work undertaken by 61% 
aims at strengthening community and national capacities through trainings, research and policy 
advice. Capacity building activities complement traditional service and welfare provision. Equally, 
capacity development implies assisting government become responsible and legitimate in 
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addressing human rights issues in its development discourse (Theodore , 2011). In working to 
promote gender mainstreaming, two issues become fundamental in a patriarchal society such as 
Kenya. First, ensure that voices of men and women are heard equally in various aspects of 
governance. Secondly, ensuring that in all sectors, policy formulation is undertaken on the basis of 
sex-disaggregated data and with an awareness concerning the differential impacts of policy decision 
on the lives of men and women (United Nations, 2002).  
Non-governmental organizations working on research mainly examine issues of social economic 
justice. Through their research activities gaps existing between perceived notions of justice and 
actual reality are identified. Lastly, non-governmental organizations research helps to spur or better 
the practice of  social innovation in addressing human based challenges (Ochanda, Mungai and 
Akinyi, 2009). Other strategies include institutional building and advocacy. 
2.6.6 Non-governmental organizations fit in the third sector discourse  
Summarily, numerical growth of the sector from the 1990s is mainly attributed to the enactment of 
the NGO Coordination Act of 1990. In the 2000s this growth is mainly attributed to the changing 
political landscape in Kenya which allowed for more community and grassroots participation in 
governance. Earlier on in the 1980s, structural adjustment programmes had reduced the role of 
government as a service provider, bringing about a social welfare crisis. The sector came in to 
provide some solace to the poor. Human rights abuses and lack of democratic freedoms in Kenya 
during the 1990s also contributed to the rise of non-governmental organizations in the country.  
Non-governmental organizations are found in all provinces of Kenya. Provinces with better 
infrastructure tend to attract more of them. This is quite unfortunate because provinces without 
better infrastructure are often marginalised and this is where majority of the needy population is. 
The fact that non-governmental organizations tend to avoid the neediest places contributes to a new 
phenomenon to be known as “the marginalization of the excluded by agents of social inclusion”. 
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This condition is in line with a model expounded by Posner (2004) where he elaborates that in 
situations of difficulties, civil societies find it hard to thrive. However, there are a few non-
governmental organizations working in hardship areas where other actors find it a challenge to 
operate. The government could provide incentives to encourage non-governmental organizations to 
work in the remote areas. 
With the present global recession and donor fatigue non-governmental organizations find that their 
core activities exceed inflow of grants and donations. They are increasingly being compelled either 
to reduce the quantity and/or quality of their work, or find new sources of funds to cover the 
difference.  Reaching out to new donors with innovative fund-raising approaches is usually the first 
step (Viravaidya and Hayssen, 2001). Redesigning program activities to include cost-recovery 
components, whereby beneficiaries or clients pay part of program costs, is a second approach.  A 
third alternative is for the non-governmental organizations to mobilize resources through 
commercial ventures or social enterprises. Dependence on grants and donations can inhibit the 
autonomy of non-governmental organizations in choosing the kind of programs and activities they 
may undertake. It also makes it hard to select the most effective intervention strategies to achieve 
program goals. However it is encouraging that by 2004, 46% of the non-governmental 
organizations had already started some social enterprises or revenue generating activities to finance 
their social missions.  
The contribution of the non-governmental organizations to social, political and economic 
development cannot be overemphasized. They  contribute approximately 5.5% of the gross 
domestic product as well as in the provision of important infrastructure, employment and job 
creation. The added value of non-governmental organizations is that they take into consideration 
vulnerable populations and backward regions that would otherwise be ignored without their 
interventions. Their role in stimulating the enterprise spirit amongst the grassroots is also 
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fundamental. They also play a role in widening democratic space, promoting human rights and in 
enhancing peaceful coexistence among various communities. 
2.7 Micro-Finance in Kenya 
2.7.1 Background 
Microfinance refers to small-scale financial services for the poor mainly in the form of credit and 
saving services (Robinson, 2001). It also includes services such as training, insurance, housing and 
investment services. Globally, micro finance institutions provide an avenue for the poor to improve 
their livelihoods and to have a greater impact on their countries’ economic growth. 
 Microfinance has become an important development discourse in relation to global poverty 
reduction efforts. Its protagonists base their argument on the popular proposition that enabling poor 
households access credit and other financial services not helps them increase their incomes but also 
makes them acquire self-confidence and  eventually assists them escape poverty (Biosca, Mosley, & 
Lenton, 2011). Conflicting evidence shows that people below the poverty line experience negligible 
income increases after borrowing than what is promoted in the popular assumptions. The poor tend 
to use acquired loans to meet consumption needs ( (Morduch, 1998; Gulli, 1998). 
Despite contrary arguments, micro finance is largely perceived as an important mechanism for 
promoting financial inclusion of the poor. Kiiru, (2007) demonstrates that microfinance plays a role 
in improving household incomes by availing affordable financial services to rural and urban poor 
populations. It also provides  an important alternative to traditional finance through its ability to 
extend outreach to marginalised populations using innovative and unconventional strategies. Some 
of the strategies it uses include the formation of joint liability groups among  borrowers and 
compulsory savings which not only help cushion the default risk but creates a non-traditional social 
collateral. The fact that individual group members engage in intensive monitoring of each other, 
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they in turn become concerned with each other’s success creating positive social capital as a result. 
In this case good performance is not only an individual affair but a collaborative endeavour. 
Because of its element of promoting access to finance among the excluded, there are arguments 
micro finance should to be looked at as an important component of development and human rights 
(Becchetti, Conzo, & Pisani, 2009).    
In Kenya, microfinance is in its initial development stages, having started with activities of non-
governmental organizations and faith actors early 1980. The sector started becoming vibrant  only 
in the last 10 years as a result of the activities of the central bank in ensuring a favourable 
legislation regime. Rapid promotion of the sector was done because there was a general concern 
that access to financial services and products was out of the reach for a majority of Kenyans since 
the time of independence.  
Kiiru and Mburu (2007) argued that the poor  are a prime market for credit services because of their 
liquidity needs for either consumption smoothing, entrepreneurship or other self-development 
purposes. By helping the poor access finance where there is a dearth of other agents makes micro-
finance institutions be equated to agents of distribution. They thus promote empowerment through 
enabling the movement out of subsistence and vulnerability. Distribution whatever its form, helps 
move a sizeable population proportion out of the poverty line (Bourguignon, 2004). 
In this section the role played by the micro finance industry in enhancing inclusion of the poor and 
in contributing to the growth of the third sector in Kenya will be studied. The study will explore the 
background of micro finance in the country and its contribution in enhancing social inclusion.  
2.7.2 Beginnings of Micro Finance in Kenya 
Operations of micro finance in Kenya can be traced to 1984 when the Kenya Rural Enterprise 
Programme (K-Rep) was formed as an non-governmental organizations support programme for 
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Small and Micro Enterprises (Dondo, 1994). In 2002 K-Rep extended its mandate to deposit-taking 
when it became the first licensed micro credit bank in Kenya (Owen, 2007). With time other players 
such as Faulu, Kenya Women Finance Trust, Small and Medium Enterprise Program, Jamii Bora 
Trust mainly supported by K-Rep emerged. A unique institution among these was the Kenya Post 
Savings Bank, established in 1910 with a mandate of encouraging micro-savings. By the year 2000, 
the Central Bank of Kenya singled out the above and other 7 institutions including K-Rep as 
pioneer players in the micro finance sector (Central Bank of Kenya, 2000). The 12 micro finance 
organizations joined together to form the Association of Micro Finance Institutions (AMFI), 
registered under the Societies Act of 1999. The association is at the moment considered as the apex 
micro finance body in Kenya, representing the entire landscape of microfinance industry. Its roles 
entail representation, lobby and advocacy, members’ capacity building, performance monitoring 
and networking (Mokoro, et al. 2010).  
At the onset of micro finance in Kenya, about 60% of the population was defined as poor in 
absolute terms and mostly out of the scope of modern banking services. The coming in of micro 
finance acted as a two edged sword; it helped increase access to financial services while increasing 
the social inclusion space. Its strength being to assist in accessing financial services to the poor and 
also helping them to improve the quality of their businesses.  
During the National Baseline Survey in 1999, it was estimated that there were close to 1.3 million 
Small and Micro Enterprises (SMEs), employing nearly 2.3 million people and accounting for 29% 
of the country’s total employment. SMEs contributed 18%  overall  gross domestic product  and  
25%  non-agricultural gross domestic product. By the year 2000, only 10.4% of the SME sector was 
able to receive credit and other financial services from the formal banking system (CBK, 2000). 
This lack of adequate extension of financial services was attributed to the fact that the formal 
banking sector  had  over the years  perceived  the  informal  sector  as  risky  and  not commercially  
viable.  
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2.7.3 Micro finance and empowerment of the poor 
In order to address exclusion of the poor from financial services, gross domestic product  made 
attempts to provide  micro-finance (Kingoro and Bujra, 2009). The non-governmental organizations 
practiced micro-finance, alongside other social welfare activities. In 2000, major micro-finance 
institutions had 102,304 active clients with a loan portfolio of Euro 16,000,000 (Kenya Shillings 1.6 
billion). They also had a total of 103,856 active savers (voluntary and forced) with a total value of 
Euro 8,120,000 (Kenya Shillings 812,000,000) at end of the year (Mix Market 2012). In the year 
2000, the main concern of Central Bank was that micro finance institutions served a limited number 
of people. Hence, there was a need to build up strategies to reach a large number of people, 
necessary for both financial viability and impacting the development effort (Central Bank of Kenya, 
2000). This concern was addressed in 2005 when the Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) initiative 
was founded with the assistance of World Bank to improve financial inclusion (FSD, 2009). 
A key contribution of the financial sector deepening initiative has been its periodic surveys on 
financial access and inclusion. The surveys were christened, “Finaccess”, and were conducted in 
2006 and 2009. The 2006 survey found that only 19% of Kenyans had formal financial services 
access through commercial banks, building societies and the Post Bank (FSD, 2006). In 2009 this 
access was estimated at 22.6% (FSD 2011). According to the 2006 study, an additional 8% were 
served by savings and credit cooperative societies and micro financial institutions, while 35% 
depended primarily on informal financial services such as rotating savings and credit associations 
and accumulating savings and credit associations.  The survey also found that about 38% of 
Kenyans were excluded from any form of financial services, whether formal or informal, and 
labelled them “the unbanked” (FSD, 2008). Finally, the study found that access to financial services 
varied across the country and was highest in Nairobi and other urban areas. Nairobi alone had the 
greatest number of bank branches which totalled 194 out of 443 (Central Bank of Kenya, 2006). 
According to the results of the 2006 Finaccess study, most rural areas lacked access to any form of 
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financial services. On the positive side however, more people were able to access financial services 
in comparison to 1980s. 
FSD (2008), using the 2006 survey data, found that there were a range of factors influencing 
financial services people preferred at any particular time. The factors comprised cost and distance, 
literacy, income source and gender. The study also established that employed people were likely to 
have access to banks and savings and credits cooperative societies. Farmers were more likely to use 
their agricultural savings and credits cooperative societies especially in places where they are 
effective. Wealthy people have a tendency to use formal financial services. Older males were also 
more likely to use formal services than older ladies. On the overall, the informal financial services 
were found to be wide spread. In 2009, micro finance institutions doubled their intake from that of 
2006 from 1.7% to 3.4%. The Finaccess report, indicated that in 2009 the percentage of  informal 
sector participants had risen to 35.5% (FSD, 2011).  
The rise of the informal sector happened in tandem with the rise of formal inclusive finance, such as 
mobile banking and a greater diffusion of savings and credits cooperative societies.  It is estimated 
that approximately Euro 12,000,000 (Kenya Shillings 1.2 billion) was mobilized by informal groups 
monthly in 2006. Over 50% of these funds were mobilised through rotating savings and credit 
association Euro 6,900,000 (Kenya Shillings 690,000,000). While  rotating savings and credit 
associations were  the  most  used  informal services, they  were  also  the  least  well-organized  of  
the  informal  group  systems in use (Kanyinga and Mitullah 2007). Though informal finance had 
great risks and inconveniences, it continued to be used by many people because of its simplicity, 
convenience and the fact that it brought familiar people together (Liu and Spanjers, 2005).  
2.7.4 Legislating the Micro Finance Sector 
From the beginnings of micro finance in Kenya in the 1980s to early 1990s, little effort was directed 
towards micro finance industry’s regulatory needs. As a result, micro finance institutions were 
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licensed under different Acts of parliament namely; the Non-Governmental Organizations 
Coordination Act, Companies Limited by Guarantee Act, Trust Act, Societies Act, Cooperative Act, 
Companies Act, Banking Act and Kenya Post Office Savings Bank Act (Central Bank of Kenya. 
2001). The Central Bank of Kenya also found that there were varying experiences of  other Central 
Banks participation in micro finance worldwide (Kiplagat, 1998). This meant that on a global scale, 
there was lack of expertise in the area, which made most Central Banks quite cautious in regulating 
the sector.  Despite this legal lacuna, the Central Bank of Kenya set some minimal requirements for 
micro finance institutions involved in deposits collection. They were required to satisfy regulations 
that governed operations of commercial banks and non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs). 
These regulations however, did not address issues of ownership, governance and accountability 
(Gichira, 1991). These weaknesses contributed towards poor performance and eventual demise of 
many micro finance institutions. In a bid to solve this problem, in 1998, the Central Bank of Kenya 
laid groundwork for constructive policies and creation of an enabling environment for them (Kanga, 
1998).  The areas of consideration included: how to supervise micro finance institutions without 
hampering their development; finding a way to strategically mesh micro finance institutions’ needs 
within the existing banking system and encouraging accomplished micro finance institutions to 
convert into banks while still maintaining micro finance as the core of their business (Wamavumo, 
1998). 
In 2002 and 2003, Central Bank, working together with the Association of Micro Finance 
Institutions  proposed a micro finance bill that was tabled in parliament. The bill categorized micro 
finance institutions into three main tiers (Ochanda, 2002). The first tier was made up of small micro 
finance organizations which were presumed to be self-regulating and thus would not require a 
regulatory framework from the government. The informally constituted micro finance institutions 
included rotating savings and credit associations, club pools and financial services associations. The 
second tier included non-governmental organizations  and formally constituted micro finance 
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organizations that did not take deposits from the public but accepted cash collateral tied to loan 
contracts. These institutions were to be supervised by Association of Micro Finance Institutions and 
audit firms (Ochanda, 2002).  Hence, the legislation was to empower the Association of Micro 
Finance Institutions to be in a position to enforce compliance with its regulations. The last tier 
included deposit taking institutions which were to be licensed, supervised and inspected by the 
Central Bank of Kenya. It also proposed a share capital base of Euro 500,000 (Kenya Shillings 
50,000,000) for programs in urban areas and Euro 200,000 (Kenya Shillings 20,000,000) for those 
in the rural areas. Savings and credit cooperative societies and the Kenya Post Office Savings Bank  
were not covered in this bill (Central Bank of Kenya, 2002). In 2004, amendments were made to the 
bill putting an emphasis on deposit-taking institutions. Accordingly, the Minister for Finance was to 
be empowered to issue regulations for the conduct of credit by microfinance institutions (Central 
Bank of Kenya, 2004). 
A significant step in the development of microfinance industry in Kenya was made in December 
2006 when the Microfinance Act was passed. The Act specified regulations about the 
establishment, licensing and supervision of large microfinance institutions. These institutions were 
placed under the control of the Central Bank (Muthuma, 2011). Accordingly, the law aimed at 
creating an enabling environment that would promote performance and sustainability of deposit-
taking microfinance institutions, while at the same time protecting depositors’ interests. The Act 
finally settled on two tiers of microfinance institutions: nationwide microfinance institutions, whose 
minimum core capital was prescribed at Euro 600,000 (Kenya Shillings 60,000,000), and 
community microfinance institutions, with a minimum core capital of Euro 200,000 (Kenya 
Shillings 20,000,000)  (Central Bank of Kenya, 2006).  
By mid-2009, the Central Bank had licensed two large microfinance  institutions  to  become  
deposit-taking  institutions  which  broadened  their  mandate from  being  solely  microcredit  
lenders and allowed  them to mobilize market based funds  domestically  (Central Bank of Kenya, 
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2009). The Microfinance Act also offered new business opportunities to microfinance institutions 
that enabled them to offer a wider range of financial services and products including savings, 
lending, money transfers and micro-insurance.  The law introduced direct competition between 
microfinance institutions and other financial institutions. The law did not regulate micro finance 
interest rates because they deal with risky portfolio as compared to other financial institutions 
(Republic of Kenya, 2006b). 
2.7.5 Industrial Organization of Micro Finance in Kenya 
The universe of micro finance players in Kenya is so diverse and its size cannot be accurately 
estimated (Ochanda, 2002). Association of Micro Finance Institutions has a total of 52 member 
institutions serving approximately 650,000 people (AMFI Kenya, 2010). The mix market data 
estimates that the number of micro finance clients in Kenya was 1.5 million by 2009 (Mix Market, 
2012). Both Association of Micro Finance Institutions and Mix Market may not take cognizance of 
small and informal players. If all players were taken into consideration the number of industry 
players would be much bigger. However, since no other data is available by the time of this study, 
the mix market, central bank of Kenya, Association of Micro Finance Institutions and Finacess data 
will be used to demonstrate the economic impact of micro finance in improving financial services 
access.    
Table 2.7.1: Universe of micro-finance players in Kenya 
Formal Sub Formal Informal 
Micro finance institutions Community based 
organizations 
Association of Savings and 
Credit Associations 
Banks Non-Governmental 
Organizations 
Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations 
Non-Banking Financial 
Institutions 
Faith Based Organizations Individual money lenders 
 Charitable institutions  
Source: Author 
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Micro finance players cut across formality, sub-formality and informality (Kanyinga and Mitullah, 
2007). The informal sector is mainly characterized by small players while the formal sector has 
large players such as banks and registered institutions. Faith based organizations (FBOs), 
community based organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and charitable 
institutions operate within the formal and sub-formal sectors. They do this as a strategy to move the 
poor from the periphery to the mainstream core (Mokoro, et al. 2010). The informal sector is made 
up of rotating savings and credit associations and association of savings and credit associations 
groups and individuals money lenders locally commonly known as “shylocks”. All other 
organizations have rules and agreements but individual money lenders operate purely on profit 
motives and are ruthless to defaulters (Ochanda, 2002).   
In Kenya, the  first  institutions  offering microfinance  were non-profit organizations and  local  
non-governmental organizations  driven  by  a development  paradigm. The initial experience was 
quite new and it was done by the trial and error method and there was a mixture of formality and 
informality. Proper structures of micro finance developed as organizations gained more experience. 
Even the Central Bank was hesitant to introduce regulations as there were fewer similar experiences 
globally. The trend towards formalization of the microfinance practice started in earnest in 2002 
(Central Bank of Kenya, 2002). During this time, successful micro finance institutions started 
transforming or up-scaling themselves into banks. Commercial financial institutions like banks also 
started ‘downscaling’ into offering micro finance services in order to profitably serve the poor niche 
(Dokulilová, Karel and Zetek, 2009). The entry of many players into the industry did introduce new 
dynamics into the micro finance sector, with concerns that commercialization of microfinance 
would surpass their social mission. There was the danger that in the long run, financial 
sustainability would be considered as the measure of success at the expense of social impact. 
Hence, micro finance institutions had to be on guard that their focus centres on the explicit social 
aim while pursuing financial sustainability (Hattel and Halpern, 2001).  
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Micro finance continues to play a significant role in the lives of the poor. It does this by responding 
to their needs, concerns and voices through provision of easy access to financial services. This is 
shown by the growth in the number of savers and borrowers from the inception of micro finance in 
1984 to the year 2009. According to Mix Market data, the population of micro finance borrowers 
continued to rise from 0.6 million in 2000 to 1.5 million in 2009, while that of savers was 900,000 
in 2000 and increased to 6.4 million in 2009 (Mix Market, 2012). The reason for this phenomenal 
outreach over a short period included the fact that the setting of micro finance was embedded within 
the socio-cultural institutions, values and other community structures. Hence, poor people found it 
easy to deal with these institutions and did not feel humiliated, intimidated or fearful of them, as is 
the case with formal institutions. In essence, microfinance addressed the psychological 
disempowering dimensions of powerlessness and hopelessness as identified by Narayan, et al. 
(1999). This critical role played by micro finance led to the growth in the number of its users in 
Kenya.  
2.7.6 Formality and Informality of the Micro Finance Sector in Kenya 
According to Dondo (2005), the microfinance sector in Kenya comprises organizations which can 
be categorized into three “sub-systems”: the informal system, the formal subsidized system and the 
formal non-subsidized system. The informal system includes financial arrangements between 
relatives and friends, traditional money lenders (known locally as “shylocks”), Accumulating 
Savings and Credit Associations, Rotating Savings and Credit Associations  and Village Savings 
and Credit Associations  also known as Village Savings and Loan Associations. Credit from friends 
and relatives also constituted an important source of start-up capital for many micro enterprises in 
urban areas. Informal financial arrangements are deeply rooted in the cultures of many ethnic 
communities (FSD, 2010; Chelogoy, Anyango and Odembo, 2004). The popularity of these 
informal arrangements has been due to geographic proximity between lenders and borrowers, 
friendlier credit terms, and fewer bureaucratic requirements. Repayment arrangements tend to be 
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open-ended and are based on reciprocity (Zeller, 2003). In Kenya, informal groups or Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations are generally referred to as chamas (Swahili word for 
associations). There are thousands of such chamas and they typically allow their members to save 
using a ‘merry-go-round’ system and also offer a variety of other financial services such as loans 
and investments (Chelogoy, Anyango and Odembo, 2004). Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations  and Associations Savings and Credit Associations  provide credit to those who would 
otherwise be ineligible to borrow from formal sources. They also mobilise savings, serve as a social 
capital builder, and help in providing a form of social insurance (Raiser, 1997). 
The Village Savings and Loan Associations are location and community specific. They are 
voluntary groups consisting of 5 to 30 individuals, established to mobilize funds from group 
members for lending back to group members. The members could either be mixed gender or one 
gender, residing in the same village or location (FSD, 2010). These associations are built on the 
principle of pooled individual savings as the foundation for building capital, with motivation to save 
coming from the group. Mobilization of financial resources in the form of equity capital is raised in 
order to establish a locally owned and managed financial institution (Ledgerwood, 2000). In turn a 
local institution benefits its members through providing micro loans and savings depository. Other 
potential products and services include money transfer and micro insurance. 
Formal subsidized system comprises institutions that provide financial services and receive 
subsidies. The main actors are Microfinance non-governmental organizations with special credit 
programs for small and micro enterprises benefiting from foreign aid agencies (Dondo, 2005). 
Microfinance organizations range from small charitable organizations operating in a limited 
geographical area to large institutions in several regions of the country. In this category, there are 
also government agencies that have been developed to offer financial support for micro-enterprises, 
and to economically empower communities with limited access to credit (Republic of Kenya, 
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2009a). Lastly, the formal non-subsidized system includes commercial banks, non-bank financial 
institutions, Savings and Credit Co-operative Societies (SACCOs) and micro finance institutions.  
Below data from the national survey carried out by Financial Sector Deepening Initiative on the 
financial access strand and use of different financial services by Kenya’s adult population: 
Figure 2.7.1: Financial access strand by region and gender 
 
Source: Financial Access in Kenya, Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya, October 2007 
38.4% of the population were excluded from any access to financial services in 2006. This may 
have changed as from 2009 with the introduction of mobile-phone based money transfer and mobile 
banking in Kenya which helped in the inclusion of a sizeable part of the population. At the same 
time there was a huge section of the population (35%) using informal finance. 7.5% were using 
other formal finance means while 18.9% were in formal finance. Women’s access to financial 
services was less than that of men as 40.5% of women relied only on informal financial service; 
almost double the percentage of men within this group. 39.3% of women were also financially 
excluded in 2006, a percentage larger than the national financially excluded.  
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Figure 2.7.2: Usage of different financial services 
 
Source: Financial Access in Kenya, Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya, October 2007 
Kenya’s micro finance institutions currently serve a very small percentage of Kenya’s adult 
population; with only 1.7% of adults using their services in 2006. Micro finance clients also use 
informal financial services like accumulating and rotating savings and credit associations. This 
group made up 35.2% of Kenya’s estimated adult population of 17.4 million in 2006. Growth of 
microfinance and its easy access will serve to attract more financially excluded low-income 
Kenyans. The financially excluded made up 38.4% of the adult population in 2006, providing a 
huge potential market growth for micro finance sector by approximately 6 million clients. 
Micro finance institutions have to tap on the large informal and excluded sector. In order to exploit 
this potential market, there is need to introduce products that will respond well to market needs 
(Robinson, 2001). Micro finance institutions also have to learn to respond well to increasing 
competition from banks, savings and credit cooperatives and other financial institutions. The 
competition has hastened commercialization of micro finance institutions in Kenya.  
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Figure 2.7.3 Map of Financial Access in Kenya 
 
The Kenya Financial Map of Financial Inclusion provides the landscape of financial services 
providers. It provides insight into access to finance and financial inclusion within Kenya (Mix 
Market, 2013) 
These institutions have been forced to become entrepreneurial in order to respond to ever changing 
needs of their customers. They also pursue market resources like conventional mainstream financial 
institutions; hence they take out loans, issue bonds, charge interest and also benefit from other 
forms of transaction charges (The Economist, 2008).  
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Table 2.7.2: Number of Loans and Borrowers 2000 to 2008 of MFIs 
 Gross Loans in Euro 
(Millions) 
Gross Loans 
(Millions of  
Kenya Shillings) 
Number of 
borrowers 
(Millions of people) 
2000 0.183 18.30 0.06 
2001 0.295 29.50 0.08 
2002 0.486 48.60 0.15 
2003 1.001 100.10 0.25 
2004 1.630 163.00 0.40 
2005 2.360 236.00 0.66 
2006 5.418 541.80 0.92 
2007 7.824 782.40 1.10 
2008 11.13 1,113.00 1.50 
2013 22.00 2,200.00 1.50 
Source: Mix Market Data 2013. Kenya Shillings 100 = 1 Euro (2011 Ppp) 
The data above shows that the gross loan portfolio rose from Euro 183,000 (Kenya Shillings 
18,300,000) in 2000 to Euro 1,000,000 (Kenya Shillings 100,000,000) in 2003, Euro 5,410,000 
(Kenya Shillings 541,000,000) in 2006 and lastly Euro 11,130,000 (Kenya Shillings 1.113 billion) 
in 2009 and Euro 22,000,000 (Kenya Shillings 2.2 billion) in 2013. This growth in loans portfolio is 
quite phenomenal and seems to be doubling or tripling after two years. The growth in the loans 
portfolio seems to be backed by the growth in the number of borrowers. From a paltry 600,000 
clients in 2000, this number grew to 1.5 million clients in 2008 and ultimately 2013.  
The number of micro finance users and transactions continued to increase during the time of the 
global financial crisis, meaning that micro finance assisted quite a lot in cushioning the risks 
associated with the period. It is important to note that there were more loans borrowed in the year 
2008. This was the year when Kenya experienced the post elections violence (PEV), after a 
disputed electoral results. The country experienced wanton destruction of life and property and so 
many businesses suffered. After the conflict, there was need for finance to help in restoration of 
businesses and property. Micro finance did play a great role in the reconstruction process 
(Woodworth, 2011). The post electoral violence period did also affect various micro finance 
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programmes negatively especially the small ones who could not be able to cushion themselves 
against adverse macro-economic shocks.  
Table 2.7.3: Deposits and Savers in MFIs 
 Deposits in Euro Deposits  (Millions of  
Kenya Shillings) 
Number of savers 
(Millions of people) 
2000   89,406 
2001   113,472 
2002   188,123 
2003 594,051.73 59,405,173 292,273 
2004 845,873.82 84,587,382 1,347,239 
2005 1,845,299.58 184,529,958 1,688,937 
2006 3,119,129.11 311,912,911 2,472,358 
2007 8,108,582.52 810,858,252 3,652,226 
2008 8,818,805.84 881,880,584 4,912,965 
2009 11,.770,461.74 1,177,046,174 6,441,961 
2010 15,456,368.51 1,545,636,851 7,243,455 
2013 26,000,000.00 2.6 billion 8.8 million 
Source: Mix Market Data 2012 
Most micro finance institutions do provide other services such as micro savings, micro insurance 
and transfer services among others (Central Bank of Kenya, 2002; Republic of Kenya, 1992b).  The 
table above shows savings activities of micro finance institutions in Kenya since 2003.  The number 
of deposits was Euro 15,000,000 (Kenya Shillings 1.5 billion) by 2010 while there were 7.2 million 
depositors. Some of these deposits include mandatory deposits which are prerequisites for loans 
qualifications, while others were voluntary deposits. Growth in savings from 2007 to 2008 was not 
as impressive as previously or thereafter. This period coincided with post electoral violence which 
directed micro finance resources to reconstruction. Savings activities were very minimal.  
As seen above, the post-election violence negatively impacted on the savings activities. More micro 
finance resources were used to finance reconstruction loans. Some clients were also not able to 
service their loans and save as before. This led to the collapse of several small micro finance 
programs that could not withstand shocks of such magnitude (Ochanda, Wakinya, et al. 2010). 
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The surviving micro finance instructions helped their clients start afresh after that difficult period. It 
is a fact that a big proportion of these clients could not get assistance from conventional banks. 
Hence micro finance had an important post conflict reconstruction role during 2008. This was true 
during the post elections violence period where the application of financial resources from 
conventional providers was limited or was completely impossible. 
In demonstrating that micro finance institutions play a great role in the lives of the poor, Dondo 
(1991) assigns to them roles such as credit management, technical training, technical assistance, 
marketing outlets, and provision of pre-constructed commercial sheds. He also observes that credit 
is either individualized or group based. Credit helps the poor generate income, making it possible to 
move to higher levels of self-sustainability and take care of their temporal emergencies. The 
trainings offered by micro finance institutions assists individuals to develop entrepreneurship and 
vocational skills, enhancing business creativity as a result. SME proprietors also receive technical 
assistance meant to improve their routine practices in areas such as book keeping, inventory, 
costing, marketing, production and appropriate technology exploitation.  
2.7.7 Challenges faced by the Micro Finance Industry in Kenya 
Despite their impacts, micro finance institutions in Kenya face a number of challenges in the areas 
of resource mobilization, technology, corporate governance, organizational development matters 
and maintenance of high standards of performance. They also face a challenge in expanding their 
capital base (Kimenyi, 2000). Most micro finance institutions get stuck with the resources they 
mobilized at the start-up phase which get depleted with time denying the programmes the 
opportunity to reach a sufficient capacity. This can be solved if micro finance institutions 
considered diversifying their resources, acquiring soft loans, commercial loans or even exploring 
ways and means of accessing equity funding. Micro finance institutions grapple with the fact that 
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their return on investment may not be sufficient to attract venture capitalists. However, well run 
institutions can generate good levels of performance that can attract socially responsible investors.  
The main concern of micro finance is to deliver poor people from poverty while at the same time 
being vigilant in monitoring of operational efficiency, profitability, portfolio quality, market share, 
and client retention. These institutions are hence, required to build effective governance that will 
assist them resort to commercial sources of capital. There is a critical need for transparent reporting 
and adherence to industry standards of good performance. Only effective governance can provide 
the level of accountability required by investors and lenders. Effective governance also helps 
institutions deal with defaults, poor clients’ orientation, weak group cohesion, loans diversion and 
double loans (Esipisu, 1996).   
 There is a trend towards commercialization of micro finance. While they are competing with banks 
and other actors to acquire market resources, they may lose their social mission. This may happen 
as the quest for sustainability and profitability replace the quest to help the poor solve poverty 
problems. With this in mind, they may also contribute in enhancing the lack of access to finance 
among the poor. The mix between survival, growth and social needs presents a complex dynamic 
that requires expertise in handling.  
2.7.8 Micro finance fit in the third sector discourse  
By providing finance services to the poor micro finance institutions enable them to save and in turn 
gain access credit so as to satisfy a wide range of business, consumption, personal, social and asset-
building needs.  
MFIs also treat the poor with dignity.  Micro finance officers provide other services such as follow 
up and technical support in a bid to help them. Despite the fact that some of its clients may be 
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illiterate and be unable to complete all the necessary paperwork required to access formal financial 
services, these clients feel safer in a micro-finance institution. 
Micro finance also plays a great role in promoting gender equity through empowering women 
economically (Anyanzwa and Adero, 2008). It has been shown that the percentage of women using 
informal finance is about double than that of men, underscoring a gendered dimension of poverty. 
By focusing on women, they therefore contribute to reducing inequality between men and women. 
Micro finance therefore play an important inclusion role in Kenya by providing access to financial 
services among the poor. It also provides the opportunity to formalize the informal economy and 
move the country towards achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and betterment of its 
human development index.  
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CHAPTER THREE: SELF-HELP GROUPS  AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN RIRUTA 
LOCATION IN NAIROBI, KENYA  
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
Self-help groups  are grassroots associations within communities initiating development from the 
bottom.  They bring together community members into collective action so that their voices may not 
be taken for granted when decisions concerning social, economic and politics are made (Kinyanjui, 
2010). They do this by identifying and mobilizing local resources to solve problems. This active 
form of participation in solving individual and community problems improves the feeling of 
belongingness and promotes a deeper identification with the community (Ouma, 1987). Self-help 
groups exemplify a typical form of community organization for welfare promotion among the 
grassroots.  
Self-help groups, also known as mutual help, mutual aid, or support groups, are groups of people 
who provide mutual support for each other while addressing a community based concern (Ahmadi, 
2007).  These groups are deeply embedded in the village communities and represent a grassroots 
model of social activism. 
In Kenya, self-help groups were formally recognized through registration under the Department of 
Social Services in the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development. Self-help groups are 
numerous compared to other actors of the civil society organizations in Kenya. Self-helps operate 
primarily at the village and community level. They exist to advance interests of their members and 
the immediate needs of their local communities (Republic of Kenya, 2009a). 
Once founded, the officials of a self-help group meet with a local community development assistant 
or the district officer in charge of social development to formally request registration. There is a  
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minimum requirement of 7 to 10 founder-members required for registration. However there is no 
minimum capital or assets requirements at the time of registration (NGO Law Monitor, 2011).  
To be registered, self-help groups are expected to submit an application letter, duly filled 
registration form from the concerned ministry, their constitution (with a clearly defined purpose or 
project), a list of members, evidence of local resource mobilization and detailed minutes of 
democratic elections (Republic of Kenya, 2008b). An application fee of Euro 10 (Kenya shillings 
1,000) is payable by organizations choosing the self-help group mode while Euro 50 (Kenya 
Shillings 5,000) is payable by those electing the community based organizations option. Non-
compliance with these requirements can lead to denial of registration.  
There is no specific government guideline that stipulates the differences between community based 
organizations and self-help groups. In essence the common practice has been to inter-change the 
two, making them mean the same.  However the perception within the ministry ranks and the public  
is that self-help groups concentrate benefits to their members while extending some of it to their 
immediate community. Community based organizations on the other hand have a bigger community 
outreach. In terms of resource mobilization the community based organizations are presumes to 
have more capabilities than the self helps. In essence self helps are encouraged to aspire to become 
community based organizations once they mature.  
In practice, the registration process can take up to four weeks because all applications are approved 
by the district officer in charge of social development. The applicants are required to seek 
recommendation from the local chief and district officer before their application for registration is 
finalized. The registration process is complete when the group receives a certificate of registration. 
Once the group comes into existence, the self-help groups are required to renew their registration 
every year. This renewal is done through payment of an annual fee, presently at Euro 10 (Kenya 
Shillings 1,000). With changes in governments, the ministry charged with the responsibility over 
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self-help groups also change. Ministerial changes also require the groups to change their certificates 
accordingly, which is usually done at a fee of between Euro 10 to 50 (Kenya Shillings 1000 to 
5000) depending on whether the group is a self-help or a community based organization. 
The District Social Development Office in every district has regulatory authority over self-help 
groups and community based organizations. During the period 2008 to 2013 the Department of 
Social Development in the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development had overall 
regulatory authority and sets the general regulations and criteria for operation (Republic of Kenya, 
2008b and 2009). Depending on where a self-help group operates, it may give notice to the District 
Officer in charge of social development in case of an intended dissolution. Generally, Kenyan law 
provides a conducive framework for self-help groups to seek and secure funding. Local resource 
mobilization through Harambee (public fund-raisers) is recognized, as long as it adheres to the 
guidelines of the Public Collections Act, Cap 106, which are generally enabling (Republic of 
Kenya, 2009e). The collections are regulated by a chief, district officer or district commissioner. All 
collections made are deemed to be for the fulfilment of a specific purpose identified by the self-help 
group.  
Self-help groups are marred by legislative limitations. There is no systematic legislation of the self-
help groups and a refined treatment in law.  Hence, self-help groups are not legal entities but are 
considered as entries in the ministry registers 
  
(NGO Law Monitor, 2011). The government drafted 
a National Community Policy in 2009 that is making an attempt to give self-help groups a legal 
recognition. The policy however, does not propose a registration model envisaged for the self-help 
groups (Republic of Kenya, 2009e). In order to solve the legislative problems and other challenges 
faced by self-help groups, in 2008 a National Community Based Organizations Consortium was 
formed in Kenya. Its mandate was representation, giving a voice and advocacy for the self-helps. 
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The self-help movement in Kenya has passed through various important stages dating from pre-
colonial time. Traditionally, these groups focused on mutual assistance on various occasions such as 
farming, building, marriages, funerals and other special projects of the villages (Ouma, 1987). 
During the colonial era the groups were used to advance mass education and help local citizens 
address social welfare (Wallis, 1976). Today, self-helps address various issues and challenges faced 
by individuals and society in general. By doing so, they are forced to generate resources using 
various means (Sall, 2009).  Their work has contributed to small development initiatives in both 
rural and urban areas. 
The aim of this chapter is to explore contributions made by self-helps towards local development in 
Riruta location in Nairobi, Kenya. The chapter addresses this by examining how self-helps’ address 
concerns facing their group members and communities in the light of the third sector discourse. 
Self-helps by nature are micro-actors whose contributions in development activities are felt at the 
level of the community. They could contribute significantly in promoting social inclusion and 
building social capital at the grassroots. They in essence heighten the sense of responsibility among 
community members. Good utilization of the self helps could improve what Coleman (1988) 
referred to as the sense of obligation, reciprocity and expectation fulfilment.   By their work, they 
fill the gaps left by the state on one hand and the market on the other. Available studies on self-
helps have focused on self-reliance (Mbithi and Rasmusson, 1977), government patronage (Male, 
1976), social relationships and resources (Barkan and Holmquist, 1989), their role in economic 
empowerment (Ochanda, 2012a) and their experience with respect to the Harambee movement 
(Ngau 1987) among others. However none of the available studies have acknowledged the role 
played by the self-help movement in filling gaps left by the state and the market in Kenya. 
In order to achieve its aim, this chapter will build an understanding of how the self-helps fit in the 
third sector discourse by investigating three salient factors. It will first look at the determinants of 
the self-helps self-perception of success in the process of pursuing their social mission. While doing 
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this it will employ the use of an Ordered Probit Model. Secondly the chapter will use a Poisson 
Distribution Model to study the determinants of effectiveness in resource mobilization, and lastly 
using the same model determinants of economic empowerment will be studied. The study shall 
therefore be guided by the following hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1: The propensity of the self-help groups to perceive themselves as being 
successful is increased by positive changes in capabilities 
 Hypothesis 2: A unit change in economic empowerment activities has a positive effect on 
the expected positive changes in capabilities in the organization 
 Hypothesis 3: A unit change in total resource mobilization activities has a positive effect on 
the expected positive changes in capabilities in the organization 
3.2 Methodology 
The methodology section provides an account of methodological framework that guided the study. 
This is followed by research design and justification. A  narrative  account  of  the  data  collection  
procedures  employed  in  the  study is also presented.  The last section deals with the analytic 
approaches and techniques applied in the study.  The chapter then concludes with a discussion. 
3.2.1 Research Site 
The Research was carried out in Riruta location of Dagoretti District in Nairobi, Kenya. Nairobi 
covers a total area of 684 km
2
 and has a population of 3,138,369. The population has grown 3.8 
times since 1979. This growth is partly attributed to high rate of rural-urban migration. Kenya as a 
country generally, has a high population growth rate estimated at an annual rate of 2.3%. This 
population growth rate contributes to high rate of unemployment and causes pressure on scarce 
resources including government services (Republic of Kenya, 2007).  
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Riruta was selected as the research site for this study, because of a number of reasons. The 
researcher was familiar with this area and that made data collection easier. It is usually very 
difficult to collect data from grassroots organizations. These organizations tend to be suspicious of 
researchers for various reasons, hence familiarity helps a lot. Riruta Location comprises both 
middle and lower class of Nairobi. It is considered the headquarter of Dagoretti District, hosting 
important administrative offices. Dagoretti District covers an area of 39Km
2
 and has a total 
population of 240,509. Riruta Location is one of the six locations of the district and has a total area 
of 7.3 Km
2
 and a total population of 65,958 (Kenya Bureau of Statistics, 2009). The large Riruta 
residential facility is mainly for middle level income people. On its western side rests Kawangware 
slums. On the eastern side lies the peri-urban Waithaka, where agricultural activities take place.     
A tributary of Nairobi River known as Kagicu passes through Riruta. It has a number of small 
private clinics, public primary schools, butcheries, churches, a number of micro businesses such as 
saloons and barber shops, retail, clothing businesses and bars. Micro-grocery businesses are mainly 
run by women while bars and taxi businesses are run by men; micro-retail shops are evenly 
distributed between both genders. The Satellite Centre has a market with business stalls being 
managed by a network-coalition of self-help groups known as Kawangware-Ndurarua-Satelite 
(Kandusat) and Youth Economic Empowerment Program (YEEP). The formation of self-help 
groups coalitions is an important characteristic of self-helps not only in Riruta but also in Nairobi.  
It is not easy to quantify the unemployment rate in Riruta. However, most youth are idle and do not 
have access to employment opportunities. In fact, youth and women are categorized as some of the 
vulnerable groups.  This idleness exposes them to despair and criminal activities in search of 
livelihoods. A number of youth however, have started small income generating endeavours such as 
mkokoteni (hand-carts), recycling of solid waste and small urban agricultural activities. As a result 
of joblessness, security is deteriorating as youth engage in violent crimes. Few young people are 
penalized each year as a result of criminal activities. Because of poverty, young ladies may fall prey 
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to sexual exploitation. A few lucky youth are absorbed into some of the micro-enterprises in Riruta, 
while others get assisted by some of the existing non-governmental organizations, faith based 
organizations or the self-help groups in the region. 
Table 3.1: Dagoretti District Population 
Place Population % Distribution 
Kawangware Location 86,824, 36.10 
Riruta Location 65,958 27.42 
Kenyatta/Golf Course Location 30,253 12.58 
Uthiru/Ruthimitu Location 23,016 9.57 
Waithaka  Location 19,937 8.29 
Mutuini Location 14,521 6.04 
Dagoretti Constituency 240,509 100.00 
Source: Kenya Bureau of Statistics, 2009 
According to table 3.1, the population in the other locations of Dagoretti District is distributed as 
follow: Kawangware 36.1%, Kenyatta/Golf Course 12.58%, Uthiru/ Ruthimitu 9.57%, Waithaka 
8.29 and lastly Mutuini at 6.04%. Riruta is the second biggest location of Dagoretti District having 
27.42% of the total population.  
3.2.2 Research Design 
The research design used for this study is triangulation i.e. qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies using a combination of observation and interviews. Triangulation was deemed 
appropriate because the use of different sources or methods corroborate each other. Though 
Silverman (2000) advices against triangulation, he contends that it may improve the reliability of a 
single method. In order to make triangulation effective Silverman suggests that it must be grounded 
in theory and that the methods and data should account for the meaning and structure.   
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3.2.3 Sources of Data   
The research relied on  three  main  methods  of  data  collection; Riruta Location administrative 
data,  semi-structured  interviews and  direct  observations.     
3.2.3.1 Riruta Location Administration Archives 
The initial data for this research was provided by the provincial administration offices of Riruta 
Location. The location archives covered the period between January 1984 to August 2010. During 
this period, approximately 523 community based organizations were registered in Riruta Location. 
The archival materials comprised self-help groups registration forms, constitutions, proposals, 
official communications, dispute resolutions processes, resource mobilization activities and 
minutes. In order to capture this data in a systematic manner, the researcher developed a standard 
instrument whose variables included demographic information about the self-help groups, 
objectives, real work done, resource mobilization strategies and the type of resource mobilization 
activities. 
The archival data had major limitations. It did not show whether the organizations did exist beyond 
the time of their registration. It could also not provide an understanding of organizational dynamics 
such as challenges and successes.   
In order to minimize the weaknesses of the archival data, the list derived from the location was used 
as a sample frame for a fresh data collection exercise. However, despite the weaknesses of the data, 
it was used in econometric analysis and its results compared with data from the field. Tables 3.2 to 
3.5 summarize information on creation, registrations and membership of the Riruta self-help groups 
according to the location archival data. 
Table 3.2: Self-help groups creation by year 
Year of creation Frequency Percentage 
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1984-1990 2 0.38 
1991-1995 5 0.96 
1996-2000 24 4.59 
2001-2005 193 36.90 
2006-2010 299 57.17 
Total 523 100 
Source: Author from the Riruta self-help group archival data 1984-2010 
Table 3.2 shows that very few self-help groups were created from 1980s to 2000. Data shows that 
only 2 groups were created between 1984 and 1990.  There were only five groups that were created 
from 1991 to 1995 while 24 groups were created between 1996 and 2000. There was a phenomenal 
increase in the creation of self-help groups from 2001. 193 groups were formed between 2001 and 
2005.  
In just a period of five years beginning 2001, the creation of self-help groups was six times more 
than the previous decade. Between 2006 and 2010, 299 self-help groups were created. This 
phenomenal increase in self-help associational activities indicates that Kenya had experienced a 
major transformation in terms of civil liberties as a result of a change in government among other 
factors. The data on table 3.2 is complemented with the data in table 3.3 below.   
Table 3.3: Self-help group registrations by year 
Year of registration Frequency Percentage 
1984-1990 2 0.38 
1991-1995 2 0.38 
1996-2000 6 1.15 
2001-2005 161 30.78 
2006-2010 352 67.30 
Total 523 100 
Source: Author from Riruta Location Archival Data 1984-2010 
From table 3.3, we find that there were fewer self-help groups registered from 1984 to 2000. Only 2 
groups were registered between 1984 and 1990, 2 more were registered between 1991 and 1995, 
while 6 others were registered between 1996 and 2000. In two decades, only 10 self-help groups 
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were registered. The trend changed as from 2001 as 161 groups were registered between 2001 and 
2005 and later 352 were registered between 2006 and 2010.   
 Many self-help groups were hence created and registered between 2001 and 2010. In total 492 
groups were created during the period while 513 groups were registered. A small proportion of the 
groups registered in the 2000s included those that had been formed in the previous decade and were 
either operating without being registered, had been denied registration or those that their registration 
had been unduly delayed. In essence therefore, between 2001 and 2010 approximately 49 groups 
were being created annually while 51 organizations were being registered. The phenomenal 
increase in registrations of the groups certainly had a positive effect on the number of created 
organizations over the years. 
Despite its positive effect, this registration process had many latent weaknesses. The self-help 
groups were not recognized in the Kenyan law as legal entities. The certificate that the self-help 
groups received only helped them be recognized in the community, open a bank account, conduct 
business and be able to conduct resource mobilization activities. They however could not enter into 
binding contracts as entities as their members were jointly and severally liable. This weakness cost 
them many opportunities.  
Table 3.4: Distribution of group membership by gender 
Member type 
Total Minimum 
per group 
Average 
per group 
Maximum 
per group 
Male members 1,974 0 10.15 88 
Female members 1,721 0 10.42 108 
Both genders 3,695 5  120 
Source: Author computations from Riruta Location data 
Table 3.4 shows that the average participation of males in self-help groups is 10.15 while it is 10.42 
among female members. The ratio of male to female participation in the self-help groups is 1:1.025 
indicating more participation in self-help activities by women. The minimum number of gender 
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based participation in the groups is 0, meaning that several groups were comprised of only one 
gender either male or female. The maximum number of male members in the self-help groups is 88 
while it was 108 for female members. The minimum number of members in any one group was 5 
while the maximum number was 120. 
Table 3.5: Self-help group membership disaggregation by area and gender in Riruta Location 
Area Males Females Total male to female 
to male Ratio 
Kawangware 673 967 1,640 0.70:1 
Riruta 448 393 841 1.14:1 
Ngando 374 372 746 1.01:1 
Satelite 226 242 468 0.93:1 
Total 1,721 1,974 3,695 0.87:1 
Source: Author computations 
In Table 3.5, membership of self-help groups was demarcated according to the region of residence. 
In Riruta, the total number of self-help members was 841; male members totalled 448 and 393 for 
female members. Overall the ratio of male to female membership in Riruta was 1.14:1 meaning that 
there was more male participation in self-help group activities. In Ngando, total membership was 
746 (374 males and 372 females); the ratio of male to female was 1.01:1 meaning that there was 
slightly more participation of men in self-help groups. Women participation was lowest in 
Kawangware at 0.70:1 female to male ratio. The ratio was also low at 0.93:1 female to male in 
Satelite. Overall male to female ratio membership in self-help groups is 0.87:1 signifying in general 
more female participation in self-help group activities in Riruta. 
3.2.3.2 Semi-structured interviews  
The second data collection exercise was done using semi-structured interviews and questionnaires. 
The questionnaires contained questions that sought information on bio-data, scope of intervention, 
networking, self-help group activities, extent of stakeholder involvement, human capital, resource 
mobilization strategies, expenditure, organizational challenges and successes. The total number of 
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respondents was captured and demarcated within the four major regions of the location. This data 
was collected between August and December 2011. 
Table 3.6: Number of interviewed Respondents according to Location 
Residence Frequency Percentage 
Ngando 39 31.97 
Riruta 37 30.33  
Satelite 24 19.67  
Kawangware 22 18.03  
Total 122 100 
 
Table 3.6 shows that many respondents (31.97%) resided in Ngando followed by those residing in 
Riruta comprising of 30.33%. Satelite comprised of 19.67% while in Kawangware there were 
18.03% of the total respondents. 
 In order to ensure that the research instruments (questionnaires, focus group discussion guidelines 
and observation checklists) would be understood, they were tested on three self-help groups. They 
were also tested among seven people identified by the researcher who had knowledge of self-help 
groups operations. From the tool testing exercise, the researcher adjusted the tools on the basis of 
feedback received.  
From the contacts provided by the location archival data, the researcher made telephone calls to 
representatives of self-help groups to set the date for interview appointments. The process of data 
collection was slow since in some cases members requested the researcher to wait until they were 
all available. Hence, the researcher had to be equipped with days of the month and dates when these 
groups were meeting. During meetings, it was much easier for the researcher to get full information 
about the groups and complete the questionnaire.  
Many groups did not have a meeting during the time the researcher was available for the data 
collection exercise. In some cases, it was also difficult for the researcher to get information as those 
found were not in leadership positions. To overcome this challenge, the researcher deployed 
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assistants who continued with the data collection exercise once he had left. Also, it was difficult to 
track other groups because of challenges explained later in this section. In the long run, the 
researcher only managed to reach 122 groups for the interviews.   
3.2.3.3 Direct observations 
From the data collected in the field, the researcher identified a group of 10 respondents who were 
approached for further interviews for purposes of developing case studies. These groups also invited 
the researcher to participate in some of their activities. During these times, the groups availed more 
information to the researcher and even produced their organizational documents. Majority of the 
groups approached were those that had existed for five years and had a membership of 10 and 
above.   
Observations enabled the researcher to acquire a better understanding of the context within which 
ordinary members, staff members and board members interacted on a regular basis.  The direct  
observations  of  each  self-help group  took  place  over  four  weeks  and  were spread out to 
capture different group activities.  The observations took 1-1½ hours at a time. The researcher 
adopted the stance of “observer as participant” in which the researcher’s observer activities were 
known to the group.  The researcher participated in some of the group activities, meetings and 
special events.  
Some groups were highly interested in the researcher’s work and invited him to explain it. Others 
even asked the researcher to organize some training for them on social entrepreneurship. This was 
important as during these interactive sessions, self-help group members had discussions on how it 
applied to their own settings and at times, provided more information about themselves to the 
researcher. Hence, these observational events enabled the acquisition of latent information about the 
groups and to clarify points that were not captured in the questionnaire interviews. This was 
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possible because the researcher was allowed to view annual general meeting minutes, historical 
documents and in some cases the books of accounts.  
While applying the observation method, the researcher focused on the naturally occurring, ordinary 
events. This ensured that the data  collected  was in  close  proximity  to  the  specific  self-help 
group situation  and  were  therefore  locally grounded in context (Milles and Huberman, 1994). 
The data obtained from direct observations was limited to  contemporary  events  and  so  the 
researcher  turned  to  documentation  in  order  to  investigate  the influences of past events.  
During the data collection process, the researcher experienced a number of challenges. When some 
of the prospective respondents were called, they responded well and identified themselves with the 
groups in question. However, when the researcher requested for an interview opportunity, they 
disassociated themselves from their groups.  Secondly, about 15 to 20% of telephone contacts 
provided, belonged to people who were less active group members or those who had severed 
relationships with their groups and hence had little or no information about the group operations. 
In some cases, it was not clear whether the groups had ceased to exist, since the respondents did not 
associate themselves with the groups in question. There were also those groups which had already 
disintegrated and the group certificate was being used by one of the splinter groups. The other 
splinter in most cases had sought their own separate registration certificate.  
Most groups had no offices and were meeting in members’ residential places, social halls, schools 
or church premises. There were some groups whose contact information had changed and they had 
not updated this information with the registration offices. Some of these problems are not unique to 
self-help groups; a recent report in Kenya indicated the same problem for the non-governmental 
organization sector (Republic of Kenya, 2009d). 
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There were also those groups which got their registration in Riruta and migrated to operate in other 
places. Conversely, there were groups which came to get their certificates in Riruta despite residing 
in other areas. When it came to the actual interviews, questions on finance were considered too 
sensitive. One problem experienced was the fact that some groups considered the researcher to be a 
government or donor agent. Depending on the nature of the relationship the groups had with the 
government or donors, they either shared their information or withheld it. However, to solve this 
problem, the researcher organized training sessions on social entrepreneurship for the self-help 
groups. The training session enabled bonding between the self-help groups and the researcher and 
helped in overcoming data collection mistrust.  
The researcher was able to decipher the basis for government suspicion by the self-help groups. 
Some groups had borrowed moneys from some governmental agencies in the hope of carrying out 
investments. Unfortunately some investments did not pick up as was planned. As a result, they were 
struggling to pay back their loans but not according to the original schedule. There was fear that if 
they were to be forced to pay according to the original schedule, their activities could have been 
hampered. There are also those that received grants from the government for specific purposes and 
had little to show from the grants. Other groups thought that the researcher was an agent of a donor 
organization. Hence, they were willing to share their information easily. The researcher however, 
corrected these perceptions at the beginning of all interviews and in the letter of request for the 
interview.  
Due to the fact that some self-help groups had ceased to exist, data collection difficulties,  while 
others declined the interviews, others still had either changed their address or were at large. Thus 
from an original population of 523, the researcher was only able to interview a sample of 122 self-
help groups. It is this data therefore that was used in the statistical and empirical analysis.  
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Since the researcher collected the data in person, there was keenness to ensure that all information 
received was correct and that there was little probability of bias. To limit the biases, the researcher 
ran one model using data collected from the field and another model using the objective data 
collected from the administrative offices.  
3.2.4 Data Analysis and Interpretation  
This section presents the analysis of data obtained to study the contribution of the self-help groups 
towards local development in Riruta Location in Nairobi, Kenya.  The first part of the analysis 
presents descriptive statistics, the second presents econometric models with the third presenting the 
discussions. 
In analysing the bio-data, basic information about self-help groups was examined. The main focus 
of analysis was organizational background, age of the self-help groups, community of residence and 
scope of service provision. 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Section One: Self-help Groups Bio Data 
Table 3.7: Ages of the responding self-help groups by 2011 
Age Frequency Percentage 
0-2 33 27.05 
3-5 44 36.07 
6-8 26 21.31 
9-11 13 10.66 
12-14 4 3.28 
15-17 2 1.64 
Total 122 100.00 
Source: Author computations 
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In table 3.7 27.05% of self helps were aged between 0 and 2 years by the time of data collection. 
Others were as follow 3-5 years (36.07%), 6-8 years (21.31%), 9-11 years (10.66%), 12-14 years 
(3.28%) while those age 15-17 years were 1.64%. 
 The oldest organizations were established in 1994 and were aged 17 by time of data collection. As 
can be seen there were fewer organizations aged 12 to 17 as this time coincides with a less-enabling 
government ambient that discouraged cooperation and associational activities through its tough 
bureaucracy. Despite the bureaucracy, several groups found expression in the grassroots and 
operated informally and never sought registration (Ndegwa, 1996).  
Signs of change appeared in the 2000s with the number of self-help groups starting to rise. For 
example, there was a rise in the number of groups between 2000 and 2004. In 2002, the existing 
government during that time, lost to the opposition movement.  This change in government became 
later a catalyst for the growth of self-help groups. Hence as can be seen with the encouragement of 
associational and cooperation activities, the number of younger self-help groups kept on rising till 
the year 2011. 
Table 3.8: Educational levels within the self-help groups 
Education Frequency Percentage 
Not specified 1,036 28.04 
Secondary 919 24.87 
Primary 886 23.98 
Tertiary 431 11.66 
Some literacy 290 7.85 
No literacy 133 3.60 
Total 3,695 100.00 
 
Generally, most self-help group members have completed either primary (23.98%) or secondary 
school (24.87%) education. There was a good participation of members with a tertiary school 
education whose overall estimation was 11.66%. Several self-help groups had people with low 
literacy skills who comprised approximately 7.85% of the total self-help group membership. 
However, a significant number (28.04%) did not indicate their literacy levels.  
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Table 3.9: Distribution of member age profiles  in self-help groups 
Member ages Number Overall proportion 
Not specified 1,156 31.29 
18-30 1,160 31.39 
31-40 967 26.17 
41-50 301 8.15 
51-60 87 2.35 
61-over 24 0.65 
Totals 3,695 100.00 
Source: Author 
The 18 to 30 age group comprised 31.39% of the entire self-help groups’ population. Members aged 
31 to 40 comprised 26.17% of the total membership population. The 41 to 50 age-group comprised 
8.15% of the entire population. The 51 to 60 age group was approximately 2.35% while the 61 and 
above group was approximately 0.65%. From this analysis, it emerges that membership of self-help 
groups mainly comprises 18 to 30 and 31 to 40 age groups. There were also those who did not 
specify the age-groups of their members comprising 31.29% of the total sample population. 
Table 3.10: Experiential duration within the self-help groups by members  
Experience duration in 
self-help group Number of members Percentage 
Not specified 1,157 31.31 
five-above 533 14.42 
two year 513 13.88 
three year 427 11.56 
one year 394 10.66 
less than a year  380 10.28 
four year 291 7.88 
Total 3,695 100.00 
Source: computations based on the location data 
Members with five years’ experience made up 14.42% of the overall sample population.  13.88% 
had two years’ experience while 11.56% had three years’ experience in the groups. In general the 
duration of membership signals the degree of loyalty. There is evidence that new people join self-
help groups each year. This signals that self-help group services are needed and do attract 
community attention. 31.31% did not specify their experiential duration. 
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Table 3.11: Organizational stakeholders according to gender 
 
Male Female Ratio M:F 
Beneficiaries 2039 2417 0.84:1 
Members 1974 1721 1.15:1 
Volunteers 388 296 1.31:1 
Board 344 282 1.22:1 
Staff 176 157 1.12:1 
Promoters 223 0 
 Average 857 812 1.12:0.83 
 
Stakeholders were categorized into board members, staff, volunteers, beneficiaries, promoters and 
members. The ratio of male to female board membership was 1.22:1; male to female staff 
membership was 1.12:1, male to female volunteers 1.31:1 and male to female members 1.15:1. 
There were more female than male beneficiaries with the male to female ratio being 0.84:1. Lastly, 
the promoters of the self-help groups were all male.  
Table 3.12: Scope of Service Provision 
Target area Frequency Percentage 
Village 19 15.57 
Location 48 39.34 
Division 27 22.13 
District 16 13.11 
Province 5 4.10 
National 7 5.74 
Total 122 100 
Source: Author computations 
39.34% of self-help groups work within the scope of a location; 22.13% have a divisional scope; 
15.57% have the scope of a village. 13.11% work within the scope of a district; while 4.10% cover 
a province and 5.74% work within a national scope. As can be seen, most self-help groups in Riruta 
have a locational, a village or a divisional scope.  This shows that they are embedded within their 
communities. 
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Section Two: Self-help Groups Activities  
Table 3.13: Activities undertaken by Self-Help Groups 
Activity Frequency Percentage (out of 122) 
Economic activities 109 89.34 
Social activities 101 82.79 
Educational activities 94 77.05 
Source: Author Computations  
89.34% of 122 groups implemented economic activities, while 82.39% out of 122 groups 
implementing social activities and only 77.05% of these were implementing educational activities.  
Analyses of each of these activities is according to tables 3.13 to 3.15 below. 
Table 3.14: Self-help group’s economic empowerment activities  
 Activities Frequency  (out of 122) Percentage  
Business support 74 60.66 
Financial support to members 73 59.84 
Employment creation 62 50.82 
Savings promotion 54 44.26 
Revolving fund 54 44.26 
Skills building  37 30.33 
Property investment 29 23.77 
Marketing activities 16 13.11 
Agricultural business 14 11.48 
Stock market investments 6 4.92 
Source: Author 
The economic empowerment activities include business support activities by 60.66% out of the 122 
self-help groups which could either be in the form of financial or non-financial services. 59.84% of 
the groups supported their members financially. This financial support was used to address 
emergencies, finance development activities or to cater for  precautionary needs and could have 
acted as a form of insurance.   
50.82% of the 122 groups created employment opportunities for their members and community 
residents. This was done through groups establishing work integration endeavours or enabling 
members acquire job-skills that will enhance their competitiveness in the labour market. The focus 
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of the self helps is to nurture individual skills till the time required skill are acquired enabling their 
beneficiaries to  become competitive. Self-help groups serve many other functions such as helping 
members acquire their own houses and implementing different kinds of individual or communal 
projects.  
  Table 3.15: Social welfare activities  
Activity Frequency (out of 122) Percentage  
Women empowerment 56 45.90 
Guidance and counselling 55 45.08 
Spiritual activities 47 38.52 
Youth empowerment 38 31.15 
Community integration 32 26.23 
Environmental care 30 24.59 
Health related services 29 23.77 
Water services 23 18.85 
Human rights 21 17.21 
Transport services 9 7.38 
Source: Author 
45.90% of the groups implement activities to empower women by pursuing educational activities, 
maternal health care and other services of benefit to women. 45.08% are involved in guidance and 
counselling activities. 38.52% of the groups engage in spiritual activities. Youth empowerment is 
pursued by 31.15% of the groups and involves sports activities, entertainment and performing arts. 
These activities are meant to keep the youth occupied and productive.   
Health related services (23.77%) are numerous and may take the form of assisting those infected 
and affected by HIV/AIDS, providing medical care, disability support and nutritional programs. 
Those working on community integration (26.23%) could be working in areas of human rights, 
peace building and reconciliation, community policing, culture and development. Environmental 
care is undertaken by 24.59% of the groups taking into account sanitation activities, disaster 
management and disease prevention activities. 
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Table 3.16: Educational and knowledge based activities  
Activity Frequency (out of 
122) 
Percentage 
Awareness and education on drugs 52 42.62 
General capacity building activities 52 42.62 
Implementing schooling activities 34 27.87 
Implementing vocational education 34 27.87 
Civic awareness and education 34 27.87 
Community based research and dissemination 18 14.75 
Implementing community library services 16 13.11 
Source: Author computations 
The drug abuse problem is addressed by 42.62% of the groups who have programs on drugs 
awareness and education. They offer rehabilitation and re-integration services by accompanying 
victims with psychological services. They also offer preventive education to curb drug abuse.  
In order to improve the specific skills of the community members, about 42.62% self-help groups 
are engaged in capacity building activities. Some of the skills include parenting, social 
accountability and life skills. 27.87% implement schooling activities by running nursery, primary or 
secondary schools or alternatively, they provide other types of assistance to students.  27.87% are 
involved in implementing vocational education programs. These are programs meant to equip the 
community members with employable skills either through a direct school based program or 
through an apprenticeship program.  Among other educational activities pursued, are community 
based research and civic awareness by 14.75% self-help groups. Lastly, there are 13.11% groups 
that provide libraries and reading spaces to the community. 
Section Three: Networks and Collaboration 
 
Table 3.17: Networking relationships amongst self-help groups 
Activity Frequency/122 Percentage 
Collaboration with finance institutions 33 27.05 
Collaboration with a parent organization 29 23.77 
Collaboration with government agencies 21 17.21 
Other types of collaboration 18 14.75 
Collaboration with other self-help groups 12 9.84 
Not collaborating 89 72.95 
Source: Author computations 
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Information collected on networking and collaborating in Table 3.17, provided materials to examine 
how self-help groups enhance their activities through cooperation with different stakeholders. The 
net result was that very few self-help groups averaging 18% pursue networking activities. 
Organizations that indicated to collaborate with a financial institution were only 27.05% of the 
entire sample. This means that there is a high likelihood that many of the remaining self-help 
groups may not have access to basic financial services. There is a distancing of the remaining 73% 
self-help groups from financial institutions. Approximately 23.77% groups indicated to have a 
parent organization. This parent organization could either be a church, a company or mostly a non-
profit organization.  
Only 17.21% groups reported to have a relationship with government agencies. The remaining did 
not cultivate this relationship, despite the fact that the government has a number of devolved 
resources that could benefit them. Only 14.75% indicated that they were pursuing collaborations 
with donors and other capacity building organizations. Evidently only 27% of the self-help groups 
pursued active networking. The rest i.e. 73% did not pursue any networking at all.  
Table 3.18: Self-help group relationship with parent organization 
 Benefit Frequency Percentage 
Networking 11 37.93 
Loans 5 17.24 
Capacity building 3 10.34 
Spiritual 3 10.34 
Material 2 6.90 
Funding 2 6.90 
Marketing 1 3.45 
Logistic 1 3.45 
Consultancy 1 3.45 
 29 100 
Source: Author computations 
In table 3.18, only 29 of the 122 self-help groups benefitted from having a parental relationship. Of 
these, 37.93% benefitted from networking opportunities. 10.34% indicated that they benefitted from 
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capacity building activities. 6.90% were being assisted materially with a similar proportion 
benefiting from funding.  Other benefits included spirituality (10.34%), loans processing (17.24%) 
marketing (3.45%) logistics (3.45%) which could take the form of free office space and other 
benefits that enable effectiveness in their work, and consultancy (3.45%).  
Table 3.19: Relationship with a government agency 
Benefit      Frequency Percentage 
Consultancy 6 28.57 
Networking 6 28.57 
Funding 3 14.29 
Capacity building 3 14.29 
Material assistance 2 9.52 
Loans 1 4.76 
      Total 21 100 
Source: Author 
Relationship with government is only pursued by 21 self-help groups out of the entire sample of 
122. Among the 21, this relationship benefited them in consultancy (28.57%), networking 
(28.57%), funding (14.29%) and capacity building (14.29%). Other benefits accruing from relating 
with government agencies included material assistance (9.52%) and loans access (4.76%). 
According to the 2009 draft Community Development Report, the government has a number of 
devolved resources that self-help groups could benefit from. However, from these results it is 
evident that very few self-help groups collaborate with the government. 
Table 3.20: Relationship with financiers 
 
Benefit       Frequency Percentage 
Financial services 21 63.64 
Loans 12 36.36 
      Total  33 100 
Source: Author computations 
Only 33 out of 122 self-help groups according to table 3.20 stated that they had a relationship with a 
financier. The main benefits of collaborating with financiers included access to financial services 
(63.64%) and accessing loans (36.36%). 
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Table 3.11: Relationship with other self-help groups 
Benefit Frequency Percentage 
General networking 5 41.67 
Consultancy 4 33.33 
Funding 1 8.33 
Capacity building 1 8.33 
Advocacy 1 8.33 
Total 12 100.00 
   
Source: Author computations 
Only 12 out of 122, indicated having a relationship with other self-help groups. Out of these, 
41.67% collaborated to enhance general networking. 33.33% benefitted by consulting with each 
other; sharing experiences and ideas, monitoring and evaluation or in peer monitoring. Other 
benefits include funding (8.33%), capacity building (8.33%) and advocacy (8.33%).  
Table 3.22: Benefits Emanating from other networks 
Benefits Frequency Percentage 
Funding  10 55.56 
Capacity building  2 11.11 
Religious  1 5.56 
Material assistance  1 5.56 
General networking  1 5.56 
Marketing 1 5.56 
Advocacy  1 5.56 
Consultancy  1 5.56 
Total  18 100.00 
Source: Author computations 
Only 18 self-help groups had other types of relationships which benefitted them. These were 
relationships with specific types of people or institutions. The benefits of these relationship were 
mainly funding (55.56%) or capacity building (11.11%). Other benefits included religious (5.56%), 
material assistance (5.56%), networking (5.56%), marketing (5.56%), advocacy (5.56%) and 
consultancy (5.56%). 
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Section Four: Success and Governance  
Table 3.23: Self-perception of success  
Self-help group 
success rating 
Frequency Percentage 
1 9 7.38 
2 35 28.69 
3 57 46.72 
4 20 16.39 
5 1 0.82 
Total 122 100.00 
Key: 1= very poor; 2= poor; 3 = fair; 4 = good; 5 = excellent  
The self-help groups were asked to provide a self-perception of success of the their overall 
performance on a Likert rating scale with the poorest ratings being 1 and the best being 5. Most of 
the groups (46.72%) rated their success at 3; 28.69% rated their success at 2 while 16.39% settled 
for 4. Those who rated their performance at 1 i.e. poorest performers were 7.38% while 0.82% 
considered their performance excellent at 5. Mostly the self helps rated themselves inadequately 
meaning that they felt that they needed to do more than they were doing at the moment. They 
however faced constraints in reaching their peak performance. 
Table 3.24: Organizational Meetings 
Number of 
meetings 
General meetings 
frequency (out of 122) 
Management meetings 
frequency (out of 122) 
Board meetings 
frequency (out of 122) 
0 65 17 63 
1-5 32 31 11 
6-10 4 4 4 
11-15 17 35 20 
20 and above 4 35 24 
Total 122 122 122 
 
Source: Author computations 
According to table 3.24, only 57 out of 122 self-help groups held general meetings. It is through 
general meetings that important decisions affecting self-help groups are made. It is during such 
meetings that elections are held and special bodies such as management, committees, the board and 
trustees are chosen or mandated. 65 groups held no general meetings at all while 32 held 1-5 
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general meetings annually. Of the remaining, 4 held 6-10,  17 held 11-15 while the remaining 4 held 
20 and above general meetings. 
Out of the 105 self-help groups hold management meetings, 35 groups had 11 to 15 management 
meetings, 31 had 1 to 5  meetings while 35 had above 20 meetings. Most groups held monthly 
management meetings. Only 17 groups never had management meetings during the year.  59 self-
help groups held board meetings. Out of these, 11 had 1 to 5 board meetings, 20 had 11 to 15, 4 had 
6 to 10 board meetings while 24 had more than 20 board meetings annually. Out of the 122 self-
help groups 63 never had board meetings. 
Section Five: Resource Mobilization 
Table 3.25: Self-help group resource mobilisation strategies 
Resource mobilization 
strategy 
Frequency/122 Percentage 
Proceeds from members 
contribution 
92 75.41 
Proceeds from business 
projects 
55 45.08 
Loans borrowed by the self-
help group 
34 27.87 
Donor grants 24 19.67 
Proceeds from contributions of 
other well wishers 
21 17.21 
Proceeds from transaction fees 19 15.57 
Contributions of the immediate 
community 
19 15.57 
Proceeds from own assets 13 10.66 
Government resources 9 7.38 
Proceeds from investment in 
stocks and shares 
5 4.10 
Proceeds from other sources 1 0.82 
Source: Author Compilation 
Table 3.25 captures different resource mobilization strategies used by self-help groups. The bulk of 
resources (75.41%) were raised through members’ contribution; 45.08% had a business projects; 
27.87% had access to loans, it is not clear whether the loans were from institutions or from 
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individual members; 19.67% were able to access donor grants; while 17.21% got their resources 
from proceeds and contributions of well-wishers. 
In addition, 15.57% mobilized resources from proceeds of transaction fees; while another 15.57% 
raised resources from contributions of the immediate community. Some (7.38%) were able to 
access government resources; while others (4.10%) had investments in stocks and shares or other 
sources (0.82%).  From these findings, most groups raise their financial resources through proceeds 
from member contributions, with few raising resources through proceeds from other sources and 
own assets. However, there is the element of resource mix from different sources which in essence 
likens the self-help groups to social enterprises. 
Table 3.26: Self-help group Resources mix 
Number of strategies used to raise 
resources 
Frequency (out of 
122) 
Percentage 
0 2 1.64 
1 48 39.34 
2 24 19.67 
3 24 19.67 
4 6 4.92 
5 10 8.20 
6 6 4.92 
7 1 0.82 
9 1 0.82 
Total 122 100.00 
Source: Author computations 
Majority (39.34%) groups mobilized resources from one source or activity. 19.67% had 2 resource 
mobilization activities. Another group of 19.67% had three sources.  Much fewer groups were able 
to mobilize income from more than 5 sources. 1.64% groups indicated that they  did not have any 
resource mobilization strategy. 
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Table 3.27: Self-help group annual income estimates in Euro 
Estimated income in 
Euro 
Frequency Percent 
100 1 0.82 
300 2 1.64 
500 2 1.64 
1,000 3 2.46 
1,200 1 0.82 
2,500 62 50.82 
5,000 21 17.21 
7,500 14 11.48 
10,000            8 6.56 
10,001           8 6.56 
Total            122 100.00 
Source: Author Computations. 
The respondents were required by the study to provide annual estimates of their yearly income. All 
122 self-help groups provided their yearly income estimates, where majority (50.82%) reported an 
estimated income of  Euro 2,500 (Kenya Shillings 250,000). 17.21% indicated that they had an 
annual income of Euro 5,000 (Kenya Shillings 500,000) and 11.48% had an annual income of Euro 
7,500 (Kenya Shillings 750,000). 6.56% attracted an annual income of Euro 10,000 (Kenya 
Shillings 1,000,000). Another 6.56% was able to attract an income of more than Euro 10,000 
(Kenya Shillings 1,000,000). There were fewer groups earning below Euro 1,000 (Kenya Shillings 
100,000). However the lowest income earners made Euro 100 (Kenya Shillings 10,000) per year. 
Section 6: Challenges 
Table 3.28: Self-help group challenges 
Challenges Frequency /122 Percentage 
Inadequate finances 92 75.41 
Membership challenges 72 59.02 
Inappropriate technology 69 56.56 
Competition  49 40.16 
Legal challenges   40 32.79 
Inadequate human capital 40 32.79 
Insecurity 36 29.51 
Staff challenges 32 26.23 
Poor organizational structure and design 28 22.95 
Tension with the community 15 12.30 
Donors/funders challenges 8 6.56 
Source: Author 
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Table 3.28 shows challenges faced by self-help groups. Financial inadequacy was a problem facing 
75.41% of the entire sample. Groups either lacked capital, finances for their operational and 
recurrent expenses, development expenses or could not meet their overall financial obligations. 
About 59.02% experienced membership challenges which manifested themselves in free riding, loss 
of members, transparency problems, nepotism, member disputes or vested interests.  
56.56% faced the challenge of inappropriate technology. Technology in this case refers to those 
tools aiding the effectiveness of the production process. Their lack makes groups unable to 
effectively address their mission.  
Other challenges included competition (40.16%), inadequate human capital (32.79%) and legal 
challenges (32.79%). Legal challenges were due to the limiting nature of the self-help group 
registration, scarce resources, collective action challenges or membership problems. In most cases 
the disputes were always solved by the locational administrator (the chief) applying the Chief’s Act 
Cap 128 (Republic of Kenya, 2012b) but in other cases they involved a court jurisdiction.  Other 
challenges faced by self-help groups included insecurity (29.51%), staff challenges (26.23%), poor 
organizational structure and design (22.95%), tension with the community of residence (12.30%)  
and problems with donors (6.56%).  
The descriptive statistics section has brought out important  human development dimensions made 
of economic empowerment, education and social welfare pursued by self-help groups. In 
accordance to the UNDP (1999) the three dimensions are central to enhancing the quality of life.  
The economic empowerment activities are pursued for three purposes. The first being to contribute 
to the survival of the self-help groups as organizations. This is in line with the resource dependence 
approach where it is considered that key to organizational survival is the ability to acquire and 
maintain resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
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Economic empowerment improves income earning abilities of self-help group members by 
providing a regular income, a source of employment, contributing towards member’s welfare and 
assisting them with credit facilities. These activities are in essence, pursued with a view to sustain 
the self-help groups’ social missions. Garai, Mazumder, & Maiti (2012) using data from Bengal 
India for women proved that self-help group members  were more empowered than non-members. 
This result demonstrated that self-help groups were effective in empowering their members 
economically. This same result was achieved on an empirical study by Das (2013) in Assam, India 
where data confirmed that self-help groups helps improved their members’ economic conditions. 
These improvements were reflected in terms of increases in income, savings, value of assets, 
amount of borrowing and betterment in consumption provisions.   
This study has demonstrated that the choice of economic activities is highly dependent on members 
and community needs. These activities are community driven and are intended to solve specific 
problems. Jayawarna (2010) demostrates that community based enterprises respond to community 
needs and to those of the vulnerable people in a better way than commercially oriented firms do.  In 
this study the self helps pursued knowledge based and educational activities to improve specific 
skills and ensure general capacity of group members and the community in general is developed.  
They include; school education, vocational training, skills development, capacity development, 
educational sponsorships, research and dissemination, corruption awareness, civic education, child 
rights awareness, human rights education and advocacy and maintenance of community libraries. 
The concept of developing the capacity of individuals and communities is at the centre of 
development discourse (Theodore , 2011).  
 
Social welfare activities are pursued to address social challenges experienced by communities. They 
include youth and gender empowerment activities, guidance and counselling, HIV/AIDS 
interventions, spiritual activities, child assistance, legal aid, peace building and reconciliation. Self-
help groups are also involved in community policing, social cohesion and integration of the 
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marginalised as well as sporting activities. Self helps as third sector actors cannot divorce 
themselves from delivering social services in their communities. In essence their primary 
characteristic as social enterprises is the pursuance of an explicit social aim in accordance with 
Borzaga and Defourny (2001). They also help the government respond to the ever growing demand 
for social services. They are solving problems related to health, water, transport, security and 
myriad others in unique ways using simple and uncomplicated tools. 
3.4 The Econometric Models  
This section has three main objectives. The first is to study factors determining self-perception of 
success of self-help groups. This part will use data collected in the field by the researcher and will 
estimate an Ordered Probit Model.  The self-perception of success was a subjective assessment of 
the overall performance in achieving the self-help groups’ social economic empowerment mission. 
This data contains 11 variables and 122 observations. The explanatory variables have been 
highlighted in table 3.29 below and thereafter explained.  The hypothesis of this section will be:  
 Hypothesis 1: The propensity of the self-help groups to perceive themselves as being 
successful is increased by positive changes in organizational capabilities 
The second objective aimed at testing the determinants of self-help groups-empowerment effects. 
This was done through estimating a Poisson Distribution model, using archival data from the 
administrative offices of Riruta Location. This same model and data was used to achieve the third 
objective whose aim was to test for resource mobilization effects.  The archival data was 
administrative and hence highly objective. It contained 7 variables and was made of 523 
observations. The explanatory variables for the two Poisson Distribution Models are listed in Table 
3.38 and thereafter explained.  The two models under this section were used to corroborate the 
results of the Ordered Probit Model whose data was collected by the researcher.  This section tested 
the following two hypotheses: 
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 Hypothesis 2: A unit change in economic empowerment activities has a positive effect on 
the expected positive changes in organizational capabilities 
 Hypothesis 3: A unit change in total resource mobilization activities has a positive effect on 
the expected positive changes in organizational capabilities 
3.4.1 Model I: Ordered Probit Model 
Model I tested for self-perception of success. The self-help groups were requested to rate their 
success levels from 1 meaning very poor to 5 meaning excellent. They assessed success by looking 
at overall capabilities required to help them deliver their objectives. This is in line with Potocki and 
Brocato (2002) who explained capability as the inherent propensities required to achieve objectives. 
Successful groups have higher objective-completion propensities and hence are considered to have 
higher capabilities. The objective-completion propensities in our case, were unique to each group. 
These propensities were also dependent on specific objectives that each group addressed.  
We chose to study the impact of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable for several 
reasons. The first being to determine the way the groups rated their success in relation to their 
objectives which provided their reasons for existence. In essence the groups’ challenges, progress, 
environmental effects and growth over time were important.  
Success could also be viewed as either survival (Phelan and Lewin, 1999) or performance    
(Agwaral, 1997). It entails the ability to develop specific types of efficiencies over time (Strotmann, 
2006). Other studies look at success in terms of social and cultural capital, ability to pursue a mix of 
resources, balancing of social and entrepreneurial mission, embeddedness within the local 
community among others (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001; DeTienne, Shepherd, and De Castro, 2008; 
Lengyel, 2002).  
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The Ordered Probit Model in this section was used to test hypothesis 1 as stated in section 3.4 
above.  
Hypothesis 1: The propensity of the self-help groups to perceive themselves as being 
successful is increased by positive changes in organizational capabilities 
Table 3.29: Model I Variables Description 
 
Observations 122 
Variables 11 
variable name    Variable label 
Sucrate Self-perception of success 
Age Age of the self-help group 
Totmem Total number of members 
Econacts Number of economic empowerment activities 
Socacts Number of social welfare activities 
Eduacts Number of educational activities 
Resmob Number of resource mobilization activities 
Chalnos Number of challenges 
Logstinc Log of estimated annual income 
Malemem Total number of male members 
Femem Total number of  female members 
 
There are 122 observations in total according to Table 3.29. The dependent variable is self-
perception of success. This variable is ordered from 1 which represents very poor 2 representing 
poor, 3 representing satisfactory, 4 representing good and 5 representing excellent. The variable 
represents a subjective self-assessment by self-help groups on how they perceived their overall 
performance in relation to the achievement of their mission. 8 variables were used as explanatory 
variables and these include the age of the self-help group, membership number, number of 
economic empowerment activities, number of social welfare activities, number of educational 
activities, number of resource mobilization activities, log of estimated annual income and total 
challenges. Economic empowerment activities included business financial support, assistance 
during difficult moments or to meet important needs, assisting members with marketing, business 
consultancies and education. Resource mobilization activities included donor resources, member 
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contributions, transaction fee, community contributions, government contribution or business 
income.    
Table 3.30: Model I Summary Statistics 
    Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Success rate 122 2.74 .87 0 5 
Age of groups 122 5.05 3.50       0          17 
Total members 122 30.00 91.37 4 1,000 
Economic activities 122 3.41 2.20 0 9 
Social activities 122 6.11 5.73 0 25 
Education activities 122 3.05 2.75 0 10 
Resource mobilization strategies 122 2.41 1.68 0 9 
Log of estimated income 122 5.53 .34 4 6 
Total challenges 122 5.68 3.20 0 15 
 
There are no missing observations for all variables. The summary statistics of each variable are as 
captured in Table 3.30 above. They include mean, standard deviation, the minimum and maximum 
number of values for each variable. The dependent variable self-perception of success is an ordered 
variable of scale 5.  
Table 3.31: Model I Coefficient of Correlation 
 
 
 
The variables were tested for correlation. Their correlation coefficients show that there is no linear 
association among them apart from education activities (eduacts) and  social activities (socacts) at 
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0.7148. The linear associations for eduacts and economic activities (econacts) is 0.4198; socacts and 
econacts is 0.3165; while number of challenges (chalnos) and eduacts is 0.3136.  
Two variables i.e. eduacts and socacts had a high linear association amongst themselves. Since this 
collinearity was high, the educats variable was excluded from the Ordered Probit regression. This 
was done to eliminate biasing the final results. 
Figure 3.1: Analysis of the dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is ordered hence making Ordinary Least Squares regression inappropriate. 
This implies that it is not possible to establish a numerical value for the distance between the 
different categories. Furthermore, the predicted values may be higher than 5 or lower than 1 and this 
is not possible for an ordered variable. 
Table 3.32: Distribution of the dependent variable 
 
 Percentiles Smallest   
 1% 1 0   
 5% 1 1   
10% 2 1 Observations 122 
25% 2 1 Sum of Wgt. 122 
     
50% 3  Mean 2.737705 
  Largest Std. Dev. .8701029 
75% 3 4   
90% 4 4 Variance .757079 
95% 4 4 Skewness -.2987485 
99% 4 5 Kurtosis 3.150795 
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The variance of self-perception of success is approximately 0.76. This low variance indicates little 
variability in the data set. The distribution of this variable does not display signs of over-dispersion. 
Skewness indicates the distribution asymmetry and deviation from a normal distribution. In our 
case the skewness is -0.2987 which is less than 0, indicating that most values are concentrated on 
the left of the mean, with extreme values to the right. Conversely, Kurtosis which analyses 
distributions in terms of flattening or "peakedness" is 3.15 which is greater than 3 indicating 
a  Leptokurtic distribution, which is sharper than a normal distribution and has  values concentrated 
around the mean and thinner tails. This also indicates a low probability for extreme values. 
3.4.1.1 Ordered Probit Model Specification 
 
The perceived rate of success variable takes on 1-5 values which are ordered.  
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The Ordered Probit Model will estimate the statistical significance and direction of the relationship 
of each explanatory variable on the self-help groups’ self-perception of success, as well as the 
marginal effect of each relationship. For the self-help groups’ self-perception of success, it is more 
appropriate to use the Ordered Probit because while accounting for the categorical nature of the 
dependent variable, it accounts for the ordinal nature of success categories. 
The ordered probit model will then take the following form 
  nn xxxy ...2211
*
, N(0,1)~   
or in our case 
  totmemstincstakeshnoschaleduactssocactseconactsagey 87654321
* log.
Where *y is the unobservable dependent variable “the self-help groups’ self-perception of success” 
coded as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.   is the vector of estimated parameters and x  is the vector of explanatory 
variables.   is the error term which is assumed to be normally distributed.  
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The success rate of an individual self-help group falls in category n .  As with the Probit Model, we 
assume that the observed y  is generated by a latent variable 
*y . Hence the self-perception of 
success data y , are related to the underlying latent variable 
*y , through the thresholds n  where 
5,....2,1n . Hence 
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54321 ....,,,  and  
are defined as thresholds between which categorical responses are 
estimated. The Ordered Probit model will hence give the thresholds   and parameters  .  
The thresholds  shows the range of the normal distribution associated with the specific value of 
the response variable. The remaining parameter,  , represents the effect of changes in the 
explanatory variables on the underlying scale.  
The marginal impacts of factors x  on the underlying success rate can be evaluated in the following 
way 
 )]()([/)(Pr '1
' xFxFxnyob nn      5,....,1n  
Marginal effects are instantaneous rates of change, computed for an x  variable while holding all 
other variables constant.  They provide the probability of a good approximation for the amount of 
change in  self-perception of success that will be produced by a unit change in x . In other words the 
marginal effect is the partial first derivative of y  with respect to x .  It is calculated at one specific 
value of the dependent variable. The sign of the marginal effect is not necessarily the same as the 
sign of    since )()( 1  xfxf nn  can be negative. Indeed it is possible for marginal 
effects of kx to change signs as   kx  changes.  
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Computation of the marginal effect is particularly meaningful for the Ordered Probit Model because 
the value of the regression coefficient is not readily interpretable. This makes the effect of variables 
x  on the intermediate categories ambiguous. Since the marginal effect depends on the levels of all 
variables, we must decide on the values of the variables to use when computing the effect. More 
commonly the marginal effect is computed at the mean values of all variables. 
)]()([
)|Pr(
1 



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.  
In our case however we shall pick the observable values of iy and use them to calculate the 
marginal effects. 
Table 3.33: Ordered Probit Model of self-perception of success excluding educats 
Self-perception of success Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
Economic activities . 0148592 .0508521      0.770 
Social activities .0261494 .0197993      0.187 
Log of estimated income 1.117152    .3311122 0.001 
Age of self help group .0169205    .0290013      0.560 
Resource mobilization activities .0884881    .0728312      0.224 
Number of challenges  -.1067551    .0338996 0.002 
Total members .0002723    .0011702 0.816 
 
A regression model was estimated with the basic variables and the outputs are according to Table 
3.33 above. As already noted the output values of the regression coefficients of the Ordered Probit 
Model are not readily interpretable as the effect of variables x  on the intermediate categories is 
considered ambiguous. We hence proceed to compute the marginal effects of the model whose 
outputs are as in Table 3.34 below. 
Table 3.34 Ordered Probit Model marginal effects in perceived rate of success  
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. P>|z|      
Economic activities .0031446       .01076     0.770 
Social activities .005534 .00423 0.190  
Log of estimated income .2364217 .07521 0.002       
Age of self help group .0035809       .00617 0.562 
Resource mobilization activities .0187266       .01568     0.232 
Number of challenges  -.0225925       .00778    0.004      
Total members .0000576       .00025 0.816 
Mfx predicted at 4iy  
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In the case of the Ordered Probit on percieved rate of success, the marginal effect was computed at 
value 4. A regression model was estimated excluding the education activities variable. This was 
because of the high coefficient of correlation between it and the social activities variable. The 
marginal effect was estimated for the regression at different values  (1,2,3,4 and 5). In the model, at 
1 and 2 all the variable signs changed and were not significant, while at 3 and 5 the results were less 
significant than those at 4. As explained above, the sign of the marginal effect is not necessarily the 
same as the sign of the coefficient, since the instantanous change between the threshholds could be 
negative. In our case at  4iy , more convincing results were obtained that were statistically 
significant as in the Table 3.34 above. 
The marginal effects of each explanatory variable on each rate of success as reported in Table 3.34 
above explains the propensity of the explanatory variable to decrease or increase the probability that 
the percieved rate of success will be of a specific class. A positive value means that the explanatory 
variable increases the propensity of the self-help group’s self-perception of success with an increase 
in its magnitude. 
The Ordered Probit identified that more earned estimated income increased the propensity of the 
self-help groups self-perception of success while more challenges within the self-help groups 
reduced it. In reality, it is also true that self-help groups that are able to attract more income are 
considered more successful. This is because they are able to meet their objectives with less strain 
unlike those that are unable to attract income.  
It is however tricky whenever interpreting financial related variables such as estimated income in 
relation to the dependent variable because of the problems of endogeneity. In this case, for example 
while finance increases the propensity for self-perception of success, the reverse could also be true 
i.e. the self-perception of success could also enhance the propensity for better earned estimated 
income. Hence, this study has only concentrated in finding the correlations and not the causal 
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relations. In this estimation, endogeneity has not been checked. This could either be done by 
instrumental variable analysis or randomized experiments that were not possible at this stage. 
Endogeneity could result from omitted variables, self-selection, reverse causality or data errors and 
could contribute to parameter estimates that may be biased, inconsistent and wrong.      
More challenges faced by self-help groups increase the propensity of the probability of negative 
self-perception. An increase in these challenges increases the propensity of failure perception. If the 
self-help groups would like to improve the propensity to perceive themselves in a better light, 
therefore, they ought to strive to minimize their challenges. In this case too, endogeneity could not 
be ruled out as there could be cases of reverse causality for instance, less successful organizations 
are likely to undergo more challenges. 
The Ordered Probit Model econometric analysis has demonstrated that the propensity of the 
probability of success for the  self-help groups is also influenced positively though not significantly 
by increases in economic empowerment activities, social welfare activities, age of the self-help 
group, resource mobilization activities and by the increase in the number of members.  
3.4.2 Model II: Poisson Regression Model 
Model II tested for economic empowerment effects. The self-help groups were requested to indicate 
their total number of economic empowerment activities. The minimum number of economic 
empowerment activities were 0 while the maximum were 4. Economic empowerment activities are 
pursued by the groups to assist improve the income earning abilities of their members. Pursuing 
economic empowerment activities is the primary social value created and sustained by the self-help 
groups. Profit is not the gauge of economic empowerment activities but the overall empowerment 
of members and the social impact wrought in the communities.  
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According to Menzel (1999), economic social value considered in a welfare dimension constitutes 
preferences or evaluative claims about an aggregate or community of persons. Accordingly, societal 
value is pursued by maximizing the sum of all the individual utilities of a community’s members. 
The economic empowerment activities therefore do promote collective member’s welfare and hence 
constitute an important social value to the groups.  
We chose to study the effects of the dependent variable on the explanatory variables. The primary 
objective of self-help groups is to economically empower its members. This mission, is pursued in 
tandem with providing solutions to challenges facing communities. In most cases, the desire to 
address community  challenges is what triggers the formation of self-help groups. After formation, 
groups undertake other activities to ensure achievement of their objectives. Hence, it becomes 
important to investigate whether pursuance of group members’ economic empowerment has in 
essence, a positive effect on other activities undertaken.  
This section will test the following hypothesis 
Hypothesis 2: A unit change in economic empowerment activities has a positive effect on the 
expected positive changes of organizational capabilities 
Table 3.35: Model II Variables Description 
Variable name Variable label Total observations Min Max 
Ecomp Economic empowerment activities 523 0 4 
Toremo Total resource mobilization activities 523 0 7 
Regyr Year of self-help group registration 523 1984 2010 
Villoutr Total service outreach villages 523 1 4 
Network Total self-help group networks 523 0 4 
Totchals Total number of challenges  141 1 6 
Totmem Total self-help group members 523 5 120 
The variables are as listed in Table 3.35 above. The dependent variable is economic empowerment 
activities. Economic empowerment activities comprised employment creation, market and value 
chain development, property investment, revolving fund, stocks and agri-business. Resource 
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mobilization activities encompassed member contributions, proceeds from transaction fee, property 
and businesses; community and well-wishers contributions, government and donor resources.  
Table 3.36: Model II Correlation coefficients 
 
 
The variables were correlated to find linear association. The linear relationship among them was 
found to be negligible and hence they were all used in the regression model. 
 Table 3.37: Summary distribution of total economic empowerment activities 
The dependent variable; total economic empowerment activities, has count characteristics. The 
properties of these variables are further explained as follow 
 
 Percentile    
  Smallest   
1% 0 0   
5% 0 0   
10% 0 0   
25% 0 0 Obs 523 
   Sum of WGT 523 
50% 1  Mean .98 
  Largest Std deviation 1.01 
   Variance 1.01 
75% 2 4   
90% 2 4 Skewness .81 
95% 3 4 Kurtosis 2.99 
99% 4 4   
 
The minimum observation of the variable is made up of 0 counts while the maximum is 4. Though 
the variance is larger than the mean, it is within the limits of equi-dispersion as the difference 
between the mean and the variance is 0.030249. The variance is hence not greater than might be 
expected in a Poisson distribution, making a Poisson regression appropriate. In cases where the 
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variance would be much greater than the mean leading to over-dispersion, a Poisson distribution 
would be inappropriate and a Negative Binomial Regression would be appropriate. Further analysis 
of the variable is made in the histogram below.   
Figure 3.2: Model II histogram distribution of the dependent variable 
 
 
As can be seen the data are strongly skewed to the left, meaning that a linear regression analysis 
would be inappropriate for reasons already stated above.  
Count variables are not continuous and hence applying a linear regression model on them can result 
in estimates that are inefficient, inconsistent and biased. For count variables, models such as the 
Poisson Regression or the Negative Binomial Regression models are appropriate. In a Poisson 
Regression, the probability of a count is determined by a Poisson Distribution, where the mean of 
the distribution is a function of the independent variables. This model has the defining characteristic 
that the conditional mean of the outcome is equal to the conditional mean of the variance. 
Let y be a random variable indicating a number of times an event has occurred during an interval of 
time. 
y has a Poisson distribution with parameter 0 if 
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The parameter  also known as the rate is the expected number of times an event has occurred per 
unit time. It could also be thought as the mean of the expected count. Hence, as  increases as the 
mass of the distribution shifts to the right.  
 )()( yEyVar  
The variance equals the mean, a characteristic known as equidispersion. In practice, however, count 
variables have a variance greater than the mean, a characteristic known as overdispersion. As 
increases the probability of 0’s decreases and the Poisson distribution approximates a normal 
distribution. A critical assumption of a Poisson process is that events are independent. 
3.4.2.1 Estimating the Poisson regression model 
 
A Poisson regression model is estimated, where the number of event y has a Poisson distribution 
with a conditional mean that depends on an event’s characteristics. The model is hence expressed as  
      (2)
 
)exp()|(  iiii xxyE   
ix  = explanatory variables as listed in Table 3.38 
The exponential of 
ix  forces the expected  to be positive which is required for the Poisson 
distribution. 
Since y is a count variable, it can only have non-negative integer values. The probability of a count 
given x is given by 
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For the Poisson Regression Model, the expected value of y for a given x is given by 
)exp()|(  xxyE        (3) 
Since the model is nonlinear the value of the marginal effect depends on both the coefficient for kx
and )|( xyE . The larger the value of  )|( xyE , the larger the rate of change in )|( xyE . Further, 
since )|( xyE depends on the value of all dependent variables, the value of the marginal effect 
depends on the level of all the variables. Often, the marginal effect is computed with all variables 
held at their means. The marginal effect is the partial derivative of )|( xyE with respect to kx and is 
computed using the chain rule as follow 
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Table 3.38: Poisson Regression Model Outputs for Economic Empowerment Activities 
Variable Coef Std Err Significance 
Total resource mobilization 
activities 
 .3363773    .0962254      0.000      
Board meetings  .0312306    .0203367      0.125     
Organizational meetings  .0006095 .00468      0.896     
Registration year   .0544732    .0307126      0.076     
Total members  .0004188    .0065446      0.949     
Village outreach  .2075913    .1937157      0.284     
Network -.2121747    .1654673     0.200     
Total challenges -.1412141    .0786354     0.073     
Constant  -111.0878    61.52863     0.071     
 
A Poisson model was estimated with the basic variables and the outputs are according to Table 
3.38. The marginal effects of the Poisson Model were computed.  As noted above, the value of the 
marginal effect depended on the value of all independent variables. The outputs of the marginal 
effect computations of the model are as in the table below. 
  
209 
 
Table 3.39: Poisson Regression Model marginal effects outputs for economic empowerment 
activities 
Variable dy/dx Std Err Significance 
Total resource mobilization 
activities 
.3051293       .08129     0.000    
Board meetings .0283294        .0183     0.122   
Organizational meetings .0005529       .02756     0.896   
Registration year .0494129       .02756     0.073   
Total members .0003799       .00594     0.949   
Village outreach .188307       .17469     0.281   
Network -.1924647       .14896    0.196   
Total challenges -.128096       .07084    0.071   
 
According to the outputs of the marginal effects of the Poisson regression model, a unit change in 
resource mobilization activities has a positive effect on the expected changes in the number of 
economic empowerment activities. Successful resource mobilization activities are important in 
deciding whether or not a self-help group will take on more economic empowerment activities. 
Additional economic empowerment activities emerge with extra financial burden to groups. This 
being the case, groups with abilities to create extra resources are able to counterbalance this 
challenge and create more empowerment activities for their members.  
Effective resource mobilization also enhances the organizational survival capabilities. Self-help 
groups are organizations that have some social enterprise characteristics and hence do survive well 
by mixing resources (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001). These resources could be raised from a 
combination of government sources, community, business activities (Borzaga, Nogales and Galera, 
2008) or  local and international funding organizations in the case of developing countries 
(Ochanda, Akinyi, & Mungai, 2009).  
In this study, there has been some evidence that resource mobilization is a challenge and that self-
help groups’ main challenge is to attract resources in order to finance their mission effectively, 
hence this leads to their underperformance. Although traditional economic theory would suggest 
that the decision to abandon economic activity is based upon under performance, Meyer & Zucker, 
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(2006) found that efficient business performance is not necessarily the most important determinant 
of organizational survival. Self-help groups’, despite their sub-optimal resources, have several other 
factors contributing to their survival motivation. These include the feelings of social security 
provided by the sense of belonging to the group and the pull of their social mission.   
A second important relationship was provided by unit changes in the year of registration meaning 
that a unit change in registrations, had a significant positive effect on the expected changes in the 
number of economic empowerment activities. Once registered, self-help groups see themselves as 
legal associations. Since registration accords them recognition by the community and other 
institutions, they carry out their activities with increased confidence.  
Unit increases in number of Board meetings had positive effect on expected changes in the number 
of economic activities. To a lesser extent too, members meetings had the same effect. Meetings play 
an important role in decision making on future activities to be undertaken. Board meetings do help 
guide future expected activities much better than the entire membership. This is because the board 
is a specialized body with a mandate to oversee overall implementation of group activities. A Self-
help group with a board structure therefore tends to fare better on future expected economic 
activities.  
Conversely, a unit change in the number of challenges facing a self-help group, has a negative 
effect on the expected changes in the number of economic empowerment activities.  Challenges 
could be internal or external. Organizations may have control over some challenges and may not be 
able to control others (Porter, 1985). Several self-help groups seemed to face many challenges that 
they were not in control of. These challenges had the effect of diminishing their effectiveness. 
Examples of challenges included legal disputes, free riding and vested interests. Granted that self-
help groups were not considered as legal entities, their disputes could not be arbitrated by the 
industrial tribunal. They had to deal with complexities surrounding their legality before court 
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proceedings could begin. The dispute therefore, though having started from simple issues unearthed 
a whole plethora of challenges that have a great toll on productivity, time and energy.  
3.4.3 Model III: Poisson Regression Model 
Model III tested for resource mobilization effects. The self-help groups were requested to indicate 
their total number of resource mobilization activities. The minimum number of resource 
mobilization activities were 1 while the maximum were 7. Resource mobilization is a strategy, 
comprising mix of mechanisms employed in order to directly finance groups’ production and 
delivery of  their services in a manner that is efficient  and sustainable (Chawla & Berman, 1996). 
We chose to study the effects of the dependent variable on the explanatory variables. The primary 
objective of resource mobilization activities is to ensure that finances are available to enable groups 
accomplish their objectives. According to the resource dependence approach, ability to attract 
resources increases competitive advantages of organizations (Nemati, Bhatti, Muqsal, Mansoor and 
Naveed, 2010; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
In testing for resource mobilization effects we utilized the Poisson Regression Model. This model 
has been deeply expounded in 3.4.2 above. 
The hypothesis in this section is as follow: 
Hypothesis 3: A unit change in total resource mobilization activities has a positive effect on 
the expected positive changes in organizational capabilities 
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Table 3.40 Summary distribution of total resource mobilization activities 
 Percentiles    
  Smallest   
1% 1 0   
5% 1 0   
10% 1 1 observations 523 
25% 4 1 Sum of wgt 523 
   Mean 4.56 
50% 5  Std dev 1.18 
  Largest   
75% 6 7 Variance 3.16 
90% 6 7 Skewness -.809 
95% 7 7 Kurtosis 2.60 
99% 7 7   
     
 
The minimum observable value of the total resource mobilization variable is 1 count. The variance 
is smaller than the mean however it is within the limits of equi-dispersion as the difference between 
the variance and the mean is 1.4 which is expected in a Poisson Distribution. A further analysis of 
the variable is in accordance with the histogram in Figure 3.3 below  
Figure 3.3: Analysis of dependent variable 
 
 
The graph is skewed to the right. This makes a Linear Regression analysis inappropriate for various 
reasons already stated in the analysis of the total resource mobilization variable in Table 3.40. The 
total resource mobilization is a count variable, making it appropriate to  use a Poisson Regression 
Model in its analysis.  
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Table 3.41: Poisson Model Outputs for Total Resource Mobilization Activities 
Variable Coefficient Standard error Significance 
Total socio-economic empowerment activities .0467515    .0095771      0.000 
Board meetings -.0018177    .0055581     0.744 
Organizational meetings .0022947    .0011135      0.039 
Registration year -.001736    .0012456     0.163 
Total members .0018922 .0015771      0.230 
Village outreach -.0493348 .0305353     0.106 
Networks -.0340826 .0280474     0.224 
Total challenges .0366861 .0191674      0.056 
Constant 4.709302 2.498886      0.059 
 
 
A Poisson Model was estimated with the basic variables  and the outputs are according to Table 
3.41 above. The marginal effects were then calculated and are captured in Table 3.42 below. As 
stated earlier, in a Poisson distribution, the marginal effects are dependent on the values of all 
independent variables. 
Table 3.42: Poisson Marginal Effects Outputs for Total Resource Mobilization Activities 
Variable dy/dx Standard error Significance 
Total socio-economic empowerment activities .212 .043 0.000 
Board meetings -.008 .025 0.744 
Organizational meetings .010 .005 0.039 
Registration year -.008 .006 0.162 
Total members .008 .007 0.230 
Village outreach -.224 .138 0.106 
Networks -.155 .128 0.224 
Total challenges .166 .087 0.055 
Constant    
 
The marginal effects of the Poisson Regression Model shows that a unit change in social-economic 
empowerment activities has a positive effect on the expected changes in resource mobilization 
activities. This is explained by the fact that the success of social economic empowerment activities 
is dependent on the ability to mobilize resources. The mere existence of an additional socio-
economic empowerment activity implies a resource burden to the organization or a possible 
opportunity which may be used to mobilize the required additional resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Dees, 1998).  
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Different economic empowerment activities tend to require different resource mobilization 
strategies. Conversely, in some cases different socio-economic empowerment activities could 
provide different sources of mobilizing resources. For example, where a group began with an 
agricultural activity, this provided one source of income for it. In case it took another activity such 
as an environmental one, this also provided another source of resources. And more income areas 
will manifest themselves as the group takes in more socio-economic empowerment activities. At 
times also one socio-economic empowerment activity which is a resource mobilizer could also 
beget other activities which are resource mobilizers too. Alternatively, groups may start with one 
socio-economic empowerment activity which helps mobilize resources but they may realize that 
they are incurring other costs as well to maintain the activity. In their effort to start another activity 
to help them save the associated costs of the previous activity, they may also create another socio-
economic empowerment activity that helps in mobilizing additional resources. 
From the Poisson output, a unit change in organizational meetings has a positive effect on the 
expected changes in resource mobilization activities. This could imply that organizations that 
organize more meetings are able to generate more ideas on resource mobilization. Also, 
organizations that meet often denote great amounts of commitments from members who in essence 
would be ready to sacrifice for their organizations. Meetings are the channels where organizational 
weaknesses are laid bare and strategies to address them formulated. Meetings also have the effect of 
bringing out the best in each member for the benefit of the group.  
In the meetings, members share different expertise and experiences which when harnessed by the 
group contribute positively in the resource mobilization aspect. More organizational meetings also 
help address collective action and agency challenges and reduce instances of information 
asymmetry  (Hansmann, 1996). By this, cases of vested interests are addressed and people 
encouraged to work for the common good leading to a great feeling of organizational ownership 
among members and by extension the confidence to invest their energies to build the said 
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organization. Continuous meetings also imply continuous enlightenment of organizational 
members. Members get the chance to educate one another on various issues of importance to their 
organization hence improving the quality of their human capital. This mutual learning assists in 
improving on their abilities to raise resources.   
Lastly, a unit change in challenges has a positive effect on the expected changes in resource 
mobilization activities. Increased challenges usually indicate an attack on the organization thus 
affecting its survival capability. Members will therefore invest energies to fight for the organization 
to ensure that it continues to survive. In any case, the collapse of the organization does not augur 
well for the members. There are fears of losing reputation or being seen to be failures. 
Organizational members may also find that switching costs of abandoning their present activities to 
be too costly as opposed to continuing with it. Sheppard (1995) proves that an increase in 
challenges might not lead to the failure of an organization because of the switching costs and 
specific investments entailed. In this case therefore, members of a group will tend to look at their 
energy investments over time. This energy is seen as an important investment which they will be 
ready to defend hence their increased efforts in resource mobilization during threatening times.  
The other reason as to why the challenges would be associated with increased resource mobilization 
is centered in the hope for a better future and that the organization would be able to overcome the 
challenges and be able to serve its mission. Lastly, self-help groups are mainly started as means of 
livelihoods for members. When they face challenges, this means that members livelihoods get 
affected negatively. Efforts in resource mobilization are meant to reinforce the groups efficacy. 
According to  Inmyxai and Takahashi (2009), resources in this case entail human capital, intangible 
and tangible resources. These three types of resources are important to intervene during times of 
stress for the organization. 
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 There is a great difference in the above two models on the total challenges. While  a unit change in 
challenges had a positive effect on the expected changes in resource mobilization activities, it had a 
negative effect on the expected changes in economic empowerment activities. One reason for this 
could be due to the fact that during times of stress, organizational resources are diverted to address 
the stress and not its social mission. At the crisis times, organizations tend to formulate short term 
actions as opposed to addressing the long term mission of the organization. These findings are in 
line with Strotmann (2007) where during difficulties, much more organizational efforts are 
channeled towards solving the stress factor as opposed to pursuing the core business. 
3.5 Chapter Discussions 
A majority of self-help groups were established and registered between 2001 and 2010 and very 
few were registered before this period. It is important to note that the decade beginning the year 
2000 marked the entry of a new government in Kenya under National Rainbow Coalition 
Movement (NARC) that replaced the earlier government under Kenya African National Union 
(KANU) that had held power since independence in 1963. While earlier governments were 
unenthusiastic towards grassroots cooperation and associational activities, the new government 
provided an ambient that allowed such activities to flourish. Hence, this encouraged self-help 
groups and other associations to be created. 
An important development in the 2000’s was the registration of self-help groups. Data shows that 
this registration process was correlated with the creation of new self-help groups. The registration 
provided a form of quasi legal recognition that served to authenticate groups activities. Along with 
the registrations there were also a number of incentives in terms of devolved resources that were set 
aside by the government to aid local development which  self-help groups were also encouraged to 
tap into. 
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The study has also demonstrated that  self-help groups have a greater  participation of women in 
comparison to men.  This signifies that these groups provide a basis in which traditional gendered 
power structures that feminize poverty are altered through grassroots activities. By encouraging 
equality between women and men, they allow equal enjoyment of rights, opportunities and rewards 
by women and men. Most groups had a proportionate inter-gender participation and representation. 
This signifies low barriers between women and men on issues of local development, which is an 
important initial condition in the community empowerment agenda. This aspect if harnessed could 
help promoting equal realization of dignity and human rights for both women and men, and the 
elimination of gender based poverty and injustice. The work of self helps is therefore quite essential 
in encouraging a just distribution of resources  and ensuring equal benefits for both women and 
men. Thus, these groups contribute immensely to gender mainstreaming and empowerment from 
the grassroots levels which is in line with the call of the United Nations (2002). 
From the research activities the researcher found that local authorities did not have up to date 
knowledge of groups within their localities. There was also a disconnect between the social 
development offices and the administrative offices as far as the management of these groups was 
concerned. The formidable challenge that needs quick redress relates to the management of data 
relating to groups.  This brings about the need to develop a data depository for the self-help groups 
by the social development office  which would be updated on regular basis. The directory should be 
made available to the members of the public, other governmental organs and interested 
stakeholders. One way to update this depository would be to institute a submission of returns by 
self-help groups. At the end of the year, groups should also file simple returns that should 
accompany their registration renewals. The form should include simple details such as information 
about the membership, residence and office, challenges, activities implemented and financial 
information. This information would become handy in helping appropriate offices respond to the 
challenges faced by the self-help groups at any time.   
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The study established that self-help groups have a strong local communitarian dimension. Most of 
their work is within the scope of a location, division or the village. Very few have a wider scope 
reaching the district, the province or the national level. This demonstrates that self-help groups are 
strongly embedded in their residential communities, befitting them the title of community 
enterprises. Consequently, they have an extra ability to understand their community needs. With 
this understanding, they are in a position to develop simple localized and inexpensive solutions 
towards community challenges. The law in this case needs to define clearly the scope of effective 
service provision for these groups borrowing from experiences in other parts of the world such as 
the Community Interest Companies of UK and the Social Cooperatives of Italy which have a 
similar community orientation. 
Networking proves to be a great challenge for the self-help groups. Less than 20% of the groups in 
this study seem to maintain networking activities while 80% does not. Inability to network is a great 
contributor to the low performance of these associations. Networking could prove to be a very 
important resource for self-help groups. It could be pursued for purposes of knowledge expansion, 
scaling of the activities and promoting collaborative action among a group of peers for various 
purposes. One argument that strongly favours social networking is the issue of resources. Well 
networked organizations have an inherent ability to acquire and maintain resources (Sheppard, 
1995). Self helps hence should explore benefits wrought by both strong and weak ties. Each of these 
ties have idiosyncratic benefits (Granovetter, 1983). Other obvious purposes to which people and 
organizations seek to network include: seeking for advice, cooperation, socialization, emotional 
support and other technical reasons, (Anuska, Doreian , & Vladmir , 2010). 
Most self helps concentrated in one or two areas to raise required resources. They did not have the 
ability to diversify. This could be explained by the fact that human capabilities in most self helps 
are low. Hence, pursuing complex resource mobilization strategies is far-fetched for them.  Huy & 
Zott (2009) demostrate that resource mobilization requires special skills including use of affective 
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influence meant to build three kinds of trust in regards to the organization. These forms of trust 
center on the firm’s integrity, the competence of promoters and ability to cultivate relationships. 
Chawla & Berman (1996) on the other hand demostrate that effective resource mobilization is a 
function of organizational capabilities which may be minimal or lacking in the self helps. 
Accordingly, there is a need to develop a resource mobilization strategy that looks at issues such as 
current resource situation, existing needs, resources needed and future projections.   
Self-help groups acting in a local perspective do contribute to the development of communities in a 
localized and innovative way using simple and inexpensive tools. According to the 1986 
Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA)
 
report in Kenya, the difficulty in accessing government 
services made the poor to form indigenous social networks which became the basis for mutual 
social insurance through labour assistance and gift exchange. The social capital embodied in these 
social networks binds the poor people together and fuels innovation that springs up in economic 
activities (Republic of Kenya, 1986). However this study has established the presence of weak 
social capital inter, intra and extra groups. This weak social capital constrains the pace to which 
these groups could contribute to local development. The government needs to invest in 
strengthening social capital in all its forms at the grassroots. 
Their localized capacity building activities are very diverse and have various types of impacts.  A 
vibrant grassroots movement in essence, complements the efforts of the national government in 
strengthening local economies. The localized nature of the self-help groups makes them part and 
parcel of the community structure; hence they are the first actors to respond to any delightful or 
stress call in any specific community and ultimately are also the last actors to remain after all other 
temporal interventions have left.  
This study has demonstrated that social innovation is manifested in the self-help groups community 
interventions. This innovation is linked to finding solutions for addressing pressures and crises 
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within modern societies, which are characterized by generalized privatization culture and unjust 
economic allocations (Laville and Nyssens, 2000). Unjust economic allocations lead to  exclusion 
of a sizeable population proportion and condemns it to serious lack, powerlessness, educational 
disadvantages, insecurity and feelings of rejection and alienation (Narayan, et al. 1999). Kenya has 
suffered from unjust allocations and distributional irregularities; this condition has been locally 
refered to as “historical injustices” (Maathai, 2009). Hence, through their work, self-help groups 
help to decrease the effects of historical injustices, social exclusion and bring other positive 
outcomes such as increasing affiliation or integration, interdependence and participartion in various 
dimensions of life, thus helping people live their lives with dignity. 
According to this study, self-help groups would fit well within the social enterprise discourse. They 
display an entrepreneurial dynamic in the way they mobilize resources. All groups had at least one 
resource mobilization activity.  There is also strong evidence that all self-help groups have an 
explicit social mission that takes precedence over all activities that they undertake. The self-help 
groups are unique in that they are constituted to be of help to both their members and their 
communities (Republic of Kenya, 2009a). In most cases, the situation of group-members is not 
much different from that of their communities. As far as multi-stakeholder governance is 
concerned, it can be seen that there are different categories of members and stakeholders in the 
groups divided into promoters, board, staff, beneficiaries and volunteers. Participation of the 
different groups of stakeholders in the governance of the groups is context specific. Members of the 
groups are also allowed to share the residuals of their produce and there is no restrictive cap placed 
on this distribution unless stated in their constitution. Most of these characteristics are in conformity 
with those of (Borzaga & Defourny, 2001) and (Salomon & Anheier, 1997). 
Though self-help groups may be seen to be socially innovative, their capacity to innovate in a much 
better way is marred by inadequate human capital. Despite the presence of literate members within 
groups, their level of education cannot allow them to undertake high level conceptualization 
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activities. This becomes a reason for poor networking and also presents an inability to take 
advantage of emerging opportunities. For the process of social innovation at the local community 
levels to grow, there is a need for capacity building on various issues. This would enable them 
respond adequately to local challenges in an innovative way more than they are doing presently. 
Self-help groups could also do much better if they were able to diversify their resource mobilization 
strategies. The ability to pursue an effective diversified resource mobilization strategy requires an 
empowered and creative human capital.   
There is a poor legal framework that holds back the local development potential of self-help groups. 
Self-help groups are not legal entities but are considered as entities in the register of the appropriate 
ministry. The only guideline available for these organizations is spelt out in the registration form 
and is quite sketchy. The fact that its legal provisions are quite weak contributes to weakening of 
the enterprise dimension of the groups. There is therefore need for a conducive legal environment 
which will address all present challenges faced by self-help groups. The government acknowledged 
this weakness in its draft community development policy of 2009 and is looking for a proper 
legislative home regime for self-help groups. This study would recommend a legislative regime that 
would enhance their social entrepreneurial abilities. This would reinforce their contributions to 
empower members and communities on one hand and strengthen their entrepreneurial dimension on 
the other. 
Self-help groups are also limited financially. Access to finance would be vital in breaking up  the 
vicious cycle of poverty amongst grassroots communities. It would help create tools that would 
enable households to address multiple challenges facing them. Access to finance would strengthen 
the self-help group enterprise and increase their earned resources. More financial resources would 
help them become more capacitated to meet their social and survival objectives. In essence, self-
help groups present a possibility of becoming fully-fledged social enterprises if they could access 
resources with ease. At present however, given their limited resources, it’s unlikely that they have 
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any residuals that could be invested to strengthen their organizational capacities. Data also showed 
that only 25% of the groups were able to access financial services. The rest did not have access to 
these services as they did not have bank accounts. We recommend that there should be a deliberate 
attempt to encourage self helps to develop relationships with banks through the social development 
offices. 
Data shows that there was a generalised poor self-perception of success among the self-help groups. 
It is evident that self-help groups are not confident of their performance placing it between average 
and below. This in effect shows a dissatisfaction with their performance. There underperformance is 
linked to poor abilities in procuring enough resources to finance their activities. Other problems 
faced by the groups too compound this challenge and they include collective action problems, poor 
social and human capital and inadequate legal ambient. An appropriate capacity building 
programme should be geared towards  improving aspects that will contribute towards refining the 
self-perception of success and ultimately enhance their abilities to contribute to local development. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDIES OF SELF-HELP GROUPS 
4.1: Chapter Introduction 
Case studies of ten self-help groups are presented in this section to aid in corroborating findings 
provided in the statistical chapter. These case studies have looked at the self-help groups’ 
dimension, turnover, year of creation, contributions to job creation, challenges and involved 
voluntary efforts. Each case is unique and looks at how the enterprise activities of  each group 
contributes to solving the problem of social exclusion and ultimately contributing to local 
development. The conclusion is made in the light of third sector theoretical framework.      
4.2: Case 1: Dagoretti Shangaa Women Self Help Group 
Dagoretti Shangaa Women Empowerment Center (DASWEC) was initiated in 2002 by a group of 
15 Christian women who had earlier attended a series of courses in leadership and micro finance 
courtesy of Caritas Internationalis, a Catholic development organization. This group was later 
registered in 2003 as a self-help group.  
The group initially started as a revolving fund initiative and later developed as savings and loans 
scheme where members were allowed to take loans amounting to three times their savings. The 
members who were allowed to borrow were those whose savings had reached Euro 20 (Kenya 
Shillings 2000). The basic monthly savings per member was Euro 2 (Kenya Shillings 200). With 
this initial activity, the group was able to benefit about 300 members from the Riruta community. 
In order to guarantee that all members had an equal opportunity to take loans, they were placed into 
cell groups of 10 to 20. Members of the same cell would guarantee or be guaranteed by others in the 
same cell. The main collateral was their cell group savings and group pressure.  
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The group later ventured into other activities like civic education, technical skills training, 
HIV/Aids awareness and training in entrepreneurship. Its activities benefitted both its members and 
the community. In the year 2004, the group established a computer college to enhance computer 
literacy among the women of Riruta. This initiative created employment for two members and one 
volunteer, all being youth. In 2005, the group started a secondary school for children from poor 
backgrounds who were required to pay a smaller fee so as to meet the school’s recurrent expenses. 
The school hired five teachers and three support staff and two teacher-volunteers.   DASWEC was 
able to enlist an average of 30 candidates each year to sit for Kenya Certificate of Secondary 
Education (KCSE).  
In order to support its activities, DASWEC pursues a mixed approach to resource mobilization. 
Hence it set up income generating activities that included a cybercafé, rental houses, community 
recreation facilities, a resource centre, a tailoring and hairdressing centre. They also sought for 
resources from the government, members’ contributions, international organizations, the 
community and well-wishers. 
 In 2004, the group was split into two after a disagreement over the use of Euro 3,500 (Kenya 
Shillings 350,000) that was given to them by National Aids Control Council to help in AIDS 
awareness. An agreement to allow the formation of a splinter group was overseen by the area chief. 
The splinter group was also registered as a self-help group. Despite the split, the two groups were 
then helped to collaborate in implementing the project to its completion and give a final report 
jointly under the leadership of DASWEC. After this, they decided to run their activities 
independently.  
The second challenge was a temporary closure of the computer school after a division of assets and 
liabilities with the splinter group. Some of the computers, furniture, training materials, and the 
group’s proceeds were a subject of the division. The group also experienced a loss of Euro 685 
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(Kenya Shillings 68,500) as a result of poor investment. These challenges contributed to 
temporarily weakening of the computer school activities.  
As a result of the split, members of the splinter group decided not to repay their loans to DASWEC 
preferring to pay to their new group instead. There were also those members who did not want to be 
associated to any of the groups and recovering the loans from them proved costly and difficult. 
Other challenges included inability to provide loans to all members due to overstretched resources. 
The quality of some of the activities had also to be sacrificed because of lack of funds to efficiently 
carry them out. The group also suffered from inability to provide the best learning environment in 
its secondary school, as it operated from rented premises. Maintaining the school and the income 
generating activities was a difficult task because of inadequate capital and human resources. 
On a brighter side, DASWEC managed to mobilize two women groups of at least twenty members 
each after the split. These members were assisted to access loans which they used to strengthen or 
start small businesses. The group also managed to sustain its computer school and establish 
additional vocational skills training activities. Their members and the community were assisted to 
learn practical skills such as tie and dye, tailoring and soap making. Since 2005, the secondary 
school has enrolled over 300 candidates and registered good performance, with some students 
joining local universities and mid-level colleges. DASWEC has also trained about 250 youth in 
computer literacy over the same period. As a result of its activities, DASWEC received the UN 
Habitat Poverty Alleviation award in 2006. 
DASWEC generates income from all its activities. Its total annual income is approximately Euro 
15,000 (Kenya Shillings 1,500,000). Twenty two Percent of this income is generated from the 
computer school adding up to Euro 3,300 (Kenya Shillings 330,000) per year. Membership 
contributions (5%) adding up to Euro 750 (Kenya Shillings 75,000),  transaction fees (7%) totalling 
to Euro 1,050 (Kenya Shillings  105,000) similarly community contribution at Euro 1,050 (Kenya 
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Shillings 105,000). The biggest annual earner is the secondary school (35%) contributing Euro 
5,250 (Kenya Shillings 525,000) per year. The vocational training activities (15%) contribute Euro 
2,250 (Kenya Shillings 225,000), and funding from the international community constituting 9% 
amounting to approximately Euro 1,350 (Kenya Shillings 135,000).  
DASWEC has benefitted the Riruta community in a number of ways. To begin with,  its secondary 
school was mainly established to educate children orphaned as a result of HIV/AIDS. Secondly, its 
revolving fund enabled its members pursue projects of their own choice thus empowering them 
economically. The micro finance project was eventually opened up to the community members. In 
time it also started vocational, computer training and life skills activities to its members and the 
community at large.   
As can be seen the DASWEC case shows that it could be a close asymptote of a social enterprise in 
accordance to the resource mix approach (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001). Its enterprise activities are 
mainly pursued to fulfil social aims. In line with the empirical findings, increases in resource 
mobilization activities within DASWEC led to an increase in economic empowerment activities. 
This is clearly evidenced by having started with a revolving fund project, and over the years 
diversifying its resource mobilization strategies.  
4.3: Case 2: KITO International Self Help Group 
KITO International Self Help Group is located at the heart of Kawangware slums. KITO works with 
street youths and helps in bridging their societal integration gap created after undergoing 
institutional rehabilitation process. The organization was started in 2009 by a former street boy in 
collaboration with an American benefactor. The two had the vision to simultaneously help former 
street children create connections with the community. In addition they aimed at assisting 
communities attain better understanding of former street youths. The group is registered as a 
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community based organization and has plans to upgrade itself to a non-governmental organization 
so as to overcome the limitations of its current registration. 
KITO’s desire is to assist former Street youth effectively tackle poverty, avoid exploitation and be 
safe from violence. It achieves this by helping them move away from street-life and by nurturing 
them towards financial independence. Its work is aimed at helping street youths become 
competitive and build their self-esteem.  The work of KITO takes the form of a work integration  
social enterprise program.  
To achieve its objectives, KITO runs a business that sells environmental-friendly products (eco-
light bulbs and other appliances). It also operates other initiatives such as making of handicrafts, 
sandals and bags. From these initiatives and other fundraising activities KITO generates a total of 
approximately Euro 20,000 (Kenya Shillings 2,000,000) annually.  In its business, it employs 
former street youth as marketers and producers. On an annual basis about 20 young people are 
employed. These youth learn how to interact with the society through their marketing activities. 
They also gain useful work and life skills. KITO has also employed a social worker to help the 
street youth address their self-esteem issues. In order to mobilize resources, KITO relies on its 
business activities and donations of well-wishers in the community and abroad. Most of the 
professional services such as psycho-social support services are usually offered by volunteers.  
Even at its infant stage, KITO has experienced some challenges. The premier challenge was the fall 
out between the two founding members. This fall out affected the operations of the group for 
sometime. However the group was able to move on with its activities and stabilize with time. 
Given that KITO assists former street youth, some of their beneficiaries subsequently drop out as 
they find the formation process to be too tedious and long, not offering them instant satisfactory 
rewards. Regrettably some of the youth engage in petty theft of project resources time and again. 
On their part, some girls drift back to prostitution since they feel that it takes them a long time to 
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learn the necessary skills from KITO. Additionally, former street children have various 
psychosocial challenges emanating from their having been in the streets, habits and public stigma.  
KITO has had several youth intakes since its inception. A few of its graduates are now admitted in 
secondary schools and middle level tertiary institutions in Kenya. Successful apprentices of KITO 
have been able to find job placements. Some alumni have become mentors to other youths still 
trapped in street life. KITO’s work has attracted increased contribution and voluntary efforts from 
the community in recognition of its positive role in integrating street youth. The indirect effect of 
the integration programme is the fact that the apprentices are able to contribute to their family 
incomes thus stopping their siblings from joining street life. 
In terms of networking, the organization has attracted both local and international members on its 
Board, with some hailing from the UK and USA. The organization also works with various 
rehabilitation centres in Nairobi. In 2010, the founder of KITO founder was awarded a 2010 Cordes 
fellowship which enabled him travel to Ixtapa, Mexico for the Opportunity Collaboration 
Conference of Worldwide Social Entrepreneurs. He was also selected as a Hidef Fellow to attend 
the same conference in 2011 where he was given the chance to speak about the activities of KITO at 
TEDx in California, USA.  
KITO’s efforts are unique. First, they concentrate on assisting street youth, an aspect that had been 
left out by most institutions working with street populations. Generally, institutions concentrate on 
working with street children mostly aged up to 18 years. Hence working with street youth from 18 
years and above has proved to be quite unique. Given the fact that this is a pioneer effort in this area 
within Riruta Community, it is also providing avenues for learning and improvement and eventually 
provide some lessons for future interventions.  
Kito raises its income mainly from its enterprises comprising environmental products and 
handicrafts. These products are sold both to the local and international markets. The proceeds of 
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Kito are used to pay salaries and take some of its beneficiaries back to school or to vocational 
institutions.  They also use them to sponsor outreach activities such as talent and cultural shows. As 
can be seen, Kito exists to fulfil the goal of meeting  community’s social needs. 
4.4: Case 3: Mkokoset Self Help Group 
Mkokoset was established in January 2005 and registered in August of the same year as a 
cooperative effort involving 12 former street youth in the Satelite area of Riruta. The main aim of 
establishing Mkokoset was to create employment for former street youth around Riruta Satelite. 
Initially, a football team Kamageera Football Club united the group. Once they came together in 
2005, they decided to start a hand-cart business as a means of transporting goods in Satelite. 
Secondly,  Mkokoset had an aim of helping to prevent its members from engaging in criminal 
activities.   
The group later discovered that all its members could not be served adequately by the hand-carts 
transport business only. Hence in 2006 they started looking for capacity building opportunities that 
would enhance their skills to expand their activities. A local consultancy provided them with this 
needed formation. In 2007 the group was able to form collaborations with the Ministry of Water in 
Kenya where they managed to secure a 20,000-litre tank to help in supplying water to residents of 
Riruta. In the same year, the group started food kiosk. In 2009, the group was given 20 dairy goats 
by the Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture and today the group benefits from selling its milk and its 
goats. Lastly in 2010, the group was also able to establish a candle making business producing 300 
candles per day. All these activities earn the group about Euro 7,000 (Kenya Shillings 700,000) per 
year. While all the 12 members benefit directly from Mkokoset, other former street youth also 
benefit from the activities of the group. 
Mkokoset as a group has had numerous challenges in the process. Firstly, some free riding members 
fiercely claim to be entitled to full benefits just like the hard working ones. The group has also lost 
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some of its members because of deaths and other causes. Alcoholism and excessive drug abuse is 
also a major problem associated with the group. Most of its members have little reading and writing 
abilities; even the most learned among them are barely educated. Moreover, most of the group 
members lack national identity cards and this locks them out of job opportunities and exposes them 
to constant harassment by law enforcers. 
However, Mkokoset has registered notable successes despite its challenges. It has played an 
important role in the integration of former street youth into the society. In fact some of these youth 
were able to find their marriage partners from the same community, showing that Mkokoset has 
helped its members get fully integrated back to the society.  It has also been able to create and 
sustain a number of projects for the benefit of its members and the community. At an individual 
level, the director of Mkokoset was chosen by World Vision to coordinate its activities for the youth 
in Riruta in 2010. 
Mkokoset just like Kito is a unique case in that it deals with former street youth. It is however goes 
further to embrace cooperative ideals among its members. All planning, strategizing and 
implementation of activities are done by members and decisions concerning all income earned are 
made by the entire group. Though the group has many problems, these youth help each other in 
many ways including drawing each other away from criminal activities and being in solidarity 
during adverse and joyful moments facing any of their members.   
4.5: Case 4: Africa Sanalimu Art Ensemble 
Africa Sanaelimu Art Ensemble (ASAE) is a group of talented creative performing artists who 
double up as educationists. The group was established to use performing arts in the form of cultural 
music, narration and dance as a social media in propagating community education on various issues. 
The group represents a multi-cultural ethnic nature of Kenya in their educational endeavors. This 
group was started in Mathare Valley slums. 
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Although ASAE was registered in 2009, it has a history dating to 1998. In  that year, a number of 
Catholic youths in Babadogo Parish, came together to help spread values propagated by faith in 
their community. These youth also aimed at creating employment opportunities through performing 
arts. Some of the youths who joined the group were already engaged in other activities such as shoe 
shining, garbage collection, laundry and car washing inter alia.  
ASAE makes an average income of approximately Euro 60,000 (Kenya Shillings 6,000,000) from 
its entire portfolio of activities annually. After its establishment, ASAE undertook to use its artistic 
abilities to entertain and educate. Its name Sanaelimu is derived from two Swahili words: sanaa 
which means art and elimu which means education. ASAE pursues an entrepreneurial approach 
where it targets the high-end markets and uses its proceeds to educate the poorer sections of society. 
In a year, ASAE employs an average of 40 youth from the slums.  
Its activities are African traditional performances based mainly on the Kenyan culture, educational 
theatrical performances and African aerobics. ASAE also offers entertainment on social occasions 
such as weddings and company celebrations. Its educational activities are mainly done in national 
theatres, schools, churches, organizational premises and in public gatherings. Most of ASAE’s 
resources are from its business activities. It also receives a few donations. 
ASAE has had various challenges. Disputes among its founders have led to some of them leaving 
the group. Lack of constant funding has also affected the organization in many ways. Availability of 
expert human capital to conceptualize and design projects for the organization, market and identify 
business opportunities among others is a challenge faced by ASAE. Lastly, all ASAE members are 
less educated with the director only having completed primary school. 
The group has made great strides since its formation. They have been participating in major events 
and festivals in Nairobi including performing at the State House, universities and top companies. 
The group has implemented major educational programs especially on human rights. ASAE is a 
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member of Ngoma Kikwetu, a Kenyan network of performing artists affiliated to the Kenya 
National Theatre.  In 2010, ASAE represented Kenya in South Africa during the World Cup as 
Kenya’s cultural ambassadors. They also travel and perform in various countries during summer 
festivals and global celebrations such as the London and Beijing Olympics. 
ASAE is a unique enterprise as it combines performing arts and education. Over the years, 
communities have not only been entertained on various aspects but they have also been educated on 
topical issues such as human rights, health, reproductive health, civic issues, inter alia. The biggest 
benefit to its members has been their exposure to the international community events. The other 
aspect of ASAE is changing the traditional constructs in Kenya that performing arts do not present a 
competitive way to earn a living. Proceeds received by ASAE, are mainly used to finance cultural 
escapades and community education activities. Since most of the members come from very poor 
families, whatever they earn, contributes significantly in improving their own economic situation. 
4.6: Case 5: Riruta Environmental Group 
Riruta Environmental Group (REG) was started in 1998 by 30 members of a football club in Riruta 
Satelite Community. The group got registered in 1999. At the beginning of REG, the team had 
problems raising finances to meet their fixtures. They started carrying out environmental clean-up 
activities after training sessions and over the weekends to raise funds for the matches and to 
advertise themselves to the communities. The activities of this group matured over time and they 
identified their mission as that of linking sports to development. 
With time, REG became a popular group. With the aid of some funds from the community, the 
group bought a couple of hand-carts and plastic bags. They then started commercializing their 
services to the residents of Riruta.  Riruta residents would pay Euro1.50 (Kenya Shillings 150) for a 
pack of four plastic bags and garbage collection services. In time the group attracted funding from a 
local donor. The donor however realized that the group suffered from lack of quality human capital 
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and decided to recruit professionals to help in mentoring the group members. The group 
subsequently bought three lorries, a piece of land in Nairobi and put up structures and made 
sophisticated machines to recycle solid waste and glasses. Apart from its environmental activities, 
REG uses is premises for youth formation. REG employs about 50 youths although it targets to 
offer employment to about 200 youth. 
REG has had a number of challenges in its growth process. The first challenge was a disagreement 
with its first donor who went ahead made decisions on behalf of the group without consulting it.  
Secondly, it has had to deal with issues of vested interests and free riding among members. It was 
not been spared from financial difficulties and hence it could not meet all its objectives with ease. 
Lastly, as a result of poor human capital, the group is not able to network effectively and also take 
advantage of emerging  opportunities adequately. 
From 2009 the group was able to make an annual business income of Euro 2,500 (Kenya Shillings 
250,000) from its members and its business activities. In 2010 it made an income of Euro 4,000 
(Kenya Shillings 400,000) while in 2011 it made an income of Euro 6,000 (Kenya Shillings 
600,000). REG also benefits from donor funds which total to approximately Euro 25,000 (Kenya 
Shillings 2,500,000). 
Some of its social activities at the moment include youth formation, job skills training and 
reproductive health issues and spreading awareness about human trafficking. So far, REG earned 
awards from international organizations and some commendations from the National Environmental 
Management Authority (NEMA) and has participated in local and international conferences on 
issues of solid waste management. 
REG pioneered the idea of linking sports to local development in Riruta and Dagoretti area. From 
this idea, it has concentrated in making a special contribution to environmental conservation. Some 
of its projects include making different products from recycled glass, making of bio-diesel and 
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methane from used vegetable oil, sorting and processing plastic garbage and selling it to recycling 
companies. REG also educates the community on how to manage their waste and participates in 
environmental advocacy. On special occasions REG sponsors community clean ups, talent activities 
and conferences with environmental and/or human rights themes in Riruta and Dagoretti.  One great 
contribution to the Riruta Community arising out of REG activities is the fact that there are no 
longer any more road-side dumping sites. 
REG has a social enterprise dimension. First, it raises its resources from a variety of sources. 
Secondly, it works to solve the pressing environmental challenges faced by Riruta Community. It 
also reinvests all its surplus in the project or in its member’s development and to promote 
community benefits. 
4.7: Case 6: KOBWA Self Help Group 
KOBWA is an acronym of Kivuli Old Boys Welfare Association. Events leading to the formation 
of this group started in 1994 with youth formation activities within Riruta that included former 
street youth rehabilitated by Koinonia Community. Koinonia is a Kenyan NGO that runs several 
street children homes in the wider Nairobi. The youth formation activities took economic and social 
dimensions.   
The economic dimension started in 1998 when several youth were taken to tertiary level institutions 
to acquire vocational skills in carpentry and joinery, welding, building construction, plumbing, 
electric engineering, motor vehicle engineering and catering. At the same time, most youth with 
similar skills joined together so as to commercialize their skills. The group also started workshops 
in welding, carpentry, carving, motor vehicle repair and fabric art and were manned by either the 
former rehabilitees of Koinonia or the youth from the surrounding community. Moreover, a small 
savings and credit association known as Employment and Enterprise Programme (EEP) was 
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established with the hope of helping the former street youth learn the culture of saving and be able 
to access credit opportunities. 
It was believed that the integration of former street youth would be much more successful if 
pursued in tandem with the participation of members of the community. However, the successive 
joining of members from the community in an activity meant that several former street youth were 
crowded out. Koinonia then thought of a social dimension approach to youth formation with the aim 
of increasing the self-esteem of former street youth.  
The social formation began in 2005 and tackled issues such as the benefits of education, African 
culture, reproductive health, drugs awareness and counselling, career formation, self-esteem, self-
assertiveness, societal integration and psycho-social challenges faced by street children and youth in 
daily life.  These formations continued up to 2007 when this group of youth decided to constitute 
themselves as KOBWA and got registered as a self-help group. 
In constituting KOBWA the former street youth had a number of objectives.  They intended to offer 
psycho-social support to their members in order to boost their confidence. Peer mentoring was also 
among its initial objectives. The group was cognisant of the fact that the streets offered the former 
street youth survival skills but not competitive skills. KOBWA was hence tasked with the role of 
facilitating the acquisition of these skills. Thus, an industrial liaison activity was pursued to link the 
youth to the job markets. As the youth got jobs, they experienced stigma from their places of work.  
The group has had a number of challenges since its initiation in 2007. Dependency on Koinonia has 
been a major challenge. Members joined the group with expectations that they would be noticed by 
Koinonia Community and ultimately get employed. This dependency has had the effect of making 
the group less creative and innovative in finding new ways of meeting its objectives as opposed to 
being preoccupied with getting employment opportunities within Koinonia. When employment 
236 
 
opportunities were not forthcoming, many of KOBWA members became disillusioned and 
demotivated and left the organisation. Active member drastically reduced from 80-30.  
KOBWA is a member of the larger Koinonia Community and ipso facto they get affected by the 
problems experienced by the larger Koinonia. Because of this lack of autonomy and independence 
its vision has been asphyxiated with a few of its members splitting from it and forming other 
independent groups. At the moment there are two of such groups.  
As a result of the human formation activities, KOBWA eventually started bidding for contracts. 
They have been able to secure and service a contract to supply foodstuffs to street youth 
rehabilitation homes including those run by the government since 2009. KOBWA was able to 
establish concrete economic empowerment projects as part of its work integration program. Other 
projects of KOBWA include a carpentry workshop and a grain retail shop.  
KOBWA also, constituted itself to advocate for its members in their work places and also to 
educate the wider public, especially public schools about street children. Their encounters with the 
public, are meant to lessen the stigma experienced by former street children and youth and  to 
minimise re-integration challenges. They also visit rehabilitation centres where, they mentor former 
street children, helping them with school work, psycho-social support and advice.  
KOBWA undertook as part of its mandate to advice Koinonia Community on ways to improve its 
impact on rehabilitation and reintegration of former street youth. In 2010 KOBWA was integrated 
into the wider Dagoretti and later Kenya Network of Street Children Caregivers where they now 
advice on street youth rehabilitation and reintegration. At the same time, the group started hosting 
an annual national conferences of former street youth dubbed as Kongamano la Vijana kwa Base 
(Former Street Youth Conference) where issues of rehabilitation and reintegration are discussed in 
detail. The group also participates in international conferences where issues of street children and 
youth are discussed.   
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In 2009, members of KOBWA concerned by the plight of former street girls after rehabilitation, 
helped in establishing another organization for them. This organization was to address various 
issues facing young street women and girls. The new group was christened Get together Girls 
(G2G). KOBWA contributed in the initial formation process mainly concentrating on psycho-social 
issues and the governance structure. The girls later established a tailoring and designs business 
concentrating on women clothing. G2G has since become an important collaborating partner of 
KOBWA. 
In 2009 and 2010 KOBWA helped Koinonia with its internal problems and it still stands as an 
important support structure to Koinonia. Its mentoring activities are successful as more youngsters 
are proceeding to tertiary institutions including the university. Since societal reintegration is a great 
challenge among the children leaving institutions of care, successful former street youth have also 
been encouraged to receive children leaving rehabilitation homes. Those received by bigger youth 
are the ones that cannot find a conducive ambient for re-integration in their own families. This is 
because their families could be seriously dysfunctional or their personal changes as a result of 
adolescence makes it hard to fit in their families.  
KOBWA’s capital was raised from group members and well-wishers. On average KOBWA earns 
Euro 12,000 (Kenya Shillings 1,200,000) annually from its business activities. Donations to the 
group amount to Euro 7,000 (Kenya Shillings 700,000) emanating from both local and international 
donors. KOBWA’s proceeds are mainly used to pay salaries to its approximately 30 working 
members. Another portion is used to finance its conferences and outreach programmes to street 
children institutions.  
KOBWA, by its work to enhance better re-integration of former street youth into the society 
embraces both inductive and deductive dimensions. It has formulated unique levels of engagement 
from its parent organization to the national organs. It also has presented a unique aspect in the 
238 
 
advocacy arena where it has given voice to those directly affected by the problem they are 
addressing. KOBWA’s work to reduce stigma, instil self-confidence and raise self-esteem among 
street youth will eventually help street youth become better at undertaking their civil responsibilities 
as socially included citizens.  
4.8: Case 7: Dagoretti Youth Developers Group (DYDG) 
Dagoreti Youth Developers Group (DYDG) was an initiative of Young Women Campaigners 
against HIV/AIDS (YWCAHA) based in Dagoretti District, which came up with an idea of 
involving youth in their activities. YWCAHA proposed that the youths form a group of thirty 
members and were to be funded to raise awareness of HIV/AIDS. Dagoretti Youth Developers was 
born through this initiative as a group of young artists that came together with an aim of reaching 
out to the other youths with the message of HIV/AIDS. There were other groups which were 
formed during this time under the auspices of YWCAHA but majority were not successful since 
their expectations in terms of financial support from YWCAHA were higher and unrealistic. 
Despite this challenge, YWCAHA worked with a few groups to encourage the youths use their 
artistic talents to sensitize other youths on issues of HIV/AIDS. 
Hence DYDG got its initial mandate from YWCAHA. This group was formed in 2009 but got 
registered in 2010. The main objective of the group was to help the youth realize their full potential 
and therefore create employment. Through the use of drama and oral narrations the group was able 
to perform at various functions attracting the attention of well-wishers and the government. The 
group got funds from the National Aids Control Council (NACC) amounting to Euro 3,500 (Kenya 
Shillings 350,000) and a loan of Euro 500 (Kenya Shillings 50,000) from the Youth Enterprise 
Fund in Kenya. It became difficult for them to repay their loan since they did not have sound 
business projects. Hence, they have no plans of applying for other loans until they put up a stable 
239 
 
business. However, they continue mobilizing revenues through performing in functions, donations 
and fundraising.   
DYDG is trying to influence the government get involved in talent development. Most of its 
members have little education. They also aim to change the societal construct that only the educated 
get jobs. Accordingly, they believe that youth with little education could pursue avenues ignored by 
those with formal education. It encourages talented youths to use artistic performance as a means of 
livelihood. The group also engages in skills training and work integration. Some of its members 
have managed to find jobs as artists or in other fields. Apart from becoming role models to others in 
the group, those who have successfully gotten jobs also give back to the group in terms of time and 
finances. 
Constant change of leadership has negatively impacted on continuity of projects. This has been a 
source of conflict amongst the membership. The group also suffers from financial instability, free 
riding, lack of commitment from some members and  it also has no facilities to operate from. 
The group has made notable successes. They have managed to network with other CBOs and self 
helps in Dagoretti and also contributed to the formation of the Dagoretti Action Against Gender 
Violence (DAAGV).  The group has also built a solid partnership with the National Aids Control 
Council (NACC), National Organization of Peer Educators (NOPE), and Women Empowerment 
Link (WEL) which work on Gender Based Violence issues. Some of their members are now 
officially recognized as trainers of trainers (ToTs) on various issues on gender violence. The group 
has a formal recognition and awards from the government on their work in HIV/AIDS awareness 
and dissemination of messages against stigma and discrimination. The group feels that the best 
effect has been experienced within the membership as they have become more confident, believing 
in themselves and can compete in the job market.  
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DYDG has challenges in balancing between its social mission and entrepreneurial activities. Their 
high orientation on advocacy activities is a traded off with their resource mobilization activities. 
This is the case because of the influence of the parent organization who had HIV/AIDS awareness 
through performing arts as their objective. This shadow of the parent organization encapsulates the 
creativity of DYDG and hence it has only concentrated on its original mandate with the resources 
provided by YWCAHA.    
On a positive note, DYDG has had a positive influence on youth who had less educational chances. 
These youth are able to express themselves to wider publics and also educate them. Since these 
youth are the propagators of a health campaign, this fact also helps them to know how to protect 
themselves from contracting HIV. The group has also become instrumental in bringing out other 
aspects that were latent on inter-gender relations. In essence, it has helped empower young 
uneducated women and assisted them to become self-confident.  
4.9: Case 8: Ngando Mai Women Group 
Ngando Mai Women Group is a self-help group which was started in 1997 around Dagoretti 
Corner, Ngando area. It was registered as a self-help group on 11
th
 March 2005. The main problem 
that the group sought to address at that time was joblessness among women. Most of its members 
had problems in raising income needed to bring up their families, as some were single parents. 
Hence the group aimed at creating job opportunities for these women in order to improve their 
economic status, and also to involve them on issues of community building. 
The group identified water scarcity as a major problem during that time. They hence made it their 
vision to ensure that Ngando and the community around get access to clean water.  They therefore 
provided water service to individuals, homes, hotels (food kiosks) and so on. They also got 
involved in private or personal contracts such as laundry activities and other domestic duties, while 
others engaged in small business activities.  
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Group members contributed Euro 3 (Kenya Shillings 300) on a monthly basis. This money was part 
of the merry-go-round process and also was used as seed capital for their projects. From an initial 
membership of sixty at the time of formation, the group now stands at thirty. As the group members 
become more financially independent, they move on. This can be seen from both positive and 
negative dimensions. On a positive note the group can boast of helping empower its members 
economically. However the negative part is that once the members move on, the group is weakened.  
The group has undergone various challenges, one being drastic reduction in the number of 
members. Some members opted to venture in business activities, while others got employed 
elsewhere. At the same time others relocated to different areas forcing them not to fully participate 
in the group. Other members have also been ex-communicated from the group mainly for lack of 
active participation. The elderly members continue to quit, although this is complemented by new 
members coming on board. The exit of the founding members has the effect of blurring the original 
motivation and impetus that led to the starting of the initiative. 
It has also been challenging for the group to increase its income and therefore meet some of its 
initial objectives. Ngando Mai has not been very successful in networking and as a result of which it 
has not benefitted fully from devolved government and other resources. 
Despite its many challenges, the group has met its objective of supplying the community with clean 
water. From the savings, the group has also bought plots of land and uses them for developing 
homes for their members. The annual turnover of the group is approximately Euro 9,000 (Kenya 
Shillings 900,000). The proceeds are shared or invested in assets for the benefit of group members. 
Ngando Mai is a unique group in that it addresses the issue of single parenthood and helps the 
affected women ease the burden entailed in bringing up their families. The most notable 
contribution of the group has been to push its members to financial independence. It also extends its 
242 
 
benefits to the wider community through its water services. Access to clean water is a widespread 
problem in the poorer sections of Nairobi such as in the Ngando area where the group is located.  
4.10 Case 9: Mariamu Academy Self Help 
Mariamu Academy Self Help Group was started in 1995 by a group of people residing in Riruta 
East. The concern of this group was the inability of many poor children to access secondary 
education because of lack of school fees. Hence, they created a school which would admit children 
from poor families at a subsidized cost. They rented an acre of land where they erected make shift 
structures made of wood and iron sheets to accommodate students. In this simple way, a school was 
started, which attracted about 100 students. 
In 1995, the school found a donor from Europe. The donor proposed to help the school purchase 
land, and to pay the staff. He however insisted that the school had to be professionalized and that 
some of the founding members had to be dropped from the new arrangement. That idea brought a 
big problem amongst the founding members leading to a split. One group remained with the donor 
while the other went on to start another initiative with the same motive known as Matrix School. 
Mariamu Academy managed to acquire a plot of land of about 3 acres where they erected a 
secondary and a vocational school. The school has enabled a number of children from poor families 
access secondary education and has also assisted quite a number acquire vocational skills. The 
school is quite self-sufficient as it has a stable source of income from its donors and school fees. It 
employs a total of 10 teachers and 5 support staff. On an annual basis it graduates 40 secondary 
school candidates and about 30 vocational school candidates in carpentry, electrical wiring and 
plumbing.  
The school has not explored alternative funding opportunities though it charges a small fee to its 
students. It has enormous funding currently although that could cause serious problems in case the 
243 
 
donor withdraws support. Mariamu School is totally in the hands of the donor and its members are 
only there to stamp anything that comes from him. The heavy influence of the donor has also had 
the effect of alienating the self-help group from the community. 
Despite the heavy control by its donor, Mariamu school has managed to help several children from 
poor families in and around Riruta get educated. On the other hand, it has benefitted the community 
by providing employment opportunities. Its facilities are also used for other social functions such as 
youth formation activities, weddings and for meetings of various kinds.   
4.11: Case 10: Congo Western Community Self Help Group (CWCG) 
Congo Western Community Group was registered in 1994. It brings together members of the 
Abaluhya Community from the Western Province of Kenya. The group was formed to help raise 
resources to finance medical bills and funeral expenses for its members. Group members meet on a 
fortnight basis and each contributes Euro 3 (Kenya Shillings 300). This money is usually invested 
in shares or deposited in the account of the group or in the newly created mobile money savings 
account (also known as M-shwari in Kenya). By the end of 2010 the group had a total of Euro 
30,000 (Kenya Shillings 3,000,000). 
When a member of the group or those included in the insurance plan dies, the entire group meets, 
fundraises before withdrawing money from the group’s resources. Members can join or leave the 
group at will. To be able to access help from the group, a member is required to have saved a total 
of Euro 36 (Kenya Shillings 3,600). Group members are also assisted during their weddings and 
during births. The group also has other benefits in that it has helped all its members enrol in the 
National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) which provides in-patient insurance and National Social 
Security Fund which provides retirements benefits at old age.  
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This group has a membership of about 300 people. Members who are not able to attend the 
meetings send their contributions through the mobile money transfer (also known as M-pesa in 
Kenya) to the group treasurer. However, there is a threshold for missing meetings. Hence it is not 
enough to always make contributions without attending meetings. Members present in meetings do 
not usually exceed 30 persons at a time. Hence the members have come up with a way to sub-divide 
themselves to smaller groups in order that they may be able to manage themselves better.  
The group’s executive serve on a voluntary basis for a term of three years. Apart from the executive 
committee, the group has also been sub-divided into ten 30 member sub-groups for ease of 
management. The group leaders also elected for a period of 3 years serve on a voluntary basis. The 
meeting places are usually held in members’ homesteads on a rotational basis, this ensures that all 
members ultimately know each other.  
Group members of CWCG are bound together by their need to help insure each other. As a result, 
they have created an informal insurance scheme that helps members during their most difficult 
moments or other moments that require heavy financial inputs. Moments like this are usually 
capable of depleting individual resources hence pushing people into poverty. The intervention of 
CWCG is therefore both precautionary and preventive barring people from sinking into poverty in 
the occurrence of an event.  
4.12: Chapter Discussion 
Response to needs 
Self-help groups are member based organizations within specific communities. They are constituted 
to respond to problems experienced by members which in most cases are not very distinct from 
those of the wider community. Hence, in trying to find solutions to their own problems they assist 
their communities in the process. Thus they are embedded within their communities and attract 
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local support. This local support helps the group towards self-sustainability and independence and 
incentivise members in carrying out their social mission.   
All self-help groups analysed above have unique motivations. DASWEC and Ngando Mai Women 
Group mainly focussed on women empowerment. KITO, Mkokoset and KOBWA concentrated on 
re-integration of former street youth into society. ASAE, REG and DYDG have an aim of creating 
employment opportunities for youth.  Mariamu Academy Group and DASWEC worked to assist 
children from poor families access secondary school and vocational education. Lastly, CWCG was 
created to provide micro-insurance and also assist in funding important functions among its 
members.  
Self-help groups are not created for profit making purposes but to address genuine community felt 
needs. They have a clear social mission and strategies to achieve their objectives.  This mission 
could be to address the needs of the members, empower the vulnerable members of society or 
address a specific challenge. In a bid to respond to their call to mission, the groups usually start 
from simple efforts which in time grow spreading their benefits widely. An example of this is 
DASWEC which began from a revolving fund initiative to incorporating other activities. KOBWA 
too began from psychological counselling for the street youth to full-fledged reintegration activities 
that included apprenticeship activities, industrial liaison to high level advocacy. 
In the cases studied, it is quite evident that the self-help groups were created to respond to different 
challenges in their communities. Some of these challenges are joblessness, integrating individuals 
marginalized from the wider society, dealing with issues of stigma, enhancing peaceful inter-ethnic 
co-existence and improving capacities of their communities in several issues affecting them. Self 
helps by their work, represent a grassroots focused approach to problem solution, meaning that, 
people take the first steps to solve their own problems before other actors arrive to help them. 
Hence, groups manage in most times to find solutions to their problems before outside intervention. 
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Resource Mobilization 
All groups studied pursued a resource mix strategy to raise funds. Among the strategies are 
commercialization of social services, contributions from group members, fundraising from the 
community and donations from government, local or international donors. It is evident that most 
self-help groups relied on internally self-generated resources.  The ability to sustain resources to 
address social aims constitutes their entrepreneurial dynamic, as it entails a certain amount of risk in 
doing so.  
Having enough resources remains a great challenge for all the ten self-help groups studied above. 
All groups were overstretched resource wise. They served a large number of beneficiaries more 
than their resources can permit. This is a clear indication that the services offered by self-help 
groups are needed in their communities.  To illustrate this there is DASWEC which was serving a 
very large micro-finance constituency with minimal resources. Moreover the group resources 
shrank after it was split into two. This problems had a toll on the size of resources that remained at 
the disposal for serving its remaining constituency. Apart from DAWEC, other groups too had 
ambitious objectives which superseded their resources. They hence therefore either addressed these 
objectives partially or did not address them at all. 
In Kenya there are a number of resources both private and public available for the work of the civil 
society. For example the Draft Community Development Report of 2009 and Kenya’s second vision 
2030 medium plan of 2013 provides that there are a number of decentralized local community 
development resources (Republic of Kenya, 2013). They include Constituency Development Fund 
(CDF), Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF), Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF), 
Women Enterprise Fund (WEF), Orphans and Vulnerable Children Cash Transfer, Social Protection 
Fund and Constituency Bursary Fund, Uwezo Fund  (Capability fund) and Njaa Marufuku (fund 
against hunger).    These resources are allocated to enhance social protection and empower  the 
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most vulnerable members of the society with the preferred protagonists being grassroots 
organizations.  
The above  report also indicates that  self-help groups are capable of benefitting from international 
NGOs, bilateral donors and Micro-Finance Institutions. The reality however is the fact that very few 
CBOs benefitting from these resources. The 10 self-help groups studied above help us to generate 
various reasons for the inability to carry out resource mobilization effectively. First being the fact 
there is a cumbersome bureaucracy entailed in accessing the said facilities which the self-help 
groups prefer to keep away from. Secondly,  most CBOs may not have the right and timely 
information of how to access these facilities. Lastly, groups feel safe to operate with their own self-
generated resources.     
Donor influence 
Donor resources were quite helpful in many instances. However they tended to have an adverse 
effect on some groups in two ways; first, where the donor tended to much involved in group 
activities, the group lost its autonomy thus altered its original vision and became alienated from the 
community. Hence there is need for care where donor influence has to increase in projects. This was 
the case with the Mariamu Academy, which not only lost its autonomy but became highly 
dependent on the donor.  At times donor based imposed professionalism tended to crowd out group 
members and interfered with the founding social mission. REG is a vivid example of this. Donor 
strong involvement in the project in the name of professionalism had an effect of replacing the local 
action with professional action. The professional actors later found themselves alienated from the 
community. In the overall strong donor involvement not only caused tension to groups, but at times 
led to  split of groups into two groups; the one favoured by the donor and the jilted group.  
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Where donors are deeply involved in the self-help group activities, there is a high likelihood that 
they would eventually alienate the founding self-help group members in case a conflict develops. 
Donors could at times overstep their mandate and develop interest in the group’s assets. More 
challenges are always being experienced where there is no consultation between the self-help 
groups and the donors concerned. Some donors assumed a patronizing  attitude which affected 
groups negatively. One case is that of REG where donor-based non consultative decisions had 
effect of alienating the founding members. The donors  deliberately chased the founding members 
from their own group and replaced them with their own preferred people. This not only affected the 
group from being able to accomplish its mission effectively but it also led to massive property 
losses from the group. The losses were of a great magnitude and it will take a long time for the 
group to recover. By alienating the founding members from their group, the donors brought in 
people who did not have the burden of the group at heart and hence they were not obliged to protect 
the group’s assets as they had no strong feelings of ownership.  
Secondly, there is the Mariamu Academy Self Help Group where donors led to the split of the 
original group but also made to the group highly dependent and alienated from the community. 
Associated with these cases is a situation like that of Kito international where donors withdrew their 
support as a result of disagreeing with the groups’ founding members. These disagreements in most 
cases do occur where donors propose methods which groups find difficult to apply based on their 
experience within their residential communities. From these cases, donors are advised to devise 
appropriate mechanisms in which their interference in group activities may help in building social 
capital and group capabilities. They should also be careful so as their interventions may not only 
empower but also be sensitive to the local realities and cultures.      
Parental Organizational Influence 
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Kobwa and DYDG were established by parent organizations to assist groups of vulnerable people. 
The two groups  found themselves highly dependent on the resources provided by their parent 
organizations who included Koinonia Community and YWCAHA respectively. Parental 
dependence had the effect of making these groups unable to assume their own identity, build a 
sense of direction and establish independent actions from those originally proposed by the parent 
organizations. 
 Problems usually became compounded when the said parent organizations’ support gets 
diminished, this situation may end up threatening the very existence of these groups. Groups may 
find themselves left miserable or at the mercy of a few influential members. Depending on the 
capabilities of these members  and the ease in which to attract resources to perpetuate their work, 
the groups may continue with vigor or they may face discontinuation.   
Self Help Group Challenges 
Self-help groups did experience a number of challenges. A common challenge experienced is 
related to the problem of collective action which manifested itself in free riding. Some group 
members wanted to be entitled to group benefits with minimal contributions. These types of 
problems manifested themselves in REG, MKOKOSET, KOBWA and DASWEC.  On the other 
hand leadership wrangles and fights for resources also hampered the activities of many self-help 
groups. A case is given where the administration had to prevail upon the splitting of the one group 
as a result of wrangles over resources. These wrangles and the ensuing assets distribution process 
usually leaves the groups in dispute much weaker and with less ability to address their social 
mission.  
There is therefore need for structured mechanisms to ensure that groups are not weakened after  
gruelling disputes. In essence an incentive system could be in-built into the self helps to ensure that 
group assets are not affected but disgruntled members are helped to exit the group through 
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alternative incentive system.  The fact that investments cannot be owned by the self-help group, will 
always bring the risk that opportunistic behavior will always be manifested among members. 
Upgrading the self-help groups’ power of representation and ability to own  will greatly solve the 
present challenges. 
Groups had also unique and idiosyncratic challenges only specific to them. Kito International for 
example had challenges to retain a few of its beneficiaries till programme end. These beneficiaries 
were fending for themselves and they found the formation process long, denying them opportunities 
to find alternative livelihoods. Providing extra programme oriented incentives in order to enhance 
retention is not easy for Kito and this in a way works to constrain the scope of envisaged benefits to 
its beneficiaries.  
Other groups experienced membership problems. These problems are mainly attributed to the 
informal nature of the self-help groups among other causes. For example groups such as Mkokoset, 
DYDG, ASAE, and REG experienced collective action problems which exposed them to 
opportunism, selfishness and joy-riding among some of their members.  The groups also 
experienced petty thefts and misuse of their properties time and again by both members and 
beneficiaries. 
Kobwa, Ngando Mai and DYDG experienced frequent transitions where founding and older 
members left on one hand and new members come in on the other. Members’ reasons for leaving 
groups included ex-communication as a result of indiscipline, relocation, getting a new job or 
occupation or simply voluntary severance.  Groups that experienced rapid transition problems were 
mainly those constituted by the youth. This is owing to the fact that the youth is a transitional stage 
with people trying to decipher what they will do in life. Once they find their mission, it dictates 
their direction and hence may not hold onto the past activities that are not of equal benefits. The exit 
of older and founding group members had a negative effect on institutional memory and also 
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contributed in groups weakening. The transitions are compounded by the informality of self-help 
groups. A simple mandatory returns requirement would help in this area. 
Several other self-help groups had to deal with disputes.  They included Kito, Kobwa, Reg and 
DASWEC. The disputes in most cases could not be easily solved legally owing to the clumsy nature 
of the self-help groups. Several of the disputes could be solved locally at the Chief’s office. 
However where recourse was made to the courts of law it became difficult to sustain such a case 
owing to the fact that self-help groups have no power of representation, or perpetual succession. 
They do not exist in law and hence they cannot sue, be sued or even own a property on their own. 
This is a serious legal lacuna and if not solved in time it may contribute to the rise of opportunism 
as a negative exploit.  
Self Help Group Networking 
Most self-help groups tried several ways to build networks. All the cases listed had some form of 
good networking experiences. Though they had inadequate resources they still did a good job in  
addressing their social missions. Most of the groups had either some sort of recognition, award, 
with some having developed the ability to participate in international conferences. Examples of high 
level networking included ASAE, Kito and REG which have both national and international 
networks. ASAE networks in a bigger way, in that at all years, they are able to join summer 
festivals in Europe and also be represented in global festivals as Kenyan cultural ambassadors.  
These groups have also done so well to build networks with the local government and other local 
organizations.  
ASAE, Kito and REG had acquired wider networking scope at international levels. Kito’s networks 
extended to Mexico and USA. On an annual basis, the group acquired fellowships to attend 
international conferences and participate in talk shows.  ASAE through its networks with 
international regional governments and friends participates in festivals and fairs. So far most of its 
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global activities have been in Europe, Asia and Africa. ASAE has benefitted in various ways from 
its networks; marketing and facilitation of its activities, payment for international travels and 
accommodations. Other organizations too benefitted from networking, for example DASWEC and 
REG, got recognized both locally and internationally. They got commendation from the government 
and international organizations such as the UNEP, UN-Habitat among others. REG also has been 
able to attend conferences in India through the support of its networks. From these conferences it 
not only shares its experience but also learns from other global environmental endeavors. In all 
cases presented, there is evidence that effective networking benefitted the organizations studied. It 
provided a basis for resource mobilization, capacity development, experience sharing, markets 
development and the carrying out of collaborative actions.  
Social Innovation 
Social innovation is the buzz word that permeates most of the groups chosen for case studies. First 
groups raised resources in unique ways either through the sale of products, merchandising, 
attracting both local and international voluntary efforts and from donations from members and well-
wishers. Each group was addressing a service gap in unique ways reaching out to the most 
vulnerable sections of the community. Mkokoset in particular is singled out for bringing together a 
group of former street youth into a cooperative endeavour. The beneficiaries not only own their 
endeavour but have been helped to feel as part and parcel of the society that had excluded them. In 
essence the group members are even allowed to marry from the society that scorned them earlier on. 
DYDG and ASAE also have made the less educated youth to market their artistic skills far and wide 
beyond their scope of imagination. The most important thing is that people in the crevices of the 
society are made to feel that they have a dignity and they too can contribute to local development. 
REG has also pioneered in the production of bio-diesel in Kenya. Activities of these groups are  
radically forcing the Riruta Community to change its constructs bringing about street youth.     
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A great contribution of groups such as Mkokoset, Kobwa and Kito International is that of helping 
vulnerable and excluded youth get integrated nationally. Many of the beneficiaries of these three 
groups have no identity cards. One reason attributed to this lack owes to the fact that the said 
beneficiaries emanate from serious family and societal dysfuctionalities. The procedures and 
regulations that have been laid out to acquire the national identity cards are hence too cumbersome 
and in most cases difficult for them. They hence are in need of such organizations that act as 
enablers to help them manage these regulations. The absence of the three organizations would 
render them excluded from the national benefits denying them their human dignity. The government 
hence needs closer collaboration with such groups so as it may, through them address the plight of 
vulnerable people left out by its bureaucracy.  
Most groups are constituted by people with very low human capital. The study found that more than 
20% of the members lacked primary school. This was very evident in ASAE, DYDG and 
Mkokoset. This educational lack has the tendency to hamper group ability to carry out their mission 
effectively. Despite this anomaly, self helps present an ample opportunity for the government to use 
in reaching to those who are vulnerable at the grassroots and assist in improving their human capital 
and other capabilities. 
There is inevitably great amount of social innovation wrought by self-help groups at a local 
grassroots levels.   For example Kobwa, Mkokoset, REG and Kito apart from their work on 
promoting re-integration of street youth  had also positive influence on the behavior change of their 
beneficiaries, helped change public constructs about former street youth and enhanced their access 
to public services. They help these youth realize that they too can be responsible citizens and 
participate fully in the development of their own communities. In promoting this, the groups work 
through a cooperative ownership model where former street youth are encouraged to invest time 
through formation in order to acquire membership status. The feeling of organizational ownership 
acts to improve  self-esteem among the former street youth a great deal. The organizations are also 
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renowned for their work in advocating with the government and the media on behalf of the street 
populations.   
ASAE uses performing arts to educate the society. Through its work, it has contributed to immense 
exposure of its members both in Kenya and internationally. Their work exposes the Kenyan culture 
to the world and at the same time the young artists apart from developing their artistic talents are 
exposed to the exotic cultures.  While on the other hand DYDG has the same effect on the artistic 
talents of young people, it does so on a smaller scale in comparison to ASAE. Its unique niche is 
educating the community against HIV/AIDS. DYDG has a great effect on the self-esteem of its 
members considered to have lower educational achievements. It helps them to believe in their own 
potential and in their inherent abilities. The activities are helping deconstructing  the common 
constructs that only the educated are resourceful. It encourages the less educated too to see 
themselves as important development resources within their own communities. 
Social innovation is about reducing vulnerability within communities. Ngando Mai works on this 
by assisting single mothers. It helps them come together to not only share about their  difficulties 
but also to find common ways in which they can empower themselves and contribute to local 
development. Its main contribution to local development is through addressing the local water 
problems experienced in the community. Through its work, its members have been helped to own 
houses, pursue other self-development activities and be able to better care for their children. CWDG 
on its part, sensing vulnerability experienced by its members during moments of difficulties 
improvised a micro-insurance scheme. Difficult moments such as funerals and sicknesses are 
capable of condemning families to extreme poverty. Precautionary pooling of resources helps much 
avoid negative unforeseen consequences.   
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Self Help Groups and the Seven Points Criteria 
In conclusion, self-help groups have both an entrepreneurial and a social dynamic. The 
entrepreneurial dynamic can be seen in the way these groups mobilize resources. Social dynamism 
is seen as the raison d’etre for starting such organizations. Through their activities their members 
are economically and socially empowered and by extension their communities. The delivery of their 
services fits well within the criteria made of organization, autonomy, profit distribution, 
governance, degree of voluntarism, contribution to social inclusion and extent of entrepreneurial 
dynamism. Each is as explained below: 
As far as the organization dimension is concerned, self-help groups display some form of an 
organization albeit quasi formal. The clumsy government recognition and the associational bond 
within its membership exemplify this organization. The lack of a refined treatment in law however 
weakens this organizational dimension. 
These organizations are groups of  autonomous actors. Their action is not dependent on external 
influence. These groups are created voluntarily by people at the grassroots and not directly by 
public authorities or other market or non-market entities even though they may benefit from grants 
and donations. 
By nature and common practice, self-help organizations have no cap on how much of their residuals 
they may distribute at any one time. However, self-help groups have a self-imposed social contract 
that binds them to their communities that constrains the residuals they may decide to appropriate at 
any one time. The social contract helps them find a delicate balance between whatever will be 
distributed to members and what will be apportioned to addressing their mission.   
Self-help groups are based on participatory governance. They involve local people taking 
initiatives, because they want to address a specific change and are ready to take an initiative in order 
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to bring about the envisaged change. They believe that no outside authority or organisation can take 
the initiative in the same way like they would. For this purpose they actively come up with 
appropriate decisions on their situation and get organized around it. They do not submit into passive 
submissiveness. Self-help group members create their constitution and elect their leaders and decide 
on what activities they may undertake from time to time. 
Volunteering is a natural aspect of self-help groups. All groups have a high degree of voluntarism. 
Members and community residents dedicate time and other resources in pursuance  of group 
activities. In some cases members receive no payment for the efforts invested in the groups or 
where there is payment it is not commensurate to those efforts. There are however other benefits 
that accrue to membership such as the sense of belonging and the joy of ownership associated with 
being a group member. 
The work done by self-help groups to  contribute to social inclusion at the grassroots is immense. 
Some of its beneficiaries include ex-prisoners, street youth, commercial sex workers, the disabled, 
elderly, the sick and  children. Their work entails bringing about civic awareness, job creation, 
promoting reintegration, community education, environmental conservation among others. Through 
their work individuals or entire communities of people who are systematically blocked from rights, 
opportunities and resources are helped to slowly reverse the unfavourable conditions.       
Lastly, self-help groups have an inherent entrepreneurial dimension within them. Their financial 
viability is dependent on the efforts of their members. These members have a responsibility of 
ensuring that their groups attract adequate financial resources at any one time. From the data it was 
seen that several groups exercised the resource mix approach. A majority of the groups had one 
major resource mobilization activity. Unlike pure for profit organizations, these grassroots groups 
address two aspects; one being the survival of their group and the other being their social mission. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: LIMITATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Limitations 
The study  relied on self-reported data. In Kenya, it is hard to find credible datasets on the third 
sector. The available data portal, the Kenya Open Data, is still under construction having been 
created in 2008. This portal has in most times incomplete data and a complete lack of data for the 
actors of the third sector. Some Kenyan ministries have also refused to share data in this portal 
citing confidentiality. Hence the last time the portal was updated was in 2008, one year after it was 
launched.  Other agencies such as the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics have mostly data on 
formal organization and lacks data on grassroots organizations through the panoply of actors 
examined in this dissertation. 
There are inherent limitations with self-reported data. In most cases self-reported data is limited by 
the fact that it can rarely be independently verifiable. The responses of people  whether in 
interviews, focus groups, or on questionnaires  at face value may contain several potential sources 
of bias. The biases could arise from  selective memory, telescoping, attribution or exaggeration. 
Selective memory entails  remembering or not remembering experiences or events that occurred at 
some point in the past. Telescoping is about  recalling events that occurred at one time as if they 
occurred at another time. Attribution on the other hand  is the act of attributing positive events and 
outcomes to one's own agency but attributing negative events and outcomes to external forces while 
exaggeration is  the act of representing outcomes or embellishing events as more significant than is 
actually suggested from data. In order to address the problems of data limitations, the study used 
triangulation.  
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Secondly, there were challenges with sampling. Not all the elements of the sample frame could be 
reached by the researcher. The study utilized data from various sources to complement the data 
from the available sample. There were also problems of non-response making problems of 
generalizability of the sample difficult.    
Lastly, there is a dearth of literature on the third sector, social economy and social enterprises in 
Kenya and Sub-Saharan Africa. The literature used from the other parts of the world could not do 
justice to the reality in Kenya.  Literature available focused on specific actors or influences and 
these provided important resource material to the researcher. 
5.2 Conclusions 
Though the term “third sector” is unfamiliar in Kenya, this sector’s importance in the Kenyan 
economy is widely felt in the socio, economic and political domains. The sector contributes in the 
provision of social services, the empowerment of many people at the periphery of the society and 
ultimately to local development. It is not possible to quantify the exact magnitude of the 
contribution of this sector but its impacts is evident. 
The sector’s actors did evolve differently, from the pre-colonial era where associational activities 
were mainly based on cultural reciprocity. This sector was given initial impetus for formal growth 
with activities of the colonial government. At this time, cooperatives, faith based activities and 
indigenous associations for social welfare were the dominant actors. The post-colonial government 
also contributed to its growth through legislating it. Later the sector was emboldened by the creation 
of the Harambee cooperative spirit by anti-colonial movement. With various influences over time, 
the sector grew and incorporated other actors such as self-help groups and micro finance 
institutions.  
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The third sector in Kenya has also been shaped differently by various organizations constituting it. 
Religious organizations, civil societies, community based and grassroots organizations give it a 
charity and social perspective. Cooperatives and micro finance institutions help it manifest a market 
oriented perspective. Religious and civil society actors are mainly concerned with empowering 
people at the periphery of society through their work in education and health especially in remote 
areas. Cooperatives and micro-finance institutions bring people together so as take advantage of 
market opportunities. Cooperatives mainly focus on economic empowerment of their members. 
Micro-finance institutions are not necessarily member based but are created based on the need to 
assist poor and vulnerable people access financial services. Cooperatives are dominant in 
agriculture and formal employment sectors. Micro finance may have their presence in both formal 
and informal settings.  The third sector generally contributes to improving productive and service 
sectors of the economy and personal development of people.  
Non-governmental organizations in Kenya are associated with improved civic participation, 
capacity building and provision of basic social services and infrastructure improvement. Their 
presence helps in widening the democratic space, improving the human rights situation and taking 
services to poor population and marginalized regions. They create job opportunities in their areas of 
operations and contribute to increasing communities’ assets base. They are quite innovative in their 
empowerment agenda and were among the first implementers of micro finance in the 1980s. Micro 
finance is considered the latest entrant into the third sector in Kenya. It has played a great role in 
expanding the financial inclusion and reducing informality.   
Self-help groups on their part are associated with grassroots activism where members of local 
communities take action to solve their challenges. These groups have a unique mandate that 
comprises both a communitarian orientation and a focus on members’ concerns. They are usually 
created to solve a social problem facing either the community or their members. Their initial pull 
for social mission later develops into a catalyst for entrepreneurial activities. They become 
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entrepreneurial because of their search for survival and effort-perpetuation. This search for survival 
enhances their entrepreneurial performance with time, making them market players, though in 
insignificant ways because of various inherent incapacities within groups. Self helps therefore, have 
the potential to become effective market or third sector players with additional capacity support and 
improved legal identity. 
Several influences have aided the growth of the third sector in Kenya. First, the state tried to protect 
the sector from competition and also developed enabling policies to structure it. From the colonial 
era, there has been a succession of policies aimed at promoting the diffusion of the sector. 
Secondly, the Harambee spirit, an important Kenyan culture encouraging cooperation for individual 
and mutual assistance also contributed to its proliferation. Lastly, the lack of a welfare state in 
Kenya, did allow the sector to grow in order to fill the gap left by the state. It is posited that there is 
a direct relationship between lack of welfare and the growth of the third sector (Salomon and 
Anheir, 1997).  However, some of the sector’s actors have had tensed relations with successive 
governments in the country. Until 2002, there was suppression of the activities of some third sector 
actors by the state, which curtailed the growth of the sector. This situation changed after 2002 
giving the sector a new lease of life. 
The third sector in Kenya possesses all the features proposed by Salomon and Anheier (1997) 
though to some varying degree. As far as organization is concerned, all actors, apart from self-help 
groups, possess a definite institutional reality. This institutional reality is provided by legal 
definition and industrial organization of a particular actor. All actors are autonomous from the state. 
They constitute efforts launched and implemented independently by a group of citizens, who share 
a common need.  On profit distribution, some third sector actors are not constrained as proposed by 
Salomon and Anheier. These include cooperatives and self-help groups. All actors however, have 
some profit distribution constraints. The surplus they get is usually reinvested in their organizations. 
Governance takes different forms among actors. Legislations in place have allowed them the 
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autonomy to control their own activities. Actors decide on how to vote and who to incorporate in 
their decision making processes. The third sector in Kenya involves much volunteering activities. 
These may be manifested in terms of investment of resources, time, effort and ideas. Various actors 
mainstream the volunteering aspect according to their need. 
 
Figure 5.2.1: Overview of the third sector in Kenya 
Different third sector actors have made unique contributions in the domain of social inclusion. 
These contributions are either in the social, political or economic domains.  Non-governmental 
organizations, faith based organizations and self-helps have always worked in enhancing 
integration, civil liberties, social assistance and advocacy. Cooperatives and micro finance 
institutions on their part work to enhance financial inclusion which does contribute to economic 
empowerment of communities. International non-governmental organization and foundations have 
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also played a big role in building capacities of the third sector in Kenya through funding or human 
capital strengthening. Notwithstanding, third sector actors have contributed towards job creation 
and poverty reduction.   
The extent of entrepreneurial dynamism takes various dimensions amongst different actors in 
Kenyan third sector. Survival and continued perpetuation of social impacts is a pertinent concern 
for these actors. In order to develop appropriate strategies to ensure survival, some rely on member 
resources, while others raise resources from the market, local and international communities and 
from the state. The ability to attract resources is usually dependent on the quality of human capital 
the specific actor is able to attract at any specific time. It is evident that some actors are able to 
influence resource providers more than others. The most disadvantaged actors are self-help groups 
owing to clumsiness of their legal identity and poor human capital. 
Unlike third sector organizations in Europe, those in Kenya are not an extension of the welfare 
state. Hence, state financial contribution towards them is minimal.  Their resources are mainly 
internally generated or from local and international community. The sector arises from the need for 
services among its promoters and their local communities. In essence, the sector may not 
necessarily be seen to complement the state but at times may substitute it. Given the importance of 
the third sector in Kenya, the state needs to support it in terms of resources and legislation so that it 
may continue to grow and enable inclusion of many marginalised and vulnerable people.  
From the study, it is evident that the third sector contributes immensely to the local development of 
communities in Kenya. Each actor of the third sector makes an important unique contribution as 
compared to the other. A unique feature of this sector is the cooperative approach through which 
communities pursue solutions to their challenges. A second unique feature is that of empowerment 
and consideration of the vulnerable populations. It becomes evident that the sector moves people 
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from their original state to a new and improved state. The sector does not discriminate and is all 
inclusive hence it helps in promoting high level integration which is highly needed in Kenya today.  
 
Figure5.2.2: The unique local development contribution of the third sector in Kenya 
The sector plays a distributive role, reduces marginalization and injustice caused by the politics, 
history and economics. It increases inclusion of poor people and communities by increasing access 
to services normally out of their disposal. The net result therefore becomes an enhancement of the 
quality of life, people start to experience better social-economic conditions, the expansion of 
available opportunities and a general poverty reduction.     
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5.3 Recommendations 
The study recommends the following as the topics for further research 
1. The nature and role of the third sector in Kenya taking into account the absence of  a welfare 
economy 
2. Disentangling impacts and examining interdependencies among third sector actors in Kenya 
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